Indigenous Peoples under International Law: An Asian Perspective by Phuntsok, Tashi
Western University 
Scholarship@Western 
Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository 
10-30-2012 12:00 AM 
Indigenous Peoples under International Law: An Asian 
Perspective 
Tashi Phuntsok 
The University of Western Ontario 
Supervisor 
Sara Seck 
The University of Western Ontario 
Graduate Program in Law 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree in Master of Laws 
© Tashi Phuntsok 2012 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd 
 Part of the International Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Phuntsok, Tashi, "Indigenous Peoples under International Law: An Asian Perspective" (2012). Electronic 
Thesis and Dissertation Repository. 943. 
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/943 
This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact wlswadmin@uwo.ca. 
  
 
 
 
 
Indigenous Peoples under International Law: An Asian Perspective  
 
 
 
(Spine title: Indigenous Peoples under International Law) 
(Thesis format: Monograph) 
 
 
 
By 
 
 
 
Tashi Phuntsok  
 
 
 
Graduate Program in Law  
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
 for the degree of Master of Laws 
 
 
 
The School of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies  
The University of Western Ontario  
London, Ontario, Canada 
 
 
 
© Tashi Phuntsok 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
THE UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO 
School of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF EXAMINATION 
 
 
 
Supervisor 
 
 
______________________________ 
Professor Sara Seck 
 
Supervisory Committee 
 
 
______________________________ 
Professor Michael Coyle 
 
 
______________________________ 
 
Examiners 
 
 
______________________________ 
Professor Valerie Oosterveld  
 
 
______________________________ 
Professor Joanna Quinn 
 
 
______________________________ 
 
 
 
______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
The thesis by 
 
Tashi Phuntsok 
 
entitled: 
 
Indigenous Peoples under International Law: An Asian Perspective  
 
 
is accepted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Master of Laws 
 
 
 
______________________            _______________________________ 
         Date    Chair of the Thesis Examination Board
 iii 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis analyzes Asian understandings of the definition of indigenous peoples in 
international law. The rights of indigenous peoples have emerged strongly in the 
international domain, culminating in 2007 with the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Yet, the question of definition and identity of indigenous 
peoples remains uncertain and indeterminate, at least from an Asian perspective. 
Traditionally indigenous peoples are understood to be those who were victims of 
European colonial settlements. It is the aim of this research to find out whether 
indigenous peoples exist in Asia by analyzing the approaches taken by select Asian states 
and non-state groups within these states who claim to be indigenous peoples. The thesis 
also examines whether there are any specific rights belonging to indigenous peoples 
which have attained the status of customary international law.  
 
KEYWORDS 
 
Indigenous peoples, minorities, self-determination, self-identification, international law, 
customary international law, tribal people.   
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Chapter 1: Methods and Literature Review 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
This research examines the definition and status of indigenous peoples in 
international law, with the aim of uncovering whether there is a distinct non-western, and 
specifically Asian, understanding. The concept of indigenous peoples as a distinct legal 
identity has emerged strongly in the domain of international law, due largely to the 
explosion of indigenous peoples’ movements across the globe in the last four decades. 
The recent United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP)
1
 
of 2007, a landmark event in history, has further raised the status of indigenous peoples 
in international law.  
Historically, most of the scholars and writers on the subject tend to trace the 
concept of indigenous peoples from the period since World War II, especially in the 
aftermath of decolonization movements in the 1960s and 1970s. But in fact it can be 
traced back to the origin of international law itself, for the concept of indigenous peoples 
has evolved within international law’s own evolution over centuries. 
1.2. Objectives and Scope 
 
The purpose of this research is to find out whether there is an alternative 
perspective on the definition of indigenous peoples in international law which is not 
western in its understanding, by examining cases in some Asian countries. Since there is 
                                                 
1 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UNGA Res 61/295, UN Doc 
A/RES/61/295 (13 September 2007). See online: <http://www.un.org/documents/instruments/docs_en.asp 
> 
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currently little available literature on this particular aspect of the concept, this research 
intends to bring an alternative perspective on indigenous peoples into the realm of 
international legal scholarship.  
There are two main objectives behind this research. Firstly, it will analyse 
whether there is an Asian understanding of the definition of indigenous peoples based on 
the practices of some Asian states, namely China, India, Bangladesh and the Philippines, 
which will be compared to the views of non-state Asian groups within these states on the 
definition and identity of indigenous peoples. It will show that there may be a vast 
difference between the views of Asian states and groups claiming to be indigenous on the 
question of definition. The aim of claimants could be to expand and universalize the 
concept of indigenous peoples in order to include their own situations and grievances, 
whereas the aim of Asian states may be to limit the application of such a concept strictly 
within the ambit of the classical colonial situation where there was an European 
settlement. Secondly, this thesis will examine whether there are any customary norms 
related to the question of definition and specific rights of indigenous peoples that may 
have achieved the status of customary international law.  
The primary focus of this paper is on the definition and identity of indigenous 
peoples from the standpoint of international law. This research is strictly limited to the 
confines of public international law and it is beyond the scope of this study to look into 
domestic legal systems and practices with regard to indigenous peoples, aborigines, 
native or tribal peoples, except as necessary for determining state and non-state practice 
under customary international law. Accordingly, the following sections will introduce the 
sources of international law and then provide an account of the role that indigenous 
3 
 
 
peoples play in the formation of international law, before turning to the problematic 
question of the definition of indigenous peoples. 
 
1.3. Sources of International Law 
 
In the domestic legal system, the sources of law can be clearly found in the acts of 
a legislature created under a constitution as well as in common law or judicial precedents. 
So there is a “definite method of discovering what the law is.”2  In international law, due 
to the lack of a central lawmaking authority or sovereign, there is no single body which 
creates laws that become binding for all nation states.
3
 Compared to the domestic legal 
system, international law faces the problem of discovering where exactly the law is to be 
found.
4
 This situation arises as a result of the “anarchic nature of world affairs and the 
clash of competing sovereignties.”5 Despite this problem, international law exists and is 
ascertainable. The most authoritative sources of international law are found in Article 38 
(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which provides that: 
[t]he Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such 
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting states; 
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
                                                 
2
 Malcolm Shaw, International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 65. [Hereinafter Shaw]  
3
 Ibid, at 66, para 2. 
4
 Ibid.  
5
 Ibid.  
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d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the 
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law.
6
  
 
According to this provision, there are four different categories of sources, namely, 
treaties, customs, general principles of law and the subsidiary source of judicial decisions 
and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists or scholars. The first three 
sources could be described as formal law-creating processes, whereas judicial decisions 
and academic writings are considered law-determining or law-finding sources.
7
 
Treaties are one of the principal sources of international law and are defined as 
“international agreement[s] concluded between states in written form and governed by 
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related 
instruments and whatever its particular designation.”8 They are written agreements 
between states that bind themselves legally to act in a certain agreed way. On the other 
hand, agreements between states and non-state entities such as corporations, non-
governmental organizations and indigenous peoples are not considered to be treaties 
within international law.
9
 Treaties are known by different names such as conventions, 
international agreements, covenants, pacts and protocols. They are of different kinds, 
namely, ‘law-making’ treaties which are universal in scope and relevance, and ‘treaty-
contracts’ which apply only between a few states. The fundamental principle behind 
                                                 
6
 The Statute of International Court of Justice, annexed to the UN Charter 1945, online: < http://www.icj-
cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0>  
7
 Ibid, at 67. See also John Currie, Public International Law (Irwin Law Inc. 2001) 81 [Hereinafter Currie]  
8
 Article 2(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969. See UN Treaty, online: < 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf >  
9
 See Currie, supra note 7, at 109, para 1. For critical view on the agreement between states and indigenous 
peoples, see Anghie 1999, infra note 28.  
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treaty law is the rule of pacta sunt servanda which means pacts must be observed and 
performed in good faith.
10
  
A customary norm in international law is said to arise when both components of 
‘state practice’ and ‘opinio juris’11 are present.12 The requirement of state practice is an 
objective or material element which places emphasis on the actual behaviour of states.
13
 
A state practice requires generality and uniformity. The generality of practice requires a 
large number of states following a certain normative practice, but need not necessarily be 
universal in order to satisfy the generality requirement.
14
 Thus as long as a sufficient 
number of states follow a given practice, a customary norm is said to emerge in 
international law.
15
 The requirement of uniformity refers “to the consistency or 
homogeneity of that practice among practicing states. In other words, it examines 
whether those states adopting the relevant practice remain constant in their adherence to 
it or whether they drift into and out of such conformity.”16 Nevertheless, state practice 
need not be consistent at all times as only a substantial uniformity is sufficient.
17
 The 
second element, referred to as opinio juris, is a psychological element, and it requires 
states’ belief that certain practices are legally binding upon them.18 The only exception to 
the rule of customary international law is the persistent objectors rule. In this case, a state 
may escape from legal liability if it has consistently and expressly objected to the rule of 
                                                 
10
 See Shaw, supra note 2, at 811, para 3.  
11
 “Opinio juris” is the subjective element, where states believe that certain customary rules have become 
binding in law. 
12
 See Currie, supra note 7, at 163.  
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Ibid, at 164.  
15
 Ibid.  
16
 Ibid, at 167, para 2.  
17
 Ibid, para 3. 
18
 Ibid, at 163, para 2.  
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customary international law in the course of its formation.
19
 Customary international law 
“does mirror the characteristics of the decentralized international system”20 and reflects 
the spirit of democracy where all states equally share in the formulation of new 
international rules.
21
 
Regarding the general principles of law as a source of international law, there are 
differing views as to whether it refers to these principles of law in international law or 
domestic law. Nevertheless the predominant view supports the claim that general 
principles of law means “general principles of domestic law” rather than “general 
principles of international law.”22 This particular source of law was inserted in the ICJ 
statute in order to “close the gap that might be uncovered in international law and solve 
this problem which is known legally as non liquet.”23 It fulfills an important task when 
there may not be an immediate and obvious rule applicable to a certain international 
situation. Some of the general principles of law most commonly referred to include the 
principle of good faith
24
 and the concept of equity.
25
 Though article 38(1) (c) made an 
“atavistic”26 or anachronistic reference to the word “civilized nations”, it must be 
considered as redundant
27
 and understood in modern times to mean all nations.
28
 
With regard to judicial decisions and the writings of the publicists, the sources 
listed in Article 38(1)(d) were clearly “intended and are treated as merely a material 
                                                 
19
 Ibid, at 176, para 1.  
20
 See Shaw, supra note 2, at 70, para 2.  
21
 Ibid.  
22
 See Currie, supra note 7, at 86, para 1.  
23
 See Shaw, supra note 2, at 93, para 2.  
24
 Ibid, at 97.  
25
 Ibid, at 99.  
26
 See Currie, supra note 7, at 86, para 2.  
27
 Leo Gross, “Sources of Universal International Law” in R.P. Anand, ed, Asian States and the 
Development of Universal International Law (Vikas Publications: New Delhi, 1972) 197, para 3.  
28
 Antony Anghie, “Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century 
International Law” (1999) 40:1 Harv Int’l LJ 67, para 2. [Hereinafter Anghie 1999] 
7 
 
 
source of international law.”29 They are to be understood as discovering the content of 
international law rather than creating law.
30
 Thus, the wording of said provision clearly 
points out that judicial decisions and scholarly writings are subsidiary means for 
determining the rules of international law which must be read together with Article 59. 
According to Article 59, the “decision of the Court has no binding force except between 
the parties and in respect of that particular case.”31 Though the doctrine of precedent does 
not apply to international law, states in disputes and scholars often quote judgements of 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as authoritative decisions and consider them as 
having normative value.
32
 
 
Regarding other possible sources of international law, the resolutions and 
declarations of the UN General Assembly often play an important part in the making of 
international law. Though most of these resolutions and declarations are merely 
recommendatory in nature and do not have the formal binding force of law, they do 
acquire in certain cases normative significance and contribute to the formation of binding 
international law.
33
 Certain resolutions and declarations, having been endorsed by the 
overwhelming majority of the international community, do reflect a uniformity of state 
practice and understanding as to the law. For example, some of the declarations on the 
elimination of racial discrimination and the adoption of self-determination have achieved 
                                                 
29
 See Currie, supra note 7, at 91.  
30
 Ibid.  
31
 See ICJ Statute, at supra note 6.  
32
 See Shaw, supra note 2, at 103, para 2.  
33
 See Currie, supra note 7, at 99, para 3; See Shaw, supra note 2, at 108, para 1. 
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the status of international law
34
 and are thus “binding upon the organs and member states 
of the United Nations.”35 
1.4. Theory of Indigenous Peoples as Participants in International Law 
 
The thesis will also focus on the emergence of indigenous peoples as participants 
in the making of international law. The traditional account of international law considers 
only states and international organizations (to a limited extent) as the primary subjects 
and makers of international law.
36
 So international law according to this view is produced 
only through state consent or agreements.
37
 Non-state groups, such as minorities, 
indigenous and tribal groups, were historically mere objects who could not participate 
and influence the decision making in international law.
38
 In the last two decades, “non-
state actors have been expanding their say in international law-making processes and 
nowadays constitute an important ‘material source’ of law.”39 Accordingly, international 
lawmaking has become understood as “a complex and dynamic process of decision-
making that includes the participation of non-state actors.”40 The non-state actors include 
wide variety of entities of supra-national, transnational and subnational categories.
41
 The 
supra-national entities include intergovernmental organizations such as the International 
Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization. The transnational 
                                                 
34
 See Shaw, supra note 2, at 108-109. 
35
 Ibid, at 108, para 1.  
36
 Ibid, at 177. 
37
 Lillian Aponte Miranda, “Indigenous Peoples as International Lawmakers” (2010) 32:1 U Pa J Int’l L 
210. [Hereinafter Miranda]  
38
 Russel Lawrence Barsh, “Indigenous Peoples in the 1990s: From Object to Subject of International 
Law?”(1994) 7 Harv Hum Rts J 33. [Hereinafter Barsh]  
39
 Jean d’ Aspremont, “International Law-Making by Non-State Actors: Changing the Model or Putting the 
Phenomenon into Perspective?” in Math Noortmann & Cedric Ryngaert, eds, Non-State Actor Dynamics in 
International Law (Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2010) 175. 
40
 Myres S McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, “The Prescribing Function in World Constitutive Process: 
How International Law is Made” (1980) 6 Yale Stud World Pub Ord. 249. As cited in Miranda, supra note 
37, at 210.  
41
 See Miranda, ibid, at 211.  
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entities include non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other civil society groups. 
The sub-national non-state entities include minorities, corporate actors, autonomous non-
state groups, indigenous peoples, tribal people, individuals and many more.
42
  
Detailed discussion on the participation of all these non-state actors within 
international lawmaking is beyond the scope of this research. So I will discuss the role 
and participation of indigenous peoples in the making of international law. As will be 
discussed in greater detail in chapter 3, indigenous peoples have played an increasingly 
significant role in international law-making through participation in the construction of a 
distinct international legal identity and norms unique to their situation.
43
 Indigenous 
peoples have engaged in both bottom-up and top-down approaches
44
 to participation at 
various levels of international norm building, and through these engagements have 
identified core indigenous norms and values, and were able to establish a body of 
international human rights law specific to indigenous peoples. In terms of bottom-up 
approaches, they participated in various transnational networks and movements of 
indigenous peoples, produced knowledge on the issues concerning indigenous peoples 
and generated consensus on certain areas of norms related to them.
45
 On the other hand, 
they have also engaged in the formal and institutionalized top-down approaches to 
decision making through advocacy before various international and regional human rights 
bodies and mechanisms.
46
 As we will see, their participation in these formal and informal 
international processes has contributed significantly to the emergence of indigenous 
peoples as subjects and makers of international law concerning their rights.  
                                                 
42
 Ibid, at 212.  
43
 Ibid, at 205. 
44
 Ibid, at 213, para 1. 
45
 Ibid, at 228, para 2. 
46
 Ibid, at 213, para 1. 
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1.5. Understanding the Problem of Definition in International Law 
 
In the section, I will introduce the problem of the definition of indigenous peoples 
under international law based upon the various sources of international law discussed 
above. The question of the definition and identity of indigenous peoples largely remains 
uncertain in international law. There is no universally accepted definition of indigenous 
peoples, which in turn leads to varying interpretations by states. As a result, UNDRIP 
(2007), though regarded as an authoritative declaration on the rights of indigenous 
peoples, does not provide any form of formal definition of the term ‘indigenous peoples’. 
Nevertheless it does suggest that certain characteristics are common to all indigenous 
peoples such as: the experience of historic injustices as a result of colonization and 
dispossession of their lands and resources; the existence of a spiritual relationship with 
traditionally owned lands and resources; and the importance of the preservation of their 
distinct cultural heritage.
47
 The details of these characteristics will be discussed in chapter 
6.  
When treaty law is examined for a formal legal definition of indigenous peoples, 
we see that Article 1 of the 1989 ILO Convention 169
48
 provides that it applies to: 
(a) tribal peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural and economic 
conditions distinguish them from other sections of the national community, and 
whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions 
or by special laws or regulations; 
                                                 
47
 See UNDRIP, supra note 1. See also Appendix, for the full text of UNDRIP.  
48
 Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, 27 June 1989, 28 ILM 
1382, (entered into force 5 September 1991) [ILO Convention No 169] See online: < 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C169>  
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(b)  peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of 
their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a 
geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or 
colonisation or the establishment of present state boundaries and who, 
irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, 
cultural and political institutions. 
Here indigenous peoples are defined as those peoples who are descendants of those 
populations which inhabited the region at the time of conquest or the establishment of the 
present state boundaries. The ILO definition clearly includes both historical disruptions 
caused by colonization and situations outside that context during the formation of the 
present state boundaries. This definition could apply to both European settler states as 
well as Asian or African states.  
Nevertheless, according to treaty law, this definition is applicable only to those 
states who are party to the convention. As of June 2012, ILO Convention 169 has been 
ratified by only 22 countries and the only Asian state that is party to this Convention 
remains Nepal, which joined this treaty regime in the year 2007.
49
  Therefore, this 
definition could not be termed as established within international law. At the most, it is 
applicable only to those states which are party to the convention.  
Further, in the earlier ILO Convention 107 (1957),
50
 Article 1(b) provided that: 
members of tribal or semi-tribal populations in independent countries which are 
regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which 
inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the 
                                                 
49
 For ratifications of the C169, see International Labour Organization, online: < 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312314 > 
50
 Convention Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal 
Populations in Independent Countries, 26 June 1957, (entered into force 02 June 1959) [ILO Convention 
No 107] See online: < 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12100:0::NO::P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312252 >  
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time of conquest or colonization and which, irrespective of their legal status, live 
more in conformity with the social, economic and cultural institutions of that time 
than with the institutions of the nation to which they belong. 
 
Here the definition of indigenous clearly referred to populations who are descendants of 
those who inhabited the region at the time of colonization. The convention remains in 
force for only 17 countries including a few Asian countries such as India, Bangladesh and 
Pakistan.
51
 Therefore this definition could not be taken as standard within international 
law. At the most, it applies only to those who are party to the convention.  
 
Another possible source for the definition of indigenous peoples that must be 
examined is the definition provided by the former UN Special Rapporteur of the Sub-
Commission for the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Martinez 
Cobo, in 1986. This definition states:  
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical 
continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their 
territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now 
prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant 
sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future 
generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their 
continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social 
institutions and legal systems.
52
  
 
                                                 
51
 Ibid. 
52
 Jose Martinez Cobo, Study of the Problem of Discrimination against indigenous populations, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4, para 379-80.As cited in Benedict Kingsbury, “Indigenous Peoples” in 
International Law: A Constructivist Approach to the Asian Controversy”, (1998) 92:3 AJIL 419. 
[Hereinafter Kingsbury]  
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Though this definition was the result of a comprehensive study conducted by the Special 
Rapporteur on the problem of discrimination against indigenous populations under the 
recommendation of the Sub-Commission, it was merely a recommendation report
53
 
submitted to the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations and therefore could not 
be called a legal document. As shown in chapter 6, there is no apparent and uniform state 
practice and opinio juris concerning this definition; accordingly the definition of 
Martinez Cobo could not said to have attained the status of customary law.  
According to Benedict Kingsbury,
54
 Cobo’s approach to the definition was 
controversial due to its requirement of “historical continuity with the pre-invasion and 
pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories.”55 This approach reflected the 
classical European case of colonial settlement in the western settler states such as the 
United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. As I will argue, this requirement did 
not reflect the reality in many Asian and African countries where there was no clear case 
of historical disruption by colonial settlement. The views of Asian states and groups 
(claiming to be indigenous) greatly differ from Cobo’s definition of indigenous peoples. 
Many Asian states vehemently opposed the application of the concept of indigenous 
peoples within their territories and endorsed the definition laid down by Cobo. China, for 
example, agrees with Cobo’s definition while claiming that “the question of indigenous 
peoples is the product of European countries’ recent pursuit of colonial policies in other 
parts of the world.”56  Here China affirmed the test of ‘Salt-Water’ colonialism,57 which 
                                                 
53
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54
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International Law and Justice at New York University School of Law. He is one of the leading international 
law scholars in the field of the indigenous peoples’ rights and status.  
55
 See Kingsbury, supra note 52, at 420, para 2. 
56
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was a standard test of determining ‘Colonialism’ during the time of decolonization and 
self-determination in the 1960s. India and Bangladesh also denied the status of 
indigenous peoples within their territories by claiming that “indigenous peoples are 
descendants of the original inhabitants who have suffered from conquest or invasion from 
outside.”58 On the other hand, as shown in chapter 5, Asian groups continue to claim 
recognition and status of indigenous peoples within their countries despite strong 
oppositions from governments. Thus they tend to go beyond Cobo’s narrow definitional 
requirement of colonial disruption or conquest. As a result, there is no consensus on the 
definition laid down by Cobo.  
Another draft definition preceded Martinez Cobo’s definition in the Working 
Group, which took a broader approach to the definition by giving the status of indigenous 
peoples to marginal and isolated groups who may not have suffered direct colonization if: 
(a) they are the descendants of groups which were in the territory of the country at the 
time when other groups of different cultures or ethnic origin arrived there,  
(b) precisely because of their isolation from other segments of the country’s 
population they have almost preserved intact the customs and traditions of their 
ancestors which are similar to those characterised as indigenous, 
(c) they are, even if only formally, placed under a state structure which incorporates 
national, social and cultural characteristics alien to their own.
59
 
Nevertheless this draft definition was not adopted as Martinez Cobo’s definition later 
became the working definition of the UN Working Group.
60
  Even though this earlier 
                                                                                                                                                 
57
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definition is not legally binding, it can be said to have reflected the intent of the working 
group members at the time to make the concept of indigenous peoples more universal and 
applicable beyond classical western colonization. Alternately, one could also conclude 
that since this definition was replaced by the latter, it does not reflect the consensus of the 
group members.  
With regard to general principles of law as a source of international law on the 
definition, there is no literature available presently that argues the possibility of any 
particular principle of law lending its force, in order to determine a definition of 
indigenous peoples. Likewise, judicial decisions and scholarly writings, as subsidiary 
means of determining law, do not point to the existence or emergence of a particular 
definition as established in international law. For example, in one of the leading 
international cases on the rights of indigenous peoples, the Awas Tingni case,
61
 there was 
no specific mention of the definition of indigenous peoples. Here, the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, though affirming the Mayagna community’s ancestral right to 
lands
62, did not need to define the term ‘indigenous peoples’ because the question was 
already determined in the Constitution of Nicaragua where Article 5 recognized the 
existence of indigenous peoples within the state.
63
 In another example from the Supreme 
Court of Canada in R v. Powley (2003),
64
 the question was how to define “Metis” under 
                                                                                                                                                 
60
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section 35 of the Constitution.
65
 On 22
nd
 October 1993, Steve and Roddy Powley (a 
father and son) killed a moose outside Sault Ste Marie, Ontario. They were charged by 
the Conservation officers for hunting moose without a license and contrary to Ontario’s 
Game and Fish Act.
66
 They appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal and argued that they 
had a Metis traditional right to hunt as protected under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 
1982. Finally, the Supreme Court of Canada, in a unanimous judgement, upheld all lower 
courts’ decisions and said that the Powleys, as members of the Metis community, can 
exercise a Metis right to hunt as protected under section 35.
67
 On the question of 
determining who Metis are, the court did not give a comprehensive definition of Metis 
people. Instead, it laid down a 10 part test which would identify and establish Metis 
rights.
68
 One of the important tests, related to the identification of the Metis community, 
requires that the community must self-identify as a Metis community and there must be 
proof that the contemporary Metis community is a continuation of the historic Metis 
community.
69
 Thus, for the purpose of the definition of Metis as indigenous, the main 
criterion according to the Supreme Court of Canada happens to be self-identification. 
Nevertheless, for the purpose of international law, it remains to be seen whether the 
Powley decision (especially on the self-identification question) has any impact that 
amounts to Canadian state practice or is reflective of general principles of law.  
An additional source that provides a definition of indigenous peoples is the World 
Bank’s Operational Policy 4.10 on indigenous peoples from 2005, where it recognizes 
                                                 
65
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that “indigenous peoples” could be referred to in different countries by such terms as 
“indigenous ethnic minorities”, “aboriginals”, “hill tribes”, “minority nationalities”, 
“scheduled tribes”, or “tribal groups”.70 The policy goes on to claim that the term 
“indigenous peoples” is used in a generic sense to refer to a distinct, vulnerable, social 
and cultural group possessing certain basic characteristics such as self-identification, a 
collective attachment to land, and a distinct culture and language.
71
 Nevertheless, this 
definition can also not be termed as binding in international law because the policies of 
the Bank are considered more of an internal policy guideline than a binding norm of 
international nature.
72
 Also, the application of the Bank policies are to be observed (in 
good faith) only by states funded by the Bank. Therefore, the World Bank definition of 
indigenous peoples could not be termed as binding in international law.  
As established above, it is clear that there is no universally accepted and binding 
definition of the term “indigenous peoples” in international law. Moreover, as we shall 
see in chapters 4 and 5 with regard to the Asian context, there is no agreement among 
states and groups within these states claiming to be indigenous on the definition. 
Apart from the definition, this paper will also examine the status of the rights of 
indigenous peoples in international law and find out whether there are any rights that 
have attained the status of customary international law. As discussed earlier, declarations 
of the UN General Assembly, per se, do not have the binding effect of law. Nevertheless 
the significance of the UNDRIP cannot be understated, as it was adopted after decades of 
                                                 
70
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consultation and participation from both state parties and indigenous peoples in a 
legitimate process of norm-building in the field of indigenous rights. Therefore, such a 
declaration, having been solemnly adopted by the majority of member states of the 
United Nations, may arguably have a formal status nearing that of the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.
73
 According to Anaya: 
 it is possible, at least arguably, to understand the Declaration as related to legal 
obligation within standard categories of international law. First, the Declaration is a 
statement of rights proclaimed by the vast majority of U.N. member states, through 
the General Assembly, within the framework of the general human rights obligations 
established for states by the U.N. Charter, a multilateral treaty. With this status, the 
Declaration can be seen as embodying or providing an authoritative interpretation of 
norms that are already legally binding and found elsewhere in international human 
rights law, including in various human rights treaties.
74
 
 
According to Siegfried Wiessner and James Anaya, indigenous peoples’ “right to 
demarcation, ownership, development, control and use of the lands they have 
traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and used” has attained the status of customary 
international law.
75
 Thus it is crucial to examine the customary status of these rights in 
order to understand the implications of their eventual application to a wider world of 
indigenous peoples.  
 
1.6. Methodology 
 
                                                 
73
 James Anaya, International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples (Aspen Publishers: New York, 2009) 
79, para 2. [Hereinafter Anaya 2009] 
74
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75
 James Anaya & Siegfried Wiessner, “The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Towards 
Re-empowerment”, online: (2007) Jurist, para 13 < http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2007/10/un-
declaration-on-rights-of-indigenous.php >  [Hereinafter Anaya & Wiessner]  
19 
 
 
The first part of my analysis will examine the history and evolution of the concept 
of ‘indigenous peoples’ in international law from the early period of the natural law 
jurists (16
th
 century), such as Francisco Vitoria and Bartolome de Las Casas, until the 
advent of modern international human rights law and indigenous peoples’ movements. 
Chapter 2 will critically examine the problematic relationship between the concept of 
indigenous peoples and international law, primarily based upon the European concepts 
and practice of sovereignty and colonialism which rendered non-European peoples 
(including indigenous peoples) objects, rather than subjects, of international law. This 
chapter will highlight the colonial origins of international law and its negative impact on 
the status of indigenous peoples.    
Next I will focus on determining whether there is an Asian understanding of the 
term “indigenous peoples” in some Asian states, namely, China, India, Bangladesh and 
Philippines. The justification for choosing these four states is based upon three reasons. 
First, these states cover the geographical areas of South, South East and East Asia. 
Second, there are large numbers of groups claiming to be indigenous, tribal or native 
peoples living in these states. Third, a large number of cases related to the discrimination 
and subordination of indigenous peoples come from some of these states. In addition, 
these four states provide two different policy approaches to the question of indigenous 
peoples. On the one hand, the Philippines provide a perfect example of incorporating the 
international law concept of indigenous peoples within its national legal system. On the 
other hand, India, China and Bangladesh each deny the existence of any indigenous 
groups within their state boundaries.  
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This paper will examine the potential difference between the views of Asian states 
and groups claiming the status of indigenous peoples. Since there is very limited existing 
scholarly literature on this particular area, I will largely rely on primary materials such as 
government reports, submissions and statements made by these states at various 
international mechanisms related to indigenous peoples’ rights and issues. These 
mechanisms will be described in Chapter 3, and include: the United Nations Working 
Group on Indigenous Populations; the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues; the 
Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; the Expert Mechanism on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples; World Bank policies and mechanisms; and the 
International Labour Organization’s deliberations on the rights of indigenous peoples.  
In Chapter 4, I will analyse the statements and submissions put forward by these 
Asian states in various United Nations forums related to indigenous peoples. In Chapter 
5, I will analyse the views put forward by many groups claiming to be indigenous groups 
from the same Asian states in the same United Nations forums identified above. These 
will help me to determine the existing state and non-state policies and opinions regarding 
the concept of indigenous peoples, particularly its definitional aspect. Further I will 
analyse secondary materials to confirm and corroborate the views determined above 
based on the primary sources.  As a result of this analysis, I will determine the potential 
differences in views and perceptions of these two categories. This part of the research 
takes into account the potential limitations of the primary materials available in this area. 
Chapter 6 will focus on customary international law related to the rights of 
indigenous peoples with the goal of discovering whether certain provisions in UNDRIP 
have achieved the status of customary international law. Here I will refer to both primary 
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and secondary sources on the subject. As discussed earlier, a customary norm in 
international law is said to arise when both components of ‘state practice’ and ‘opinio 
juris’76 are present. Here I will examine whether there is any consistent state practice and 
opinio juris with regard to certain rights of indigenous peoples. Further, this chapter will 
examine why UNDRIP matters, by analysing crucial indigenous peoples’ rights affirmed 
in the declaration. The chapter will end by examining the legitimacy of UNDRIP in 
international law.  
  
1.7. Literature Review 
 
This paper will refer to both primary and secondary legal sources. 
1.7.1. Primary Legal Sources 
 
The most important primary source in this area of research is the UNDRIP,
77
 the 
full text of which is reproduced in the Appendix of this thesis. This landmark soft law 
instrument, endorsed by the majority of states, marked the rise of indigenous peoples as 
subjects of international law. UNDRIP affirms the basic principles and rights of 
indigenous peoples in a number of areas such as right to self-determination; equality and 
non-discrimination; the right to cultural integrity; rights over lands, territories, and 
natural resources; the right to self-government and autonomy; the right to free, prior, and 
informed consent, and others. 
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The next important source is the ILO Convention No. 169,
78
 which along with 
ILO Convention 107, remain the only international legally-binding treaties specifically 
governing the rights of indigenous peoples. The Convention 169 includes a number of 
provisions such as the right to consultation and participation in certain decision-making 
processes; rights over lands, territories and natural resources; labour and social rights, and 
others. Further, I will refer to the two international human rights covenants - namely the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966).
79
 The provisions of these two 
international human rights treaties also apply to indigenous peoples, such as: the right to 
self-determination (common article 1); the rights of national, ethnic, and linguistic 
minorities (article 27 of ICCPR);
80
 the right to education, food, housing, health, water 
and intellectual property rights.  
This paper will also refer, to a limited extent, to the recent decision by Inter-
American Court of Human Rights in the Awas Tingni case,
81
 which affirmed the 
existence of an indigenous peoples’ collective right to its land.  Further, it will look at the 
reports submitted by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, as 
well as its Communication Reports, in order to determine the status and rights of 
indigenous peoples in Asia. They face similar patterns of suppression, marginalization 
and discrimination as are faced by other parts of the world. The reports deal with issues 
                                                 
78
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of special concern to the region, such as the deprivation of indigenous lands and 
resources; situations of internal conflict; and autonomy or self-governance. They also 
provide accounts of the communications between the Special Rapporteur and various 
state governments regarding certain specific issues of importance to indigenous peoples, 
and highlight some Asian states’ official positions with regard to the concept of 
indigenous peoples. 
1.7.2. Secondary Legal Sources  
 
This literature review will highlight some of the key sources upon which I will 
rely in this thesis. My research will refer to James Anaya’s work Indigenous Peoples in 
International Law,
82
 as it is one of the most authoritative books on the subject of 
indigenous peoples and international law. The central theme of the book is that 
“International law, although once an instrument of colonialism, has developed and 
continues to develop, however grudgingly or imperfectly, to support indigenous peoples’ 
demands.”83 Most writers on the subject tend to begin examining the concept of 
indigenous peoples from the period after World War II, especially in the aftermath of 
decolonization movements in the 1960s. However, in this book, Anaya traced the concept 
of indigenous peoples and their rights back to the origin of international law itself. Thus 
the concept of indigenous peoples has altered with international law’s own evolution over 
centuries. Some of the limitations and shortcomings of this book are that it does not cover 
the process of defining indigenous peoples and the self-identification issue. The issue of 
self-identification deals with the validity and legality of indigenous or tribal groups 
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identifying and defining themselves as ‘indigenous peoples’ within the context of 
international law.   
 For Asian perspectives on the issue of defining indigenous peoples, I refer to 
Benedict Kingsbury’s article “Indigenous Peoples” in International Law: A 
Constructivist Approach to the Asian Controversy.
84
 He lays down an alternative 
approach to deal with the problematic question of defining “Indigenous Peoples”, taking 
into account the views and arguments put forward by the Asian states. He rejects the 
‘positivist approach’ to the definition because of its strong reliance on legal precision and 
its exclusivist tendency, which rules out many other variables that might form the criteria 
for defining indigenous peoples. On the other hand, he vigorously argues in favour of a 
more constructivist (inclusive) approach
85
 that takes into account views, proposals and 
concerns of a large number of groups from across the globe. This approach is naturally 
more inclusive in nature, which renders the concept of indigenous peoples vague and less 
coherent, but nevertheless acceptable to a much larger group of claimants 
On the question of the legitimacy of UNDRIP, I refer to Claire Charters’ The 
Legitimacy of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
86
 where she 
discusses the question of what makes UNDRIP legitimate in the national and 
international legal domain. The basic argument of the paper is that the greater the 
perception of UNDRIP’s legitimacy, the greater likelihood of states’ compliance.87 
According to her, UNDRIP’s legitimacy has increased by the process of engagement by 
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various international Organizations, states, non-state actors and Indigenous Peoples 
themselves.
88
   
The legitimacy of indigenous peoples’ rights in international law is also 
determined by the emergence of customary norms on indigenous peoples. On this point, I 
will refer to Siegfried Wiessner’s Indigenous Sovereignty: A Reassessment in Light of the 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
89
 This article provides a 
reassessment of the concept of indigenous peoples in international law taking into 
account the impact of UNDRIP. The author stresses the emergence of customary norms 
related to indigenous peoples’ rights in state practices as well as in the decisions of 
international and regional human rights courts. I will also refer to James Anaya and 
Siegfried Wiessner, in The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: 
Towards Re-empowerment
90
 on this issue.  
 For a critical perspective on indigenous peoples’ rights in modern international 
law, I refer to Seth Gordon in Indigenous Rights in Modern International Law from a 
Critical Third World Perspective.
91
 According to Gordon, the international legal system 
continues to subjugate indigenous peoples, as the traces of old discriminatory systemic 
practice continue in the modern world.
92
 He identifies common features of the Third-
World and indigenous peoples’ experiences under such legal system, such as: self-
identification, a shared historical experience of subordination, being victims of 
colonialism and continued subordination at the global level. The goal of this essay was to 
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analyse the ILO Conventions on the rights of indigenous peoples from Third-World 
Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), and to demonstrate that the conventions fail 
to adequately effectuate indigenous peoples’ rights. This is because the conventions are 
covered in the vocabulary of traditional international law.
93
 
Another important theme in this thesis is the significant role that non-state actors 
play in the processes of international lawmaking, as discussed above. According to 
Lillian Aponte Miranda, in Indigenous Peoples as International Lawmakers, indigenous 
peoples have emerged as distinct international legal category with rights because of their 
active assertion and participation in various international legal processes and significantly 
contributed to the creation of new norms and international standards.  As a result, as we 
shall see, indigenous peoples have emerged as the makers of international law related to 
the indigenous peoples’ rights.94 
Lastly, I will refer to International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs’ (IWGIA) 
publication entitled “The Concept of Indigenous Peoples in Asia: A Resource Book” for 
various facts and figures and situations related to the groups (claiming to be indigenous) 
in many Asian states. The IWGIA is one of the largest international human rights 
organization staffed by “specialists and advisers on indigenous affairs.”95 It was founded 
in 1968 by group of anthropologists who were alarmed by the genocide of indigenous 
peoples in the Amazon and established a network of activists and researchers to 
document the situation and advocate for indigenous peoples’ rights. It is based in 
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Copenhagen (Denmark) and most of its projects and works are directed at indigenous 
communities in the south from Asia, Africa and Latin America.
96
 
 
1.8. Conclusion 
 
As mentioned earlier, the purpose of this research is to uncover an alternative 
perspective on the concept which is not western in its understanding. 
In the next chapter, I will trace the historical evolution of the concept and identity 
of indigenous peoples in international law from the period of early natural law jurists 
until modern international human rights law. Further I will argue that the concept of 
indigenous peoples has constantly evolved within international law’s own normative 
changes.  
  
                                                 
96
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Chapter 2: Historical Evolution of the Concept of Indigenous Peoples in 
International Law 
 
The history of indigenous peoples and international law has been one of a long, 
inconvenient and problematic relationship primarily based upon the European concept 
and practices of sovereignty and colonialism, which rendered non-European peoples 
(including indigenous peoples) as objects, rather than subjects, of international law.
97
 
Since the concept of indigenous peoples gained prominence and currency in the modern 
human rights movements and struggles (especially in the later 20
th
 century), many 
scholars and writers on the subject tend to trace the concept from the period since World 
War II and decolonization. But, in fact, it can be traced back to the origin of international 
law itself. According to Antony Anghie, early natural law jurists of the 16
th
 century 
reconceptualized the then existing doctrine of divine law (the Pope’s universal 
jurisdiction by virtue of his mission to spread Christianity) and invented new ones on the 
basis of natural law, in order to deal with the new problem of the so-called discovered 
Indians in Americas. Anghie points out that, during that early period, international law as 
we understand it today did not precede and thus resolve the problem of European-Indian 
relations and encounters, but rather “international law was created out of the unique 
issues generated by the encounter between the Spanish [Europeans] and the Indians.”98 
Thus, the concept of indigenous peoples evolved within international law’s own 
evolution over centuries and bore first-hand witness to its tumultuous changes. In this 
chapter, I will describe the evolution of the concept of indigenous peoples in international 
                                                 
97
 Sharon Helen Venne, Our Elders Understand Our Rights: Evolving International Law Regarding 
Indigenous Peoples (Penticton, British Columbia: Theytus Books Ltd, 1998) at 2, para 2 [Hereinafter 
Venne]. More commonly on this theme, see Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2005). [Hereinafter Anghie]  
98
 Anghie, ibid, at 15, para 1. 
29 
 
 
law from the early period of the natural law jurists until the modern international human 
rights movements.  
 
2.1. Natural Law and Indigenous Peoples 
 
The arrival of Christopher Columbus in the so-called new world of the Americas 
prompted the development of the doctrine of discovery by Spanish and other European 
explorers. According to this doctrine, the lands of the Americas were terra nullius – 
meaning vacant lands – and the natives of those lands were not peoples with rights 
because of their primitive culture and divergence from the Christian European cultural 
norms of religious belief and civilization.
99
 Thus, it gave justification for the Spanish and 
Portuguese’ colonial patterns of rule in the new world by suppressing and taking away 
lands and resources from the natives by force and threat of war. Because of this belief in 
the inherent superiority of the European culture and polity, it set in motion the 
development of the Euro-centric legal norms in relation to peoples living in the new 
world.
100
 
 In order for European sovereigns to assert their absolute rights to indigenous lands 
in the Americas, they had to rely on the Pope’s approval to establish their legitimacy. 101 
These sovereign rulers of Europe used religious authority in the secular sphere to 
legitimize their jurisdiction over some parts of the land against other sovereigns. For 
example, the Papal bull of 1493, known as Inter Caetera divinai, was issued in favour of 
Spain and, in the words of Venne, “helped to give legitimacy to the colonization of 
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indigenous America by declaring that non-Christians could not own land in the face of 
claims made by the Christian sovereigns.”102 This Papal bull suggested that:  
[t]he Pope could place non-Christian peoples under the tutelage and guardianship of 
the first Christian nation discovering their lands as long as those peoples were 
reported by the discovering Christian nation to be “well disposed to embrace the 
Christian faith”. 103 
 
It points out that the sovereign and church collaborated to deny indigenous peoples’ 
rights and unilaterally changed their legal status without any consultation with the 
natives. This resulted in the dispossession of lands and resources, colonial settlement by 
the Europeans, slavery, torture and other horrendous acts.  
In the meantime, two prominent Spanish thinkers, Francisco de Vitoria (1486-
1547) and Bartolome de Las Casas (1474-1566), who spent years in the American 
colonies, questioned the validity and legality of these brutal European settlement patterns 
and horrors, and confirmed the essential humanity of the Indians in the western 
hemisphere. In their works, these two thinkers “looked at colonization not only in 
accordance with the canons of church law, but they also examined the nature and dignity 
of the indigenous peoples being exploited and used.”104 De La Casas wrote in his History 
of the Indies
105
 that “it was the general rule among Spaniards to be cruel, not just cruel, 
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but extraordinarily cruel so that harsh and bitter treatment would prevent Indians from 
daring to think of themselves as human beings or having a minute to think at all.”106  
 Francisco Vitoria, in On the Indians Lately Discovered (1532),
107
 held that Indian 
tribes possessed certain original autonomous powers and entitlement to land, which the 
Europeans should respect. The dominant legal theory in medieval Europe of the 16
th
 
century was a synthesis of the Aristotelian view of natural law and the divine law of 
Christian theology.
108
 So God was, according to Vitoria and other Spanish school 
theorists, a higher source of authority than the laws made by monarchs. This supreme 
normative order, based on the naturalist view (and divine law), applied across all levels of 
humanity. With this framework, the question of determining the rights and status of the 
Indians was whether they were rational human beings. To this, Vitoria affirmed that the 
Indians:  
are not of unsound mind, but have, according to their kind, the use of reason. This is 
clear, because there is a certain method in their affairs, for they have polities which are 
orderly arranged and they have definite marriage and magistrates, overlords, laws, and 
workshops and a system of exchange, all of which call for the use of reason; they also 
have a kind of religion.
109
 
 
By invoking precepts from the Holy Scripture, Vitoria held that Indians of the 
Americas were the true owners of their land, and neither Emperor nor Pope possessed 
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lordship over the whole world.
110
 The notion that the Pope’s grant of Indian lands to the 
Spanish monarch in the Papal bull established legal title to new world lands was rejected 
by Vitoria. Thus he rejected title by discovery (of Indian lands in America). Nevertheless, 
Vitoria maintained that “transgressions of the universally binding norms of the Law of 
Nations by the Indians might serve to justify a Christian nation’s conquest and colonial 
empire of the Americas.”111 The transgressions that he referred to above were based on 
the rumours at the time that indigenous peoples ate human flesh, and he concluded that 
such acts violated the natural law.
112
 Further, Vitoria constructed a theory of just war 
whereby Europeans could claim Indian lands in the absence of their consent. According 
to this view, Indians had the obligation to allow foreigners to travel to their lands and 
trade among them,
113
 and failure to do so could result in “just” war and conquest by the 
European colonizers.  
 Due to De las Casas’ and Vitoria’s passionate and reasoned arguments in favour 
of indigenous peoples’ natural rights, the Spanish King launched an investigation by 
setting up the Council of the Indies in 1550 in order to determine the moral and legal 
rights of discovery.
114
 The Council consisted of 14 eminent jurists, and two jurists were 
selected among them to present each side of the argument. De las Casas defended 
indigenous peoples’ rights as human beings, whereas Juan Gines de Sepulveda supported 
the Spanish conquest of the natives. At the end of the debate, it was proclaimed that the 
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indigenous peoples were biological human beings but “were not seen as legitimate 
peoples in the eyes of the Spanish”115 and therefore denied legal status and rights.  
Hugo Grotius, a Dutch legal theorist, also rejected title by discovery of lands 
inhabited by human beings and claimed that it should be rejected “even though the 
occupant may be wicked, may hold wrong views about God, or may be dull of wit. For 
discovery applies to those things which belong to no one.”116 His natural law theory was 
more secular in nature, dictated by right reason rather than the will of God. So Grotius 
asserted that just wars could not be waged due to the unwillingness of Indians to accept 
Christianity, which is a European belief system.
117
 Thus natural law, over all, supported a 
universal moral code for all human kind that also respected the existence and identity of 
indigenous peoples in the Americas. According to Grotius, there were only three broad 
justifiable causes for war, namely: defence, recovery of property, and punishment.
118
 
 
2.2. Emergence of Modern State System  
 
During the era of the early modern state system that emerged at the end of the 
Peace of Westphalia in 1648, a shift was taking place in legal theory from naturalist 
thinking to a more positivist one, where the international law was focused exclusively on 
states. 
Emmerich de Vattel (1714-1769), a Swiss diplomat, in his treatise The Law of 
Nations, or The Principle of Natural Law (1758), described the law as something that 
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was concerned exclusively with states. He defined the Law of Nations as “the science of 
the rights which exist between Nations or States, and of the obligations corresponding to 
these rights.”119 Vattel also highlighted the centrality of the doctrine of “State 
Sovereignty” in a positivist framework of international law, with its ingredients: 
exclusive jurisdiction, territorial integrity and non-intervention in domestic affairs.
120
 For 
Vattel, the state was free, independent and equal based upon the natural rights of its 
individual members. So, for any indigenous peoples or groups to enjoy rights as distinct 
communities, they must be first regarded as nations or states.  
The concept of the nation-state in this post-Westphalian sense is based on 
“European models of political and social organization whose dominant defining 
characteristics are exclusivity of territorial domain and hierarchical, centralized 
authority.”121 In contrast, indigenous peoples’ societies were generally organized by tribal 
or kinship ties, having decentralized political structures with shared and overlapping 
territorial control. Since their system did not fit with the European standard, they 
automatically fell outside the state-centric “Law of Nations”.  Furthermore, Vattel 
brought in a western theory of property rights (advanced earlier by John Locke) to 
determine the ownership of indigenous lands and resources whereby the cultivation of 
lands establishes a greater right to the land than hunting or gathering. Thus he advocated 
a Lockean natural law duty to cultivate the soil, according to which ownership of land is 
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established through labour, transforming the natural world into valuable and productive 
property.
122
 According to Anaya, Vattel clearly believed that “at least some non-
European aboriginal peoples qualified as states or nations with rights as such.”123 
 
2.3. Positivist International Law and Indigenous Peoples 
 
International law was in some measure sympathetic to indigenous peoples’ rights 
and existence. But soon it changed into a positivist state-centric system (strongly 
grounded in the western world view) that facilitated colonial practices of the European 
states and finally led to the downfall of indigenous peoples.
124
  
By the time of 19
th
 century positivism, international law abandoned indigenous 
peoples as political bodies with rights under international law. As western colonization 
started taking firm root, international law became a legitimizing force for colonization 
and empire, rather than liberation for indigenous peoples.
125
 In this positivist framework, 
a sovereign administered and enforced the law, as the law was the creation of sovereign 
will. Thus sovereign states became the foundation of international legal order, which 
rejected the naturalist notion that sovereign states were bound by an overarching natural 
law or supreme higher moral authority. Instead, the rules of international law were to be 
discovered by careful study of the actual behaviour of the sovereign states, its institutions 
and laws that they created.  
According to the 19
th
 century positivist school, there were four major premises of 
international law: (1) it was concerned only with rights and duties of states; (2) it upholds 
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the exclusive sovereignty of states; (3) international law was law between states, and not 
above states; and (4) the theory of recognition, under which statehood for the purpose of 
international law depended on recognition by 19
th
 century European civilized states.
126
 
The end result of these premises was that the indigenous peoples, having not qualified as 
states, could not participate in the international law-making process.   
 One of the extreme forms of positivistic attitude came from John Westlake (1828-
1913), who made a categorical distinction between “Civilized and Uncivilized” 
humanity, and viewed international society as only limited to the civilized one.
127
 
Thereby he effectively “admitted that international law was an instrument of the “white” 
and powerful colonizer. Not being among the “civilized” and powerful forces of 
colonization, indigenous peoples could not look to international law to thwart those 
forces.”128  
 W. E. Hall (1835-1894) saw the exclusion of indigenous peoples from the 
subjects of international law as a result of the positivist conception of international law, 
and stated: 
It is scarcely necessary to point out that as international law is a product of the special 
civilization of modern Europe, and forms a highly artificial system of which the 
principles cannot be supposed to be understood or recognised by countries differently 
civilized, such states only can be presumed to be subject to it as are inheritors of that 
civilization.
129
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According to Henry Wheaton (1785-1848), international law was the exclusive 
province of civilized societies. He claimed that public law was limited only to the 
civilized and Christian people of Europe. 
130
 Therefore only European states could create 
international law. In the naturalist world, law was given as a set of naturally existing 
rules, but, in the positivist world, law was created by human societies and institutions.
131
 
Accordingly, the connection between “law” and “institutions” was established and the 
positivists’ focus on the character of institutions ultimately “facilitated the racialization of 
law by delimiting the notion of law to very specific European institutions.”132 
 As positivists insisted that sovereignty was the founding concept of the 
international system, the task of defining or determining the concept of sovereignty 
became important. In other words, what entities could be regarded as sovereign? 
Positivists claimed that sovereignty could be defined as “control over territory”.133 An 
entity which does not have absolute control over a territory could not be called sovereign. 
But the problem was that many of the “uncivilized” Asian and African states, such as 
China, Turkey, Persia and Ethiopia, met this specific requirement of control over 
territory. In order to deal with this situation, the positivists relied on the concept of 
society.
134
 Therefore, unless these Asian and African states fulfilled the criteria of 
membership of international society, they were deemed to be lacking in sovereignty. The 
non-European states were found lacking in sovereignty because “they [were] excluded 
from the family of nations.”135 Thus, the issue of law and culture was linked together by 
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the positivists of the 19
th
 century in order to determine sovereignty. They developed 
strategies to explain why the non-European world was excluded from the society of 
nations and international law, namely: that no law existed in certain non-European 
barbaric regions; and, although “certain societies may have had their own systems of law 
these were of such an alien character that no proper legal relations could develop between 
European and non-European states.”136 As a result, non-European uncivilized societies 
had to follow the European society’s model if they wanted to progress137 and become 
sovereign states in international law. As a result, they were effectively excluded from the 
realm of sovereignty, society, and law. 
 
2.4. Deskaheh at the League of Nations, 1922-1924 
 
In modern times, one of the first efforts to bring forward the question of 
indigenous peoples’ rights in the international arena was Levi General Deskaheh, Chief 
of the Younger Bear Clan of the Cayuga Nation and spokesman of the Six Nations of the 
Grand River Land near Brantford, Ontario. In the aftermath of World War I, with the 
establishment of the League of Nations, the principle of self-determination and the rights 
of minorities gained prominence in the area of international politics.
138
 In 1923, 
Deskaheh made a significant effort in Geneva to obtain a hearing at the League of 
Nations concerning a dispute with Canada over the issue of tribal self-government. 
139
 He 
then made contacts with officials of the League, and sought to resolve the aboriginal 
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peoples’ problems, such as loss of sovereignty resulting from Band governance under the 
Indian Act of 1876.
140
  
 This Act, having passed with the mindset of civilizing and integrating indigenous 
peoples within the state, brought into existence a new system of “self-government” in the 
form of elected band councils functioning under the Act. Its objective can be seen in 
Deputy Superintendent-General Duncan Campbell Scott’s 1920 expression where he 
mentioned that “our object is to continue until there is not a single Indian in Canada that 
has not been absorbed into the body politic and there is no Indian question, and no Indian 
Department.”141 The Indian Act was specially designed to destabilize or remove those 
traditional governments which were not inclined to cooperate with the federal initiatives 
related to land transfers. Thus there was a tension between the reluctant Indians and the 
assertive Canadian authority over issues of assimilation and loss of traditional 
sovereignty or self-government.  
 Deskaheh, being a traditionalist from the Council of Hereditary Chiefs of the Six 
Nations, opposed formal integration of Indian nations with Canada and advocated for full 
self-government.
142
 He stated that: 
The constituent members of the State of the Six Nations of the Iroquois, that is to say, 
the Mohawk, the Oneida, the Onondaga, the Cayuga, the Seneca and the Tuscarora, 
now are and have been for many centuries, organized and self-governing peoples, 
respectively, within the domains of their own, and united in the oldest League of 
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Nations, the League of the Iroquois [formed in the 1500s], for the maintenance of 
mutual peace.
143
 
 
 In his petition to the League of Nations, The Red Man’s Appeal to Justice (1923), he 
pointed out that the escalation of the police (Royal Canadian Mounted Police) presence in 
native lands constituted an act of war against Six Nations, and was intended to:  
destroy all de jure government of the Six Nations and of the constituent members 
thereof, and to fasten Canadian authority over all the Six Nations domain and to 
subjugate the Six Nations peoples, and these wrongful acts have resulted in a situation 
now constituting a menace to international peace.
144
 
 
In an earlier unsuccessful petition to the League of Nations, Deskaheh made a strong 
argument for the recognition of their right to self-government and stated that “[t]he Six 
Nations are ready to accept for the purpose of this dispute, if invited, the obligation of 
membership in the League of Nations upon such just conditions as the Council 
[League’s] may prescribe, having due regard to our slender resources.”145 His claim to 
sovereignty was based upon the Haldimand Proclamation of 1784, in which King George 
III gave the Grand River land on the Canadian side of Lake Erie to those Iroquois who 
had fought on the side of the British during the war of American Revolution.
146
 But the 
Canadian response was dismissive and claimed that the Six Nations had not been 
recognized as self-governing peoples and were subjects of the British Crown.
147
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Deskaheh’s attempt to present the grievances of the Six Nations before the 
Assembly of the League of Nations failed, as the League was not receptive to claims of 
sovereignty that conflicted with the interests of other states. Despite this failure, his 
presence in Geneva caused a minor sensation as he conducted informal public lectures 
and circulated his The Red Man’s Appeal to Justice. The Six Nations were successful in 
gathering support for their cause from nations like Estonia, Netherlands, Ireland, Panama, 
Japan and Persia.
148
 Further he also received favourable attention and sympathy from 
many humanitarian societies and organizations. But the negative response to his effort by 
the League of Nations was clearly summed up by one independent lobbyist present at the 
time, “The representative of the world’s first League of Peace received no welcome from 
the world’s newest.”149  
 In the fall of 1924, Deskaheh delivered his address to a meeting of friendly states 
at the City Hall in Geneva. On November 27, 1924, he was informed by Canada “that, 
following an election held among the Cayuga the previous October, a new tribal council 
had replaced the hereditary body he represented. In effect, he had lost his power and his 
mandate to lobby on behalf of the Six Nations.”150 He left Geneva at the end of 1924, 
dispirited by his failed effort to get a fair hearing, and died in the United States months 
later.
151
 Deskaheh’s historic attempt to raise the question of indigenous peoples’ rights 
and status at the international forum ultimately failed not from flaws of character or his 
argument, but primarily due to the League of Nations’ positivistic state-centric outlook 
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towards international law and politics.
152
 In fact, his campaign in Geneva had all the signs 
of modern indigenous lobbying efforts, including: an appeal to public sympathy through 
media; lobbying individual state delegates; printing out summaries of his grievances; use 
of lawyers as advisors; and the use of the legal logic of statehood to oppose the 
encroachment of the state.
153
 
 
2.5. Indigenous Peoples and the United Nations 
 
The system of international law underwent a huge shift after the adoption of the 
United Nations Charter in 1945 when the concept of indigenous peoples started re-
emerging in the international domain. This time, the concept took the form of 
international human rights movements and the demand for self-determination. Even 
though human rights are primarily individual rights, modern international law 
increasingly took note of some group or collective rights.  
 In the United Nations, more favourable conditions emerged for the international 
recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples. Some of the key factors were: first, 
greater receptiveness at the international level for the protection of minorities (after the 
Nazi horrors against Jews) with standards intended to resist racism and discrimination.
154
 
This resulted in the advancement and emergence of international human rights norms. 
Secondly, the dismantling of European colonies
155
 made the demand for self-
determination more realistic and achievable. Third, assimilation policies used by colonial 
powers against natives/indigenous peoples had, by the mid-twentieth century, “clearly 
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failed in their goal of eliminating all vestiges of attachment to tradition, while 
unintentionally contributing to intertribal identity, broader political unity, and the training 
of educated leaders.”156 It led to the formation of new native groups and organisations 
that eventually turned into international indigenous lobbying movements.  
 Therefore, the creation of the United Nations “inspired indigenous peoples to 
press their claims in decolonization activities and human rights.”157 The Charter of the 
United Nations affirmed the concept of peoplehood (rather than statehood)
158
 which can 
be found in the first line of the Preamble “We the people of the United Nations …”159 and 
in Article 73’s declaration regarding non-self-governing territories, where it called for the 
responsibilities of UN members to administer territories whose peoples have not yet 
attained a full measure of self-government. The use of the term “peoples” evidenced a 
shift to a new legal category in international law and “infers the application of the 
principle of self-determination to indigenous peoples within the boundaries of 
independent or decolonizing states.”160 
 The principle of self-determination became prominent during the era of 
decolonization where the colonies of former European powers in Asia and Africa were 
freed from their shackles and achieved independent statehood. In the UN General 
Assembly Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples (1960),
161
 they condemned acts of colonialism in all its forms and manifestations. 
The Declaration called for the speedy and unconditional end to colonialism because the 
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subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constituted a 
denial of fundamental human rights.
162
  
Despite all of the above-mentioned optimism, the decolonization process did not 
recognize the right to self-determination of colonized indigenous peoples.
163
 As they 
were seen only as indigenous populations within larger political units, the decolonizing 
process did not include them. Dr. Erica-Irene Daes, Chairman of the Working Group on 
Indigenous Populations, explained that: 
[w]ith few exceptions, indigenous peoples were never a part of State-building. They 
did not have an opportunity to participate in designing the modern constitutions of the 
States in which they live, or to share, in any meaningful way, in national decision-
making. In some countries they have been excluded by law or by force, but in many 
countries … they have been separated by language, poverty, misery, and the 
prejudices of their non-indigenous neighbours. Whatever the reason, indigenous 
peoples in most countries have never been, and are not now, full partners in the 
political process and lack others’ ability to use democratic means to defend their 
fundamental rights and freedom.”164 
 
At the end of colonialism, many indigenous peoples were promised their own 
independent states, but these promises were never fulfilled.
165
 The newly decolonized 
states continue to maintain rigid control over indigenous peoples’ land and resources and 
deny their right to self-determination. Indigenous peoples were thrown from one form of 
classical colonialism into another, with the same conditions of marginalization and 
exploitation. Therefore the broken promises of decolonization became the basis for 
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indigenous peoples’ movements’ shift from the discourse of sovereignty to international 
human rights.
166
  
 The early 1970s saw changes in narrative, with the emergence of indigenous 
peoples renaissance movements across the world and the establishment of many 
organizations to promote indigenous rights such as the International Indian Treaty 
Council (IITC) and World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP) in 1974. All these led 
to the creation of UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations in 1982 to look into 
indigenous matters and prepare the draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples. Indigenous peoples, for the first time in history, took active part in the 
deliberations of the international mechanisms to lay down rights and principles directly 
related to their communities.
167
 
 Other organizations, including the International Labour Organization (ILO), 
engaged in the reform efforts, such as the reformed Convention on Indigenous Peoples’ 
Rights (ILO Convention No. 169)
168
 in 1989, which recognized indigenous peoples’ 
rights in international law.  The decade of the1990s saw intense debate on the future 
declaration with the full participation of indigenous peoples. The year 1993 was 
recognised as the International Year for the World’s Indigenous Peoples by the UN 
General Assembly
169
 to strengthen international cooperation for the search for solutions 
to problems faced by indigenous communities in areas such as human rights, the 
environment, development, education and health.  
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 In the 2001 landmark decision of the Inter-American Court on Human Rights (the 
Awas Tingni Case),
170
 indigenous peoples’ land rights were, for the first time, recognised 
in international law (or perhaps for the first time since Vitoria and Grotius). In the year 
2007, the UN General Assembly formally adopted UNDRIP, making it a watershed 
moment in the history of indigenous peoples’ rights in international law. In the end, the 
right of self-determination was finally recognized as the guiding principle of indigenous 
peoples’ rights. 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has outlined the history and evolution of the concept of indigenous 
peoples from the time of the natural law thinkers and positivist international jurists to the 
modern international human rights movements and norms. It has traced the troubled 
relationship between indigenous peoples and international law, as the later underwent 
several normative changes and directly shaped the status of indigenous peoples 
accordingly. Despite initial recognition of the rights and status of indigenous peoples 
during the early natural law period, Euro-centric colonial international law of the 18
th
 and 
19
th
 century, based upon the rigid concept of sovereignty, denied status of indigenous 
peoples in international law.  In the 20
th
 century, the status of indigenous peoples was 
raised once again within the framework of international human rights movements and 
norms, which ultimately resulted in the landmark adoption of UNDRIP in 2007.  
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The next chapter will outline in more detail the processes through which 
indigenous peoples have participated at the United Nations over the years leading up to 
the adoption of UNDRIP, as well as those which continue to welcome their involvement. 
  
48 
 
 
Chapter 3: Indigenous Peoples and the United Nations Processes 
 
This chapter will introduce the role that indigenous peoples have played within 
the United Nations systems and its processes. It will reveal how far the rights of 
indigenous peoples have come in the last 30 years and the recognition and respect that 
has been accorded to them within the international arena. The study of these various 
institutional mechanisms is crucial in order to understand the views expressed by both 
states and non-state indigenous group claimants in these international fora. The views of 
selected states and groups will be examined in detail in the next two chapters in order to 
inform the definition or identification of the term ‘indigenous peoples’ from an Asian 
perspective under international law.  
This chapter will distinguish between those UN institutions and processes directly 
related to the issues of indigenous peoples and those fora which are much larger in scope 
but somehow touch indigenous peoples’ concerns. The former category consists of fora 
such as the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations; the Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Issues; the Special Rapporteur mechanism; and The Expert Mechanism on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Other fora or institutions related to indigenous peoples’ 
rights and concerns are the International Labour Organization (ILO Convention 107 & 
169) and the World Bank. While there are other significant UN forums, such as the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) and the UN Human 
Rights Committee that have played a significant role with regard to the rights of 
indigenous peoples, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine submissions to these 
forums as well.  
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Before going into detailed descriptions of each mechanism and forum, it is 
important to understand the theoretical framework under which indigenous peoples could 
participate in the processes of norm creation and emerge as the makers of international 
law.  
 
3.1. Emergence of Indigenous Peoples as International Lawmakers 
 
Here, I will highlight how the multi-layered approaches taken by indigenous 
peoples as participants in the making of international law led to the successful 
identification of the core normative precepts that ultimately facilitated recognition of a 
distinct indigenous peoples’ category in international legal sphere.  
As noted in the Introduction, according to the traditional and positivist account, 
states and international organizations (to a limited extent) were the primary subjects and 
makers of international law.
171
 International law, according to this view, is produced only 
through state consent or agreements.
172
 Non-state groups, such as minorities, indigenous 
and tribal groups, were historically mere objects who could not participate and influence 
the decision-making in the international law.
173
 On the other hand, indigenous peoples 
have played an increasingly significant role in international law-making through 
participation in the construction of a distinct international legal identity and norms unique 
to their situation.
174
  According to Miranda, indigenous peoples engage in both bottom-up 
and top-down approaches to participation in order to identify core indigenous norms and 
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values which are distinct from other groups.
175
 Using  bottom-up approach, they 
participated in and organized transnational networks, movements and non-governmental 
organizations which were dedicated to produce knowledge on the issues concerning 
indigenous peoples and generate consensus on certain areas of norms related to them.
176
 
Examples of these institutions include the UN Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations, the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, and the formation of the 
World Council of Indigenous Peoples.
177
  On the other hand, they engaged in the formal 
and institutionalized top-down approach of decision making through advocacy before 
various international and regional human rights bodies and mechanisms.
178
  
Thus, they have “employed a multi-layered approach to international human 
rights lawmaking that includes participation in both informal mechanisms of knowledge 
production and norm-generation as well as more formal decision-making structures”179 
which, in the end, provides greater legitimacy to the lawmaking processes and norms 
which came out of those processes. It is important to note that such legitimate processes 
and the resulting normative outcomes are equally applicable to the issue of defining 
indigenous peoples in international law.  
According to Miranda, there are four factors which contributed to the emergence 
of indigenous peoples as participants in international norm-building and decision-making 
processes, namely: (1) a change in the ideological conception of indigeneity; (2) 
globalization; (3) the emergence of participatory democracy; and (4) international 
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advocacy by indigenous peoples.
180
 First, the significant shift in the ideological 
conception of indigeneity took place in 1980s when the then existing idea of indigenous 
peoples as savage and inferior and in need of assimilation within the larger society was 
rejected. Instead, there was recognition of distinct indigenous cultural identity which 
rendered previous ideology as racist and discriminatory practices.
181
 For example, ILO 
Convention 107, which reflected assimilationist polices, was revised in the late 1980s and 
was normatively replaced by ILO Convention 169.
182
 However, there are critical TWAIL 
scholars such as Seth Gordon who argue that, though the latter convention was a big 
improvement, the vestiges of the old system still prevailed, namely a presumption of state 
authority over the indigenous peoples; and the relocation of native peoples when the state 
feels necessary.
183
   
Second, the process of globalization
184
 enabled local groups and activities to 
achieve global repercussions and significance. It also offers different indigenous 
communities the opportunity to come together, share their common experiences and 
develop strategies to develop global indigenous norms. Thus non-state actors and 
transnational networks had opportunities to participate in global governance.
185
 Further, 
international interests and acceptance of democratic global governance
186
 helped 
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recognize indigenous peoples’ participatory role in international lawmaking.187 Finally, 
strong and consistent advocacy by indigenous peoples at various levels of international 
and national decision-making bodies and forums led to greater recognition of their 
participatory rights.
188
 
Indigenous peoples have pursued their cause within the normative framework of 
human rights, which has provided legitimacy or helped translate indigenous claims into 
recognizable human rights.
189
 Through their participation in the lawmaking processes, 
they were successful in identifying these distinctive claims as specifically applicable to 
them within the large corpus of international human rights law.
190
 Some of the indigenous 
claims which received recognition within various declarations and treaties are their right 
to self-determination, the right to not be discriminated against, the right to cultural 
integrity, and the right to land and resources.
191
 Thus “indigenous peoples have 
contributed to the recognition of the legal category “indigenous peoples” and to the 
creation of a well-established body of international norms that specifically address [their] 
human rights.”192 These norms may be classified as having formed either ‘hard’ and 
‘soft’ international law regarding indigenous peoples’ rights.193 The hard law consists of 
binding international treaties and customary international law norms, whereas soft law 
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includes declarations, resolutions and other non-binding jurisprudence from human rights 
bodies.
194
 According to Miranda: 
With respect to the production of “hard law”, indigenous peoples participated, albeit 
in a limited manner, in the International Labour Organization’s (“ILO”) design of 
ILO Convention 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries. Although the ILO is not an international body strictly within the human 
rights regime, the ILO’s work has impacted the recognition and development of 
indigenous peoples’ human rights. In the context of “soft-law”, indigenous peoples 
have contributed to the standard-setting work of the United Nations Permanent 
Forum on Indigenous Issues, United Nations working groups dedicated to addressing 
indigenous peoples’ issues and rights, human rights treaty compliance bodies, and 
regional human rights commissions and courts.
195
 
 
As stated earlier, their participation in the norm-building and decision making 
processes contributed to the design of the legal category ‘indigenous peoples’ as well as 
the creation of a well-established body of international human rights specific to 
indigenous peoples. In this project, they have contributed to this new legal category in 
three different ways. First, they determined the scope of the term ‘indigenous’ by 
differentiating it from other group identities such as minorities. The main characteristics 
which determined the term ‘indigenous’ were:  communal, religious and cultural ties to 
their ancestral lands and resources; assertion of collective rights and self-determination; 
and seeking institutional separateness within state sovereignty.
196
 Secondly, indigenous 
peoples
197
 advocated for the use of the term ‘peoples’ during the drafting of ILO 
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Convention 169. They preferred using the term ‘peoples’ rather than ‘populations’ 
because the term ‘peoples’ was representative of collective rights such as right to self-
determination.
198
 Finally, indigenous peoples have contributed to the distinct legal 
category of ‘indigenous peoples’ by advocating an open ended meaning for the term, 
rather than a strict legal definition.
199
 Thus, they have purposefully left the definition and 
identity of indigenous peoples in ambiguity
200
 and supported a process of self-
identification and recognition among indigenous groups.
201
 
In the end, it is clear that indigenous peoples’ participation in these formal and 
informal international processes had contributed significantly to the emergence of 
indigenous peoples as subjects and makers of international law concerning their rights. 
As will be seen in below in Chapters 3 and 4, I have tried to research the definition of 
indigenous peoples within an Asian context by relying mainly on the materials and 
statements expressed under Miranda’s bottom-up approach. Before moving on, it is 
therefore important to better understand the United Nations and other international fora 
and mechanisms related to the rights of indigenous peoples.  
 
3.2. UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations 
 
As mentioned in the preceding chapters, due to the rapid increase in international 
indigenous peoples’ movements in the 1960s and 1970s, the Working Group on 
Indigenous Populations was created in 1982 by the UN Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) as a subsidiary organ of the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and 
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Protection of Human Rights. According to ECOSOC resolution 1982/34 of May 7, 1982, 
the Working Group had two mandates: (a) “to review developments pertaining to the 
promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous 
peoples” and (b) “to give attention to the evolution of international standards concerning 
indigenous rights.” 202 
The establishment of this body opened doors to all indigenous peoples and their 
organizations to participate in the Working Group sessions and allowed oral and written 
submissions by them.
203
 According to Robert A. Williams, “the Working Group is a 
unique body within the institutional human rights structure of the United Nations. Its 
mandate as a forum devoted exclusively to the survival of indigenous peoples includes 
the urgent task of developing international legal standards for the protection of 
indigenous peoples’ human rights.”204 Its basic mandate was to draft standards on the 
rights of indigenous peoples and produce a formal declaration on it.
205
 
The Working Group consisted of five independent experts and members of the 
Sub-Commission - one from each of the five regions of the world. The Norwegian 
member of the Sub-Commission, Asbjorn Eide, became the first chairman of the 
group.
206
 The five officially-recognized regions were Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin 
America, and ‘Western Europe and Others’ (WEOG) which included the United States, 
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Canada, New Zealand and Australia. The Working Group was opened to all 
representatives of indigenous peoples and their communities and organizations. The 
annual meeting of the Working Group was highly structured and formalized, and all the 
interventions, reports and submissions (whether oral or written) were made to the five 
member working group.
207
 The Government reports generally focused on the progress the 
state had made towards securing indigenous peoples’ rights, whereas reports by 
indigenous peoples and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) stressed the continuing 
lack of progress and implementation from governments.
208
 
In such a public space, indigenous peoples or groups were allowed ten-minute 
oral interventions to the chair. The “interventions usually describe[d] government actions 
and policies affecting indigenous peoples’ human rights” and “frequently detail[ed] gross 
abuses of indigenous peoples’ most basic human rights, invasions of indigenous 
territories, assaults on cultural survival, and denial of self-governing autonomy…”209 
According to Anaya, while states were not legally bound to comply with such reports, 
they were usually compelled to respond due to the expectations and the legitimacy of the 
entire process and deliberations.
210
 Thus, the information gathered from all the relevant 
actors and the Working Group’s own expertise on the area provided the primary materials 
to help initiate a draft text for the universal declaration on the rights of indigenous 
peoples. As a result, according to Douglas Sanders, “the working group became the most 
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open body in the UN system. Everywhere else the right to speak [was] limited to states, 
intergovernmental agencies, and accredited nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).”211 
 In 1985, the Working Group began preparing a draft declaration on the rights of 
indigenous peoples, and took into account the comments and suggestions of the 
participants in its sessions, particularly representatives of indigenous peoples and 
governments.
212
 At its eleventh session, in July 1993, the Working Group agreed on a 
final text for the draft United Nations declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples and 
submitted it to the Sub-Commission.
213
 The negotiations and discussions among states, 
NGOs and indigenous peoples’ groups on the draft declaration dragged on for more than 
a decade, finally resulting in the adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) in 2007. Perhaps, the significance of the Working Group 
could be summed up in the comment by Mick Dodson, then Australia’s Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner:  
The Working Group has become the focal point of our coming together as the 
world’s indigenous peoples. In a sense, the Working Group is all about what 
international law and the UN have neglected. It is about bringing indigenous peoples 
into the UN system where we have been marginalized and unnoticed. It is about 
forcing the UN system to face its responsibility as the body charged with protecting 
the rights of all peoples. It is about transforming the UN from a club serving the 
interests of its members, namely nations and their well-suited diplomats, to a body of 
peoples.
214
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In the year 2007, with the adoption of the UNDRIP, the Working Group was disbanded 
and replaced by the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which was 
established by the newly formed UN Human Rights Council.
215
  
 
3.3. Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues 
 
The idea of creating a Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues was first discussed 
at the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights and in its resulting document, the 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action.
216
 The United Nations Permanent Forum 
on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII) was established by the UN Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) by resolution number 2000/22 of the 28
th
 July 2000 as a subsidiary organ of 
the Council consisting of sixteen members. Eight of these members are to be nominated 
by their governments and elected by the Council, and eight members are to be appointed 
by the President of the Council following formal consultation with the Bureau and the 
regional groups through their coordinators.
217
 These sixteen experts function in their 
personal capacity and serve as members for a term of three years. They may be re-elected 
for one additional term. The independent experts represent all the regions recognized by 
the Forum, namely: Africa; Asia; Central and South America and the Caribbean; the 
Arctic; Central and Eastern Europe, Russian Federation, Central Asia and Transcaucasia; 
North America; and the Pacific.
218
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The names of some current forum members (2011-13) from Asia are: Ms. 
Paimanach Hasteh (Iran) and Mr. Raja Devasish Roy (Bangladesh).  Some of the earlier 
relevant members from the Asian region were Ms. Victoria Tauli-Corpuz (2005-07/2008-
10) from the Philippines and Mrs Qin Xiaomei (2002-04/2005-07) from China.
219
  
According to Article 2 of the resolution creating the UNPFII: 
the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues shall serve as an advisory body to the 
Council with a mandate to discuss indigenous issues within the mandate of the 
Council relating to economic and social development, culture, the environment, 
education, heath and human rights; in so doing the Permanent Forum shall:  
(a) provide expert advice and recommendations on indigenous issues to the Council as 
well as to programmes, funds and agencies of the United Nations, through the 
Council; 
(b) Raise awareness and promote the integration and coordination of activities relating to 
indigenous issues within the United Nations system; 
(c) Prepare and disseminate information on indigenous issues.220 
 
Accordingly, the resolution called upon the Permanent Forum to provide expert advice 
and recommendations on indigenous issues to the UN system through ECOSOC; to raise 
awareness and promote the integration and coordination of relevant activities within the 
UN system; and to prepare and disseminate information on indigenous issues.
221
  
The UNPFII met for the first time in May 2002 in New York, which has been the 
location of the annual meeting ever since. Its work is centered mainly on the review and 
coordination of the programs of various UN agencies and affiliates that concern 
indigenous peoples, and has been organised around the contemporary topical areas of 
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ECOSOC’s work which are mentioned in the Council’s resolution. The area of its 
mandate includes social and economic development, the environment, culture, education, 
health, and human rights.  
 
3.4. The Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
 
 
The Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (EMRIP) was established by 
the Human Rights Council, the UN’s main human rights body, in 2007 under Resolution 
6/36
222
 as a subsidiary body of the Council. It replaced the UN Working Group on 
Indigenous Populations, which was a substructure of the disbanded United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights. 
The mandate of the EMRIP mechanism is to provide the “Human Rights Council 
with thematic advice, in the form of studies and research, on the rights of indigenous 
peoples as directed by the Council.  The Expert Mechanism may also suggest proposals 
to the Council for its consideration and approval.”223 The EMRIP is made up of five 
independent experts on the rights of indigenous peoples.  These experts are appointed by 
the Human Rights Council which gives due regard to experts of indigenous origin as well 
as to gender balance and geographic representation. It holds its annual session in July, in 
which representatives from states, indigenous peoples, indigenous peoples’ organisations, 
civil society, inter-governmental organisations and scholars take part as observers. In 
addition, the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and a member of 
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the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues are usually invited to attend the annual 
session of the Expert Mechanism to enhance coordination and cooperation between these 
mechanisms.
224
 Among the five present independent experts is Ms. Jannie Lasimbang 
(Malaysia).
225
 
So far, the Expert Mechanism has completed two thorough studies on the subject 
of: (a) indigenous peoples’ right to education, and (b) indigenous peoples’ right to 
participate in decision making. Currently, they are “preparing a study on the role of 
languages and culture in the promotion and protection of the rights and identity of 
indigenous peoples.”226 
 
3.5. UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
 
The increase in global attention to the human rights situation of indigenous 
peoples, and the adoption of draft declarations and principles with regard to the rights of 
indigenous peoples prompted the Commission on Human Rights to appoint, in 2001, a 
Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Dr. Rodolfo Stavenhagen 
(Mexico) became the first Special Rapporteur from the year 2001 to 2008, and was 
replaced by the current incumbent Special Rapporteur, Prof. James Anaya (United 
States). The mandate of this office was renewed in 2007, when the Human Rights 
Council replaced the Commission on Human Rights.
227
 
According to Human Rights Council Resolution 15/14, the mandate of the office 
of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples includes: 
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(a) To examine ways and means of overcoming existing obstacles to the full and 
effective protection of the rights of indigenous peoples, in conformity with his/her 
mandate, and to identify, exchange and promote best practices;  
(b) To gather, request, receive and exchange information and communications from 
all relevant sources, including Governments, indigenous peoples and their 
communities and organizations, on alleged violations of the rights of indigenous 
peoples;  
(c) To formulate recommendations and proposals on appropriate measures and 
activities to prevent and remedy violations of the rights of indigenous peoples; and  
(d) To work in close cooperation and coordination with other special procedures and 
subsidiary organs of the Council, in particular with the Expert Mechanism on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, relevant United Nations bodies, the treaty bodies, and 
regional human rights organizations. 
 
In carrying out these different activities, the Special Rapporteur is required to work "in 
close cooperation with the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues and to participate in 
its annual session;" to “develop a regular cooperative dialogue with all relevant actors;" 
to pay "special attention to the situation of indigenous children and women;" to consider 
"relevant recommendations of the world conferences and treaty bodies on matters 
regarding his/her mandate;" and to “submit a report on the implementation of his/her 
mandate to the Council in accordance with its annual programme of work.”228 
 The Special Rapporteur is also required to present an annual report to the UN 
Human Rights Council at one of its regular sessions in Geneva. The Special Rapporteur’s 
annual reports include a description of the activities carried out during the year and also 
normally include discussion of specific themes or issues of particular relevance for the 
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rights of indigenous peoples. Apart from this, it also draws attention to special reports on 
different thematic studies, country reports, and communication reports on the 
communication between states and the special rapporteur office. 
229
 
One of the most important mechanisms associated with the office is the 
communications mechanism on alleged human rights violations. A complaint can be 
initiated by any indigenous peoples, their organizations and other sources, provided that 
the alleged violation is within the mandate and scope of the office. As part of his 
mandate, “the Special Rapporteur intervenes in response to alleged violations of the 
rights of indigenous peoples. The intervention can relate to a human rights violation that 
has already occurred, is ongoing, or which has a high risk of occurring. The process, in 
general, involves the sending of a confidential communication to the concerned 
government requesting information, commenting on the allegation and suggesting that 
preventive or investigatory action be taken.”230  
 
3.6. World Bank Policies 
 
The World Bank,
231
 along with International Monetary Fund (IMF), was 
established at the Bretton Woods Conference in the United States in July 1944.
232
 These 
two international financial institutions were created as a result of economic hardships of 
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the Great Depression (1930s) and the economic difficulties faced during World War II.
233
 
During World War II, initiatives were taken by the allied states to prepare for the 
international economic regime of the post-war peace time situation.
234
 As a result, these 
two institutions were established with different mandates. The World Bank’s primary 
tasks was the reconstruction of war-torn Europe and to facilitate economic resources in 
the developing world, whereas the Fund’s mandate was to solve balance of payment 
problems and achieve international monetary cooperation among states.
235
 
The World Bank became one of the first financial institutions to endorse separate 
policies and guidelines concerning indigenous peoples. It represents the main 
international institution that promotes development and financial reconstruction by giving 
loans to poor countries in need of funds for economic development. Since 1982, the Bank 
has set up policies and safeguard provisions (to protect indigenous peoples’ interests) to 
be observed by the lending nations.  
In February 1982, the World Bank adopted Operational Manual Statement 2.34 
on Tribal People in Bank-Financed Projects.
236
 Though the Bank had taken into account 
tribal peoples’ interests, its main focus was not safeguarding tribal peoples’ rights. 
Statement 2.34 considered that “tribal peoples are more likely to be harmed than helped 
by development projects that are intended for beneficiaries other than themselves.”237 The 
overall approach in this policy was integrationist, with the main objective “to ensure the 
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integration and adaptation of tribes into the wider political economies and rural societies 
of their country.”238 Thus, the policy was intended for projects where tribal peoples were 
not the direct beneficiaries, and the projects were not made directly applicable to them 
because the tribal peoples needed to go through ‘adequate time and conditions for 
acculturation’ which was slow and gradual.239 For all practical purposes, then, the Bank 
followed an integrationist policy towards tribal and indigenous peoples, rendering them 
beyond or outside the scope of Bank’s developmental projects.  
 Due to these drawbacks, a shift in the Bank’s policy towards indigenous peoples 
took place in September 1991 when it adopted a revised Directive on indigenous peoples, 
known as Operational Directive 4.20. In this new directive, indigenous peoples were 
ensured direct benefit from the development projects and recognition was given to 
indigenous peoples’ dignity, human rights and cultural uniqueness.240 The definitional 
criteria used to identify indigenous peoples were broader in this directive, where both the 
term tribal and indigenous peoples were expressly used and pointed out a number of 
characteristics. The term ‘indigenous peoples’ in Operational Directive 4.20 covers also 
indigenous ethnic minorities, tribal groups, and scheduled tribes.
241
 The term was defined 
as “social groups with a social and cultural identity distinct from the dominant society 
that makes them vulnerable to being disadvantaged in the development process.”242 Some 
of the characteristics in this definition were: close attachment to ancestral territories and 
natural resources; self-identification and identification by others; indigenous language 
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distinct from the national language; customary social and political institutions; and 
primary subsistence-oriented production.
243
 
 In 2005, a new Operation Policy 4.10 (OP 4.10) was adopted and replaced the 
previous ones. Here the Bank recognizes that the distinct “identities and cultures of 
indigenous peoples are inextricably linked to the lands on which they live and the natural 
resources on which they depend.”244 It requires client governments to seek broad 
community support of indigenous peoples through a process of free, prior, and informed 
consultation before deciding on development projects affecting indigenous Peoples. It 
ensures and “respects the dignity, human rights, economies and cultures of indigenous 
peoples.”245 
OP 4.10 does not distinguish between indigenous peoples and other groups, 
noting that “indigenous peoples” could be referred to in different countries by such terms 
as “indigenous ethnic minorities”, “aboriginals”, “hill tribes”, “minority nationalities”, 
“scheduled tribes”, or “tribal groups”.246 According to para 4 of the policy: 
The term “Indigenous Peoples” is used in a generic sense to refer to a distinct, 
vulnerable, social and cultural group possessing the following characteristics in 
varying degrees: 
(a) Self-identification as members of a distinct indigenous cultural group and 
recognition of this identity by others; 
(b) Collective attachment to geographically distinct habitats or ancestral territories in the 
project area and to the natural resources in these habitats and territories; 
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(c) Customary cultural, economic, social, or political institutions that are separate from 
those of the dominant society and culture; and  
(d) An indigenous language, often different from the official language of the country or 
region.  
 
The World Bank established ‘The Inspection Panel’ on September 22, 1993, and 
identified its jurisdiction over projects or operations supported by the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and International Development Association 
(IDA). The Inspection Panel provides a forum for people to bring their grievances and 
concerns to the highest level of decision-making. It is for those who believe that they may 
be adversely affected by Bank-financed operations. Thus, “the Panel determines whether 
the Bank is complying with its own policies and procedures, which are designed to 
ensure that Bank-financed operations provide social and environmental benefits and 
avoid harm to people and the environment.”247 Instead of taking a top-down approach for 
resolving disputes, it empowers common people who are directly and adversely affected 
by the Bank-funded projects within/around their natural environment. Further, it 
enhances institutional “accountability” and “transparency”, and ensures effectiveness to 
the Bank-funded operations.
248
 
The World Bank Inspection Panel consists of three members who are appointed 
for five years by the Board of Executive Directors. They are selected on the basis of their 
ability to fairly deal with the requests brought to them, and their integrity and 
independence from Bank Management. In addition, an executive secretariat supports and 
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assists all Panel activities. One of the current panel members, Ms. Eimi Watanabe, 
belongs to Japan.
249
 
Another mechanism related to the World Bank is the Compliance Advisor 
Ombudsperson (CAO) which is an independent recourse mechanism for projects 
supported by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency (MIGA), which are private sector lending arms of the World Bank 
Group. The CAO responds to complaints from project-affected communities with the 
goal of enhancing social and environmental outcomes on the ground. Its goals are: to 
address the concerns of individuals or communities affected by IFC/MIGA projects; 
enhance the social and environmental outcomes of IFC/MIGA projects; and foster greater 
public accountability of IFC and MIGA.
250
 Furthermore, it has three different roles, 
namely, as ombudsman, compliance role and advisor. As ombudsman, the CAO responds 
to complaints by people affected by the social and environmental impacts of IFC/MIGA 
projects. It works with stakeholders to resolve grievances using a flexible problem-
solving approach, and ideally improve outcomes on the ground.  
 
3.7. International Labour Organization and Indigenous Peoples 
 
The ILO, founded in 1919, is one of the first international organizations to deal 
with and oversee international labour standards and rights. According to ILO, it is the 
“only tripartite U.N. agency that brings together representatives of governments, 
employers and workers to jointly shape policies and programmes promoting Decent 
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Work for all. This unique arrangement gives the ILO an edge in incorporating 'real world' 
knowledge about employment and work.”251 In 1921, the ILO began to address the 
conditions of the native workers in the overseas European colonies.
252
 The indigenous 
workers, in these parts of the world, were most exploited and suppressed at their 
workplaces, and the least recognized category of peoples in terms of their labour rights 
and benefits.  
After the creation of the United Nations, the ILO began to address and focus more 
on the issues pertaining to indigenous and tribal peoples, and participated in the 
deliberations of many other UN agencies and bodies. In the 1950s, the ILO worked on 
the Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention (No. 107) which was finally adopted 
in 1957 as the first ever international treaty law on indigenous peoples’ rights.253 The 
Convention was eventually ratified by 27 countries, but was later denounced by ten 
countries, namely – Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, 
Paraguay, Peru and Portugal.
254
 The present status of the Convention (as of June 2012) is 
that it remains in force for only 17 countries,
255
 including a few Asian states such as 
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India, Bangladesh and Pakistan.
256
 But it no longer remains open for ratification
257
 due to 
the subsequent revised Convention 169 and reasons which will be discussed below.  
 The glory of Convention 107 was a short-lived one and the ILO was subsequently 
criticized and made to rethink some of its key points by many indigenous peoples’ 
groups, activists and NGOs. The criticism was due to the underlying integrationist 
outlook and assumption in the Convention that the only possible future for indigenous 
and tribal peoples was integration into the larger society and that the state should make 
decisions on their development.
258
 This attitude could be clearly seen in the preamble and 
other provisions of the Convention, where “the adoption of general international 
standards on the subject will facilitate action to assure the protection of the populations 
[indigenous and tribal] concerned with their progressive integration [emphasis added] 
into their respective national communities and the improvement of their living and 
working conditions…”259  
Further Article 2 of the said convention proclaims that: 
1. Governments shall have the primary responsibility for developing co-ordinated 
and systematic action for the protection of the populations concerned and their 
progressive integration into the life of their respective countries. 
2. Such action shall include measures for-- 
(a) enabling the said populations to benefit on an equal footing from the rights and 
opportunities which national laws or regulations grant to the other elements of the 
population; 
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(b) promoting the social, economic and cultural development of these populations 
and raising their standard of living; 
(c) creating possibilities of national integration to the exclusion of measures tending 
towards the artificial assimilation of these populations. 
3. The primary objective of all such action shall be the fostering of individual 
dignity, and the advancement of individual usefulness and initiative. 
4. Recourse to force or coercion as a means of promoting the integration of these 
populations into the national community shall be excluded.
260
 
For these reasons, a committee of experts was convened in 1986 by the ILO’s 
governing body, and concluded that “the integrationist approach of the Convention was 
obsolete and that its application was detrimental in the modern world.”261 Therefore, in 
June 1989 the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (No. 169)
262
 was adopted, and 
came into force on September 5, 1991 after two countries had ratified it.
263
 The new 
Convention is based on an attitude of respect for the cultures and ways of life of tribal 
and indigenous peoples, and they must be consulted and given a chance to participate in 
the decision-making processes at all levels. As of June 2012, it has been ratified by 22 
countries and remains the only authoritative law on the rights and status of indigenous 
peoples in international law.
264
 However, the only Asian state that has ratified this 
Convention remains Nepal, who joined this treaty regime in the year 2007.  
Moreover, even though the separate Convention 169 was based upon the revision
265
 
of the previous Convention which makes it much more progressive and acceptable 
according to today’s norms and standards, the irony is that it technically never replaced 
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the Convention 107. Accordingly, the assimilationist provisions
266
 in Convention 107 
continue to be in force for 17 state parties, including the Asian states listed above.
267
  
With regard to the definition of indigenous peoples, as noted in the Introduction, 
Article 1 of ILO Convention 169 makes clear that it applies to:  
(c) tribal peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural and economic 
conditions distinguish them from other sections of the national community, and 
whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions 
or by special laws or regulations; 
(d)  peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of 
their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a 
geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or 
colonisation or the establishment of present state boundaries and who, 
irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, 
cultural and political institutions.
268
 
Further, Article 1 (2) stressed the importance of self-identification in order for groups to 
emerge as indigenous peoples, and affirms that “self-identification as indigenous or tribal 
shall be regarded as a fundamental criterion for determining the groups to which the 
provisions of this Convention apply.”269  
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The ILO supervisory system includes both ‘reporting’ and ‘complaint procedures’ 
applicable to all states which are parties to the conventions.
270
 The reporting mechanism 
is regulated by Article 22 of the ILO Constitution, and the Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) examines the application 
of ratified conventions by engaging in dialogue with concerned governments on the 
application and implementation of their treaty obligations. The ratifying states are 
required to send reports on treaty compliance to the Committee once every five years. 
The governments also must send copies of their reports to workers’ and employers’ 
organizations within their own country. The reports are then examined by the Committee 
(CEACR) which meets once a year, and makes comments if necessary. It can be either 
“direct requests” or “observations”. The former is less serious and preliminary and the 
comments are not published. In contrast, the “observations” are published as comments 
which appear in the annual reports of the committee and are submitted to the 
International Labour Conference for possible discussion. In the conference, the 
committee invites the representatives of the governments to explain the reasons behind 
any non-compliance to any treaty obligations.  
In terms of complaints procedures, there are two different methods – one under 
Article 26 and the other Article 24 of the ILO constitution.
271
 Under Article 26, any 
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government, any delegate to the conference, or the governing body of the ILO may file a 
complaint alleging the violation of Convention norms by a state party to it, and establish 
a commission of inquiry which holds hearings on the case. Under Article 24, any 
workers’ or employers’ organization can file a “representation” alleging violations or 
failure to observe certain provisions of the Conventions. A tripartite Governing Body 
Committee is then appointed and decides the case, including cases related to the 
standards on indigenous peoples. 
 
3.8. Conclusion  
 
This chapter has introduced some of the important international fora that directly 
deal with the issues relating to the rights of indigenous peoples. These bodies or 
institutions, in the end, help protect, promote and create standards and norms relating to 
indigenous peoples in international law.  
The next two chapters will relate the views of both select Asian states and indigenous 
group claimants on the definition of ‘indigenous peoples’. These chapters will draw 
mainly on the views and submissions presented in these international forums and 
mechanisms. 
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Chapter 4: Asian State Views on the Definition and Identification of 
Indigenous Peoples 
 
 
This chapter will explore Asian state-centric views on the definition and 
identification of indigenous peoples. I will analyse four Asian states, namely, India, 
China, the Philippines and Bangladesh. Since there is no single Asian perspective on the 
definition of indigenous peoples, it becomes important to study separately the formal 
positions taken by these states and the reasons behind them.   
The chapter will begin by briefly highlighting different approaches to the 
definition of indigenous peoples and the problems associated with each approach. I will 
also briefly point out the difference between the principles of first and prior occupancy 
when determining the issue of indigeneity.  
 
4.1. Problems and Approaches to the Definition and Identification  
 
 
The question of definition and identity of indigenous peoples largely remains 
uncertain and indeterminate in international law. There is no universally accepted 
definition of indigenous peoples, which in turn leads to varying interpretations by states. 
According to Prof. Ronald Niezen (an anthropologist at McGill University) there are 
three basic approaches to the definition of indigenous peoples, namely: legal/analytical; 
practical/strategic; and collective/global.
272
   
The legal/analytical approach seeks to find out distinct positive criteria 
identifying indigenous peoples, and creates a constructive identity based on those 
features. According to Niezen, this approach: 
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seeks to isolate those distinctive phenomena among the original inhabitants of given 
territories that coalesce into a global category. The exercise is frustrating because of 
the historical and social diversity of those who identify themselves as “indigenous”. 
The question of definition thus has the inherent effect of pitting analysis against 
identity; there will inevitably be a group, seeing itself as indigenous, that is excluded 
from the scholarly definition, its pride assaulted, its honor tarnished, and more to the 
point, its access to redress obstructed.
273
  
 
As a result, this approach tends to exclude many such groups who identify themselves as 
“indigenous”, yet are outside the scope of any formal definition.  
Several examples of formal definitions of indigenous peoples that would fit the 
legal/analytical approach were presented in the Introduction. One example is the 
definition adopted by the former UN Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities Martinez Cobo in 1986. As 
discussed in the Introduction, according to Cobo: 
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical 
continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their 
territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now 
prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant 
sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future 
generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their 
continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social 
institutions and legal systems.
274
  
 
This approach to definition is controversial because of its requirement of “historical 
continuity with the pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their 
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territories.”275 According to Professor Benedict Kingsbury, this typically reflected the 
classical European case of colonial settlement in the western settler states such as US, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand. This requirement did not reflect the reality in many 
Asian and African countries where there was no clear case of historical disruption by 
colonial settlement.  
A second example discussed previously is ILO Convention No. 169, which 
provided an additional category of “tribal peoples” to the definition in its article 1(1) and 
called for a more diffused historical requirement. This Convention applies to: 
(a) tribal peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural and economic 
conditions distinguish them from other sections of the national community, and 
whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or by 
special laws or regulations; 
(b) peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of 
their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical 
region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonisation or the 
establishment of present state boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, 
retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions.
276
 
 
 Here, the ILO clearly states that the disruptions caused by either colonialism or at the 
time of establishing present state boundaries are conditions for determining the identity of 
indigenous peoples.    As we will see below, many Asian states disagreed with the view 
that indigenous peoples existed in Asia at the time of establishing present state 
boundaries and continue to claim indigenous peoples exist only in western settler states.  
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 The second approach to the definition of indigenous peoples is a 
practical/strategic one. In order to avoid the deficiency of the formal legal approach, and 
as noted in the previous chapter, the “Working Group on Indigenous Populations has, 
since its inception in 1982, maintained an open-door policy toward participation in its 
annual two-week long gathering of indigenous peoples and organizations.”277 This 
approach aligns with Kingsbury’s less abstract and more constructivist (inclusive) 
approach that adopts “a continuous process in which claims and practices in numerous 
specific cases are abstracted in the wider institutions of international society, then made 
specific again at the moment of application in the political, legal and social processes of 
particular cases and societies.”278 This approach is taken by the United Nations and its 
institutions such as the Human Rights Committee, the Special Rapporteur on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples, and the World Bank. According to Anaya, this approach focuses 
on the “rubric of “indigenous peoples … with an implicit understanding of what kind of 
groups fall within this rubric and consensus on many of the particular groups that are 
indigenous.”279 Therefore it is non-exhaustive with regard to its criteria, and does not 
attempt to arrive at a prescriptive definition of which groups should be considered 
indigenous. Further, it is more programmatic in its orientation and tends to make “the 
matter of definition more one of describing which groups in a practical sense are relevant 
to the programmatic focus … rather than a matter of first prescribing abstractly which 
groups qualify as indigenous (and, implicitly, which ones do not) and then ascribing to 
them rights.”280  
                                                 
277
 See Niezen, supra note 139, at 21, para 3. 
278
 See Kingsbury; supra note 52, at 415. 
279
 Anaya 2009, supra note 73, at 28, para 1.  
280
 Ibid, at 29, para 4.  
79 
 
 
The third approach to a definition of indigenous peoples is the collective/global 
approach, which is informal, never explicitly explained, and was developed and acted 
upon by indigenous peoples and their delegates.
281
 This approach is based on the idea of 
self-identification by and among indigenous groups as “indigenous peoples” and 
carefully distinguishes their identity and experience from those of states. It usually begins 
with a sense of regional and global solidarity “with those who share similar ways of life 
and histories of colonial and state domination that then grows into the realization that 
others around the world [also] share the same experience.”282 So this global aspect to 
indigenous identity ultimately acts as a basis for bringing indigenous peoples and groups 
together in international meetings and movements. The UN Working Group on 
Indigenous Populations was the main international platform where indigenous and tribal 
groups could collectively come together and affirm the concept of self-identification. 
This approach is similar and related to the second approach, but forms only a part of the 
later.  
  As will be shown below, the concept of indigenous peoples is inherently linked 
with issues relating to conflicts over lands, forests, natural resources and sovereignty. 
Many Asian states including China, India and Bangladesh opposed the application of the 
term “indigenous peoples” within their own territory. These states expressed strong 
opposition to the second and third approaches to the definition and identification of 
indigenous peoples, and were instead drawn to the legal analytical approach. The 
Philippines, on the other hand, was more inclined to both the practical/strategic and 
collective/global approaches.  
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According to Kingsbury, the arguments made by Asian states which are opposed 
to the application of the international concept of indigenous peoples within their territory 
are largely three-fold: definitional; practical; and policy oriented.
283
 In terms of 
definitional arguments, many of these Asian states regard the issue of indigenous peoples 
as something bound up with European settler colonialism, and “the attempt to impose the 
concept of “indigenous peoples” upon various Asian states as a form of neo-
colonialism.”284 According to the practical argument, the determination of who came 
first in order to find out indigeneity was practically impossible because of centuries of 
migration and absorption of different peoples or groups in various places.
285
 With regard 
to the policy argument, recognition of special rights on the basis of being original 
occupants might introduce chauvinistic claims by groups, which might in turn lead to 
ethnic or communal tensions and conflicts.
286
 
The issue of indigeneity is at the heart of indigenous peoples’ identity and rights. 
In order to understand the issue of indigeneity, it is important to understand two 
principles, namely, the principle of first occupancy and the principle of prior 
occupancy.
287
 As shown below, it is the principle of prior occupancy that has emerged as 
the standard in international law to determine the question of indigeneity. When dealing 
with the issue of indigenousness, many people, including Niezen, often automatically 
assume the situation of original inhabitance or occupancy of that land,
288
 but they rarely 
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differentiate between the principle of first occupancy and the principle of prior 
occupancy. Original inhabitance could either mean first occupancy or prior occupancy; 
the term does not automatically mean first occupancy. Accordingly, as discussed in the 
next chapter, even if some of the Asian groups might claim themselves to be the original 
inhabitants of the land, this should not necessarily be seen as supporting the first 
occupancy principle. Further, Kingsbury argued that in Asia, based on practical reasons, 
the determination of who came first in order to find out indigeneity was practically 
impossible due to centuries of migration and absorption of different peoples or groups in 
various places.
289
 It is important to make it clear that I have brought out the differences 
between the prior and first occupancy in order to better understand the issue of original 
inhabitance, which is sometimes viewed as the key to determining the question of 
indigeneity. Otherwise, the principle of prior occupancy has been accepted as standard in 
international law, as will be discussed below.
290
 
According to the principle of first occupancy, a “people may be described as 
‘indigenous’ in relation to a certain land or territory, meaning that they are its [first] 
original inhabitants.”291  In the Asian context, it is extremely difficult to historically trace 
the first ever occupants of the continents in order to determine the identity of indigenous 
peoples. On the other hand, the principle of prior occupancy is a relative concept where 
‘indigenous’ may be described in relation to some other people,292 including the 
colonizers. Here, indigenous peoples need not necessarily be the first occupants of the 
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land, but could be understood as those who lived in certain places for generations before 
the coming of the outside forces, whether they were European colonialists or other Asian 
“internal” colonial disruptions. So, for this definition, it is enough to show that 
indigenous peoples occupied and governed the territory at the time of colonization, and it 
does not matter whether they were the first inhabitants of the land. What matters is that 
they were the last to inhabit or be settled in it before historical disruptions caused by the 
events of European settlement or any other colonization processes.
293
 In international 
law, a consensus has emerged around the principle of prior occupancy as a means to 
understand the question of identifying indigenous peoples.
294
 Article 1.1(b) of the ILO 
Convention 169 expressly refers to the people inhabiting the country or a geographical 
region at the time of conquest or colonization. Further, Martinez Cobo’s UN working 
definition of ‘indigenous peoples’ also affirmed the prior occupancy principle by 
requiring “historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that 
developed on their territories.”295 According to Jeremy Waldron:296 
[The] prior Occupancy is a conservative principle, not a reactionary one. Its aim is to 
vindicate and preserve an established existent status quo, not delve into tangled 
historical questions about any status quo ante. It recognizes the opacity of the past, 
and it recognizes the dangers of holding existing systems hostage to legitimist inquiry 
… Prior Occupancy refers to the human interest in stability, security, certainty, and 
peace, and for the sake of those values it prohibits overturning existing arrangements 
irrespective of how they were arrived at. Of course it cannot be an absolute principle: 
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there may be compelling reasons for overthrowing and reforming an existing regime 
… Prior Occupancy is undoubtedly an appropriate basis for condemning the injustice 
that took place at the time of colonization. For in the lands that were colonized there 
was an existing social order; there was a flourishing political and customary-legal 
system; there were established rules of property, recognized titles of sovereignty and 
governance; there was an order, which had a claim to be respected, not on account of 
its antiquity, but on account of its existence … The native order existed as a stable 
and flourishing system when you arrived on the scene, and it was entitled to 
recognition and respect as such.  
 
In the Asian context, we must understand the concept of indigenous peoples through the 
prism of the prior occupancy principle, which became the recognized international 
standard to determine indigeneity, whether explicitly put into legal definition or 
otherwise. Due to long and complex historical migrations and displacements in Asia, it is 
impossible to determine first or original settlers of the land.
297
   
 
4.2. The Asian Situation 
 
In the Asian context, people with indigenous characteristics are known by 
different names, many of which are legally recognised by their concerned state 
governments. They are called ‘scheduled tribes’ or ‘adivasis’ in India, ‘tribes’ in 
Bangladesh, Nepal and Malaysia, ‘nationalities’ in China, and ‘cultural communities’ in 
the Philippines.
298
 Since it has been said that almost two-thirds of the world’s indigenous 
peoples live in different parts of Asia with high cultural diversity,
299
 making 
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generalisations about these people is likely to result in over-simplifying the situations of 
these complex and diverse peoples. According to Christian Erni, there can be four 
dimensions to understanding indigenous peoples of Asia, namely, geographical, 
economic, socio-political and ideological dimensions.
300
 In terms of geography, 
indigenous peoples of Southeast Asia such as the Philippines, Taiwan, Southwest China, 
Peninsular Malaysia and many areas in India are highlanders (hill peoples) as against 
lowlanders of the majority/dominant cultures. In Indonesia, indigenous people are 
inhabitants of the outer islands as against the inner majority cultural group islanders. In 
terms of the economy, they are mostly engaged in agriculture or hunting and gathering in 
the upland hill areas. In terms of socio-political organization, they lived in “comparably 
egalitarian band or segmentary societies, or in petty chiefdoms, in which villages were 
politically, and to a large extent economically, autonomous units.”301 Finally, in terms of 
ideological or religious beliefs, indigenous peoples retained their own traditional belief 
systems, unlike the majority/dominant societies that followed traditions of Buddhism, 
Hinduism or Islam.
302
  
 According to Erni, for those peoples who claim to be indigenous peoples, 
“attempts of military subjugation by a foreign power were already a pre-western colonial 
reality…”303 The majority dominant societies or cultures had always invaded and taken 
control of the fertile portion of the lands and resources belonging to these peoples, and 
driven them far into the peripheries of the state in remote hills and forests. So in some 
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sense, many of these indigenous peoples of Asia were already colonized peoples before 
European colonization of Asia.
304
 But such acts of invasion are not recognized as a 
colonial project by the Asian states as they were not perpetrated by European powers. As 
will be seen below, these Asian states, having once lived under European colonialism and 
having refused to see their internal aggressions as colonial, continue to recognize Europe 
as the center and perpetrator of colonialism.  
    
With the abovementioned theoretical perspectives in mind, and by combining 
Niezen’s three approaches to definition with Kingsbury’s arguments, we can assess 
which state is following which strategy when it determines or denies the identity of 
indigenous peoples within its jurisdiction. As discussed above, Niezen proposed three 
approaches to the definition of indigenous peoples, which are: the legal/analytical 
approach (identification of distinct positive criteria); the practical/strategic approach 
(inclusive approach based upon self-identification); and the collective/global approach 
(indigenous solidarity with self-identification). On the other hand, Kingsbury identified 
three arguments that are used by Asian states to deny the existence of indigenous peoples 
within the state, namely: a definitional argument (requirement of the European settler 
colonialism); practical argument (impossibility in determining the first occupants); and a 
policy argument (chauvinistic tendencies of certain original inhabitants).   
 
4.3. India’s view  
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In India, the people of indigenous characteristics are called Scheduled Tribes or 
Adivasi. The term Adivasi is commonly used to describe tribal people of India, which 
literally means ‘original inhabitants’.305 They do not form part of the larger Hindu social 
structure such as the caste system. They were often referred to as ‘junglees’ meaning wild 
people.
306
 They generally live in the northeast and central India tribal belt region with 
inaccessible terrain and highlands. According to the 2001 census, 84.32 million persons 
were classified as belonging to the Scheduled Tribes, which form around 8.32% of the 
total population of India.
307
 There are 622 different Scheduled Tribes in the country 
today.
308
 Article 342 of the Indian Constitution laid down the provisions for the 
recognition of Scheduled Tribes:  
(1) The President may with respect to any State or Union territory, and where it is 
a State, after consultation with the Governor thereof, by public notification, 
specify the tribes or tribal communities or parts of or groups within tribes or 
tribal communities which shall for the purposes of this Constitution be 
deemed to be Scheduled Tribes in relation to that State or Union territory, as 
the case may be.  
(2)  Parliament may by law include in or exclude from the list of Scheduled 
Tribes specified in a notification issued under clause (1) any tribe or tribal 
community or part of or group within any tribe or tribal community, but save 
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as aforesaid a notification issued under the said clause shall not be varied by 
any subsequent notification. 
309
 
Articles 15(4) and 16(4) further enable the state to make advancements in the 
economic, social and educational field, and make preferential reservations for the 
scheduled tribes.
310
 Articles 330 and 332 provide political reservations for the scheduled 
tribes in the House of People and in the state (provincial) legislative assembly. A tribal 
self-government or autonomy was enshrined in the 5
th
 and 6
th
 Schedules of the 
Constitution, in order to maintain their distinct customs and socioeconomic organisation, 
and to prevent their exploitation by the dominant people around them.
311
 
 Even though India does make efforts to maintain and protect its tribal peoples or 
Adivasis, India has never recognised the application of the international legal concept of 
‘indigenous peoples’ within its territory.  It denies the existence of particular indigenous 
groups within its boundaries by maintaining that it regards the entire population of the 
country at the time of its independence in 1947 and its successors as indigenous.
312
 
Throughout the meetings of UN Working Group, India maintained the position that the 
concept of indigenous peoples does not apply within its boundaries.
313
 It linked the 
concept to European colonialism, where India strongly argued that “indigenous peoples 
are descendants of the original inhabitants who have suffered from conquest or invasion 
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from outside.”314 Following a more practical and policy oriented argument, India claimed 
that it is impossible to determine who came first in its territories due to centuries of 
migration and absorption of different cultural groups. The representative of India in the 
Working Group (in 1991) further commented that “most of the tribes in India share 
ethnic, racial, and linguistic characteristics with other people in India …”315 and it could 
therefore be difficult to determine the indigenousness of the groups. 
Furthermore, during the adoption of UNDRIP, Indian representative Mr. Ajai 
Malhotra stated that the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination does not apply 
to India. He argued that the provision on self-determination applies only to people under 
foreign domination and not to those living in independent states.
316
  
The UN Special Rapporteur (James Anaya), in response to India’s stand, clarified 
that: 
 in the Asian context, the term indigenous peoples is understood to refer to distinct 
cultural groups such as “tribal peoples”, “hill tribes”, “scheduled tribes” or “adivasis”, 
who are indigenous to the countries in which they live and have distinct identities and 
ways of life, and who face very particularized human rights issues related to histories 
of various forms of oppression, such as dispossession of their lands and natural 
resources and denial of cultural expression …317 
 
With these facts in mind, we can say that the Government of India’s position on the 
definition of the term ‘indigenous peoples’ is reflective of Niezen’s legal/analytical 
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approach due its strict criteria that requires original inhabitancy and an act of 
colonization. Further, there is no evidence that suggests India’s reliance on the other two 
approaches. India also makes definitional, practical and policy oriented arguments as 
proposed by Kingsbury to deny the application of the term within its jurisdiction. Also, I 
think India may be more comfortable relying on the term ‘tribal people’ within its system 
because the term ‘tribal’ has not been recognized as a legal category within international 
law.
318
 
 
4.4. China’s view  
 
The official position of the Chinese Government is that there are no indigenous 
peoples within the boundaries of Peoples Republic of China. According to Mr. Long 
Xuequn (advisor of the Chinese delegation at the 53
rd
 session of the UN Commission on 
Human Rights, 1997): 
As in the case of other Asian countries, the Chinese people of all ethnic groups have 
lived on our own land for generations. We suffered from invasion and occupation of 
colonialists and foreign aggressors. Fortunately, after arduous struggles of all ethnic 
groups, we drove away those colonialists and aggressors. In China, there are no 
indigenous peoples and therefore no indigenous issues.
319
 
 
In the deliberations of the UN Working Group, China maintained the policy of rejecting 
the existence of indigenous peoples within its territory by claiming that:  
The Chinese Government believes that the question of indigenous peoples is the 
product of European countries’ recent pursuit of colonial policies in other parts of the 
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world … As in the majority of Asian countries, the various nationalities in China have 
all lived for aeons on Chinese territory. Although there is no indigenous peoples’ 
question in China, the Chinese Government and people have every sympathy with 
indigenous peoples’ historical woes and historical plight … The special historical 
misfortunes of indigenous peoples set them apart from minority nationalities and 
ethnic groups in the ordinary sense.
320
 
 
According to China, there is no question of indigenous peoples within its own territory 
because the issue of indigenous peoples arises only in those states which are victims of 
former European colonialism and settlements. China is generally in favour of a more 
strict definitional approach so that the groups (e.g. Tibetans and Uighurs) within its 
territories are not given international rights of indigenous peoples. Thus, in its comment, 
“until a clear definition of indigenous peoples has been established, the Chinese 
Government cannot formulate specific opinions on individual clauses of the draft 
declaration.”321 
 Though China does not recognise indigenous peoples within its territory, it does 
recognize the existence of ethnic minorities or nationalities within its territory and claims 
that they are provided sufficient care and legal protection in the field of cultural, 
economic, social and political matters (autonomy). There are 56 officially recognised 
nationalities (minzu) in China, out of which 55 are considered minority nationalities (or 
ethnic minorities).
322
 Each of these minority nationalities are given political autonomy by 
the establishment of five autonomous regions at the provincial level, 30 autonomous 
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prefectures and 120 autonomous counties.
323
 The five autonomous regions are Inner 
Mongolian Autonomous Region (established in 1947), Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous 
Regions (1955), Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region (1958), Ningxia Hui Autonomous 
Region (1958) and Tibet Autonomous Region (1965).
324
 According to the last census of 
2000, there are approximately 105 million people belonging to ethnic minority groups 
and they comprise 8.47 percent of the total population of China. 
325
 
Article 4 of the 1982 Constitution of China advocates equality of all nationalities 
within China and thus provides regional autonomy to all minority nationalities:  
All nationalities in the People's Republic of China are equal. The state protects the 
lawful rights and interests of the minority nationalities and upholds and develops the 
relationship of equality, unity and mutual assistance among all of China's 
nationalities. Discrimination against and oppression of any nationality are prohibited; 
any acts that undermine the unity of the nationalities or instigate their secession are 
prohibited. The state helps the areas inhabited by minority nationalities speed up their 
economic and cultural development in accordance with the peculiarities and needs of 
the different minority nationalities. Regional autonomy is practised in areas where 
people of minority nationalities live in compact communities; in these areas organs of 
self- government are established for the exercise of the right of autonomy. All the 
national autonomous areas are inalienable parts of the People's Republic of China. 
The people of all nationalities have the freedom to use and develop their own spoken 
and written languages, and to preserve or reform their own ways and customs.
326
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A separate law was also created in 1984 called the “Law on Regional Autonomy”327 in 
order to effectively implement the spirit of abovementioned provision. Although the 
system of autonomous self-governance by minority nationalities was set up in the 1950s, 
in reality, all major decisions are taken by the Communist Party and the state based on 
the principle of “democratic centralism” and influenced by the Han Chauvinism.328  
Here, China’s strong tendency to deny the existence of indigenous peoples within 
its jurisdiction reflects Kingsbury’s definitional argument to reject them, and implicitly 
falls within Niezen’s legal/analytical approach to the definition. There is no evidence of 
China making policy oriented arguments against the identification of indigenous peoples 
in the country. Since China vehemently deny their existence within the state, it is highly 
unlikely that China will support Niezen’s practical/strategic and collective/global 
approaches due to their inclusive categorization and the requirement of self-
identification.  
 
4.5. Philippines’ View 
 
In the long colonial history of the Philippines, first during the Spanish rule and 
later on with the American one, the population of the state was influenced heavily by the 
colonial forces and became Christian. Nevertheless, small groups of people, who were 
pushed into the remote corners of the state, have been able to maintain their own distinct 
pre-colonial culture and religious practices. According to Doaos, these indigenous groups 
have been subjected to discrimination, abuse and exploitation at the hands of colonising 
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powers and later on under the Philippines state.
329
 One of the primary concerns of these 
groups was the right to ancestral domain or land. During the Spanish and American 
colonial rule, indigenous groups were dispossessed of their lands through different 
systems such as the Regalian Doctrine
330
 and later on the Torren titling system.
331
 After 
gaining independence in 1946, indigenous cultural communities continued to suffer 
marginalization, exploitation and dispossession of their lands at the hand of the Marcos 
dictatorship.
332
 Indigenous groups struggled and took active participation in the 
democratic movements within the country and advocated for the rights of their distinct 
indigenous culture and identity. Finally in the new 1987 Constitution, several provisions 
related to indigenous peoples were mentioned:  
The State shall recognise, respect, and protect the rights of indigenous cultural 
communities to preserve and develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions. It 
shall consider these rights in the formulation of national plans and policies. (Art. XIV, 
Section 17) 
The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development 
policies and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to 
their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-being. 
The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property 
rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain. 
(Article XII, Section 5)
333
  
                                                 
329
 David A. Daoas, “The Rights of Cultural Communities in the Philippines” in Christian Erni, ed, Vines 
That Wont Bind: Indigenous Peoples of Asia (Copenhagen: IWGIA Document No. 80, 1996) 97, para 1. 
330
 Ibid. According to this doctrine, all lands (and resources) in the public domain belongs to the state. All 
lands not privately owned become the property of the state.  
331
 Ibid, at 99. 
332
 Ibid, at 100. 
333
 Constitution of the Republic of Philippines, online: < 
http://www.philippinecountry.com/philippine_constitution/1987_constitution.html >  
94 
 
 
In 1997, the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act334 (IPRA) was enacted by the government, 
which makes specific provisions governing indigenous peoples’ rights based upon the 
Constitution. With the IPRA, the Philippines became only the third Asian state to 
recognise the concept of indigenous peoples in domestic law after Japan and Taiwan
335
. 
In the IPRA, the rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICC/IP) 
were recognised and protected as follows: 
Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples – refer to a  group of people or 
homogenous societies identified by self-ascription and ascription by others, who have 
continuously lived as organized community on communally bounded and defined 
territory, and who have, under claims for ownership since time immemorial, 
occupied, possessed and utilized such territories, sharing common bonds of language, 
customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or who have, through 
resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous 
religions and cultures, became historically differentiated from the majority of 
Filipinos. ICCs/IPs shall likewise include peoples who are regarded as indigenous on 
account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, at the time 
of conquest or colonization, or at the time of inroads of non-indigenous religions and 
cultures, or the establishment of present state boundaries, who retain some or all of 
their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions, but who may have been 
displaced from their traditional domains or who may have resettled outside their 
ancestral domains. (Chapter II, Section 3) 
336
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Further, it also goes on to recognize indigenous peoples’ right to land and resources; self-
governance and empowerment; social justice and human rights; right to maintain and 
preserve cultural integrity; and self-determination.
337
 
Accordingly, the government has identified 110 indigenous groups in Philippines 
with the population estimates ranging from 6.5 million to 12 million (between 10 and 
15% of the total national population).
338
  
The Philippines’ approach to the definition primarily reflects adherence to both 
the practical/strategic and collective/global approach of Niezen. The practical/strategic 
approach is evident as the Philippines is more inclusive of the groups which need not 
necessarily descend from a pre-colonial period, and generally more in tune with the 
modern human rights rubric. The Philippines also reflects the collective/global approach 
due to the indigenous groups’ successful decade long assertion of their identity and rights 
within state and across international forums which was finally accepted and legally 
recognized by the government of Philippines. Finally, with the legal recognition of 
‘indigenous peoples’ in the IPRA, Philippines ends up affirming Niezen’s legal/analytical 
approach to the definition. There is no evidence on any of Kingsbury’s arguments 
denying recognition to indigenous groups. 
 
4.6. Bangladesh’s View  
 
In Bangladesh, there are many marginalized groups which do not have the right to 
self-determination. According to Chakma, the majority of these tribal groups live in the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) and they are commonly known as Jumma people. It is 
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derived from ‘jhum’, the local Bengali term for swidden agriculture.339 More details on 
the history and status of Jumma people will be discussed in the next chapter.  
Officially, the government of Bangladesh rejected the use of the term ‘indigenous 
peoples’ within its territory. This fact could be clearly found in the reply of its 
representative to the UN Working Group in 1985:  
… I would like to reiterate our well known stand that any attempt to define the people 
of Chittagong Hill Tracts as indigenous populations is not only erroneous but is also 
based on arguments having very scant respect for scientific reasoning.  It is the 
considered view of my delegation that in defining the indigenous populations 
practical insight should be derived from the historical experience in those countries 
where racially distinct people coming from overseas established colonies and 
subjugated the indigenous populations.   
No such situation ever existed in Bangladesh where the people coexisted through 
recorded history with complete communal harmony. The factual situation is that the 
entire population of Bangladesh falls under the category of autocthon and should be 
described as such in any objective analysis.
340
 
 
 According to the Chairperson-Rapporteur Ms. Erica-Irene A. Daes’s report: 
The observer for Bangladesh said, inter alia, that a definition was an essential step in 
institutionalizing guarantees for safeguarding the rights of indigenous people. He also 
stated that ambiguity or absence of criteria could be a convenient cover for States to 
deny or grant recognition of indigenous status, since there would be no international 
standard to go by. He also referred to the opening statement of the Assistant 
Secretary-General for Human Rights who had spoken of an estimated 300 million 
indigenous people in the world and recalled his query made last year concerning the 
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basis for the figure and the criteria on which it had been calculated. He also stated 
that since Bangladesh's population of 120 million were all indigenous, based on the 
quoted figure, the Secretariat only had to account for the remaining 180 million 
indigenous people.
341
 
 
Furthermore, according to a statement by Bangladesh’s delegate to the 9th session of the 
UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issue in 2010: 
Although Bangladesh does not have any ‘indigenous’ population, we follow the 
deliberations of the Permanent forum on Indigenous Issues as an ‘observer’. At times 
references are made to certain cases of Bangladesh and hence we would like to clarify 
about the Government’s position. 
As I have just mentioned, there are no ‘indigenous people’ in Bangladesh but some 
tribal people or people of different ethnic minorities living in different parts of the 
country.
342
 
 
Based on above statements, it is noteworthy here that there is inconsistency in the 
assertions of Bangladesh where, on one occasion, it states that all people in the country 
were indigenous, and, on the other hand, no indigenous peoples existed in Bangladesh. 
According to Erni, Bangladesh’s reluctance to recognize indigenous peoples 
within its territory is “largely politically motivated and has its roots in Bengali 
nationalism, which was the driving force in the struggle for independence from 
Pakistan.”343 It views the concept and rights of indigenous peoples as applicable only to 
European colonies and settlements, and sees indigenous peoples’ self-determination 
claims as a direct antithetical to its sovereignty and Bengali nationalism. Thus its 
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approach to the definition undoubtedly reflects Niezen’s strict legal/analytical approach 
requiring historical disruption by colonialism as a rigid criterion, and Kingsbury’s 
definitional argument in order to deny existence of indigenous peoples within its 
territory. There is no evidence of its reliance on the other approaches and arguments.  
 
4.7. Conclusion 
 
In the end, we can conclude that, as far as these Asian states are concerned, there 
is no uniform approach to the issue of definition and identification of indigenous peoples 
within their territories. There is no overarching and common non-western Asian states’ 
view on the identity of indigenous peoples in international law. There are various factors 
contributing to the diversity of views, namely, the nature of domestic politics, human 
rights standards, civil society movements, nationalism and the rule of law, etc.  
However, it is equally important to know how non-state indigenous groups within 
these states perceive the definition and identification of ‘indigenous peoples’, and to 
discover whether their views differ from that of their state governments. This leads us to 
the next chapter which will describe how these non-state Asian indigenous groups 
perceive the definition and why they differ from the views expressed by the concerned 
state governments. 
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Chapter 5: Asian Group Views on the Definition and Identification of 
Indigenous Peoples 
 
This chapter will examine the views of Asian groups claiming to be indigenous on 
the definition and identification of the term ‘indigenous peoples’. I will analyze the views 
of groups claiming to be indigenous peoples in four Asian states, namely, India, China, 
the Philippines and Bangladesh, and determine which approaches to the definition they 
subscribe to. Since there is a limited material available in this area, I have tried to use 
primary sources as far as possible.  
Before going into the perspectives of the Asian groups claiming to be indigenous, 
it is important to understand the unique situation and context of Asia, namely, its 
complex history of migration; colonial and non-colonial (internal) disruptions; and the 
requirement of non-dominance as a crucial factor in determining the existence of 
indigenous peoples. It is also important to understand the overall discourse of human 
rights in order to determine the identity of indigenous peoples’ in Asia.  
 
5.1. Asian Context   
 
As we have seen in the preceding chapters, the notion of indigenous peoples was 
developed in the West based upon the historical disruption caused by European western 
colonialism. In this situation, there was a clear-cut series of historical events demarcating 
and identifying indigenous groups of peoples belonging to the territory as compared to 
the European settlers.
344
 But, in the Asian context, the historical requirements are much 
more complex due to a dual colonization process: namely, western colonization and 
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internal Asian colonization.
345
 So, in Asia, like many other regions of the world, historic 
and present injustices suffered by the groups claiming to be indigenous continue and did 
not end with the demise of western colonialism.
346
 Here internal colonization means the 
colonization of the Asian groups by another dominant Asian ethnic group or society. In 
this form of colonialism, the dominant “ethnic group in control of a government 
systematically exploits resources of the regions occupied by minority ethnic groups, 
reducing the development of those regions to that of dependencies”347 and renders them 
marginal, non-dominant and subordinated to the rest of the society. According to Ahmad: 
The basic feature of internal colonialism is that the more developed core of a country 
dominates the periphery politically and exploits it materially. Internal colonialism 
resembles colonial domination because the groups who dominate the peoples on the 
periphery belong to a different culture and the domination is based on racism.
348
 
Internal colonialism condemns the peoples of the periphery to an instrumental role 
and legalizes metropolitan hegemony. The typical consequences of internal 
colonialism include inequitable distribution of national wealth, employment and 
educational opportunities. The local resources and income are used primarily to serve 
the interests of the dominant ethnic or religious groups wielding state power. 
Particularly indigenous peoples that were once externally colonized have continued to 
live on the periphery in the nation-states. Internal colonialism like classical 
colonialism is responsible for causing a number of factors like … economic and 
political subordination, etc. which brought about the present state of non-dominance 
of the indigenous peoples.
349
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Thus, the requirement of historical disruption caused by both the colonial and non-
colonial or internal events is equally necessary and relevant in the context of Asia in 
order to determine the identity of indigenous peoples there.    
The migration pattern in the Asian region has been “complicated by its [long] 
history of war … and blending of different civilizations and populations”350 resulting in a 
complex situation where it is not easy to determine which group of people existed in a 
certain territory before the rest.  To some extent, as shown in the previous chapter, it is 
this complex situation that prompted many Asian states to shy away from identifying 
certain marginal groups within their states as indigenous, instead proclaiming the entire 
population of the country as indigenous.  
Next, it is important to note that the principle of self-identification is an accepted 
practice and standard in the international sphere for determining the identity of 
indigenous peoples.
351
 It is a practice where groups claiming to be indigenous identify 
themselves as falling within the rubric of international human rights law’s distinct 
category of ‘indigenous peoples’ based upon certain common characteristics. As stated in 
the previous chapters, the principle was outlined as the fundamental element in most of 
the major international documents and treaties such as the World Bank Policies
352
 and 
ILO Conventions 107 and 169.
353
  The indigenous peoples representatives had, on 
various occasions, expressed that a definition of the concept of indigenous peoples was 
                                                 
350
 See He, supra note 344, at 463, para 1.  
351
 Douglas E. Sanders, “Indigenous Peoples: Issues of Definition” (1999) 8:1 Int’l J Cult Prop 6, last para. 
[Hereinafter Sanders 1999] Further, see Chapter 3 for the detailed assertion of self-identification principle 
by various international bodies such as the World Bank, the ILO and the UN Working Group on 
Indigenous Populations.  
352
 See Operational Policy 4.10 as discussed in the chapter 3.  
353
 See article 1(2) of the ILO Convention 169, as discussed in the chapter 3. See supra note 48. 
102 
 
 
not necessary or desirable.
354
 According to Erica-Irene Daes, the procedure to exercise 
the right of self-identification had to have the following characteristics: 
first, they had to be operational in order to serve international objectives and in 
particular allow an understanding of the many different cultures; 
second, they had to be functional to allow participation of the indigenous peoples; 
third, they had to be flexible in order to be able to respond to new situations in the 
dynamic process of recognizing indigenous peoples’ rights.355  
 
The principle of self-identification cannot be practical without any recognition by others. 
But the texts of major international documents do not clearly specify who must give 
recognition to those groups for them to be firmly established as “indigenous peoples”.  
The principle can be viewed from two different perspectives. On the one hand, excessive 
use of self-identification could lead to a proliferation of the standard and thus might 
belittle the entire process.
356
 The fear of proliferation is an important argument on the 
parts of Asian states who wish to define ‘indigenous peoples’ strictly and in terms of 
legal certainty. On the other hand, the aims underpinning the project of defining the rights 
of indigenous peoples, such as human rights, justice and self-determination, might be 
jeopardized if recognition by states is made mandatory for a group to become indigenous 
people. To require recognition by the state means having an agreement between the 
powerful and the powerless, which might ultimately hamper the interests and aspirations 
of indigenous groups.
357
  
Nevertheless, international practices on self-identification are made possible due 
to the legitimate recognition of the group claiming indigenous status by other non-state 
                                                 
354
 Standard-Setting Activities: Evolution of Standards Concerning the Rights of Indigenous People, 
Working paper by the former Chairperson-Rapporteur Mrs. Erica-Irene A. Daes on the concept of 
“indigenous peoples”, at 12, para 35.  (E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1996/2) See online: < 
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/e06a5300f90fa0238025668700518ca4/2b6e0fb1e9d7db0fc1
256b3a003eb999/$FILE/G9612980.pdf >  
355
 Ibid, at 15, para 41. 
356
 See He, supra note 344, at 464, para 1. 
357
 Ibid. 
103 
 
 
indigenous groups in various international forums.
358
  Even though they do not provide 
formal and legal recognition, it does provide legitimate acceptance and assumptions in 
favour of the status of indigenous peoples. Where there was a clear misuse of the 
principle, indigenous groups and organizations did not fall short of criticizing and making 
sure the principle was observed and respected. For example, in 1994, when white groups 
from Namibia and South Africa came to the working group claiming indigenous status, 
indigenous delegates protested and criticized such misuse and misrepresentation of the 
principle of self-identification.
359
 
Finally, the requirement of the state of non-dominance within larger society is 
also crucial in the context of Asia, where the majority cultures or dominant peoples also 
claim indigenous status. As stated in the previous chapter, many Asian states declared the 
entire population of the country as indigenous to the territory arguably undermining the 
whole discourse of the modern human rights of indigenous peoples in international law. 
Under the state of non-dominance, groups claiming to be indigenous continue to suffer 
threats to their distinct identities and basic human rights in ways not felt by dominant 
sections of society. In fact, the state of non-dominance, which is subordination and 
marginalization of a particular group,
360
 was a direct result of the historical disruption 
caused by either Western colonialism or Asian internal colonial practices, and thus 
constitutes justification for recognizing legal rights of indigenous peoples.
361
 It is an 
important criterion because “no entrenchment of indigenous peoples’ rights would be 
necessary had there been no incidences of subordination of the indigenous peoples at the 
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hands of a dominant social or political formation.”362 Since the very purpose of the 
discourse of indigenous peoples’ rights is to overcome this non-domination, 
subordination and marginalization,
363
 claiming indigenous status in international law by 
majority dominant cultural groups within Asian states is antithetical to the very purpose 
for which it was formed.  
With these themes in mind, I shall now turn to views expressed by various Asian 
groups claiming indigenous status from India, Bangladesh, China and Philippines on the 
definition and identification of indigenous peoples in international law.  
 
5.2. Groups in India 
 
As noted earlier, the peoples in India who claim to be indigenous are called 
Scheduled Tribes or Adivasi.
364
 They do not form part of the larger Hindu social structure 
such as the caste system. As of 2011, a population of 84.32 million was classified as 
belonging to the Scheduled Tribes, which forms around 8.32% of the total population of 
India.
365
 There are 461 groups officially recognized as Scheduled Tribes and these are 
considered to be India’s indigenous peoples according to the International Work Group of 
Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA).
366
  The largest numbers of Scheduled Tribes are found in 
the seven states of the north-east India
367
 and the central tribal belt region with 
inaccessible terrain and highlands. 
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The first delegates of the groups claiming to be indigenous from India started to 
participate in the UN Working Group meetings in 1985 and advocated for indigenous 
status and rights for the adivasis and tribals of India.
368
 In 1987, a group of five adivasi 
delegates participated in the Working Group and expressed their solidarity with all the 
indigenous peoples of the world.
369
 They “challenged the [Indian] state’s position, saying 
that they were IPs and that since pre-historic times have remained distinct peoples, 
‘reduced to a colonial situation’, subjugated by a ‘system of values and institutions 
maintained by the dominant ruling group.’”370 In the same year, the Indian Confederation 
of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (ICITP) was formed representing almost all the regions 
of India where tribal peoples lived.  
In the 1994 UN Working Group resolution on indigenous and tribal peoples in 
India, the indigenous participants rejected India’s position that the Scheduled Tribes of 
India were not indigenous peoples, and further argued that the UN definition at that time 
relied too much on the western experience of colonialism. They called upon the Working 
Group to “take note of the reality of the indigenous/tribal peoples of South Asia and 
South-east Asian countries and widen the scope of the definition of the indigenous 
peoples to give proper recognition to the indigenous/tribal peoples in this region.”371 
Further, they claimed that the tribal peoples in India are the descendants of the first 
settlers or residents who controlled the territory before being pushed into geographical 
isolation by outsiders and invaders.
372
 Though they used the term ‘first settlers’, which is 
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questionable historically, they adhered to the principle of prior occupancy by requiring 
the forces of outside invaders in order for groups to be counted as tribal peoples. As such, 
they were suffering from political, economic and social discrimination, and treated like 
colonies by the mainstream ruling elites.
373
 Thus they recommended the Working Group 
to take notice of the situation of colonialism in South Asia and accordingly widen the 
scope of the definition of indigenous peoples to include situations in South Asia.
374
 
Furthermore, they developed criteria for defining tribal or indigenous peoples in India 
that include consideration of: (1) the relative geographical isolation of the community; (2) 
their reliance on forest, ancestral land and water bodies within their territory for food and 
other necessities; (3) the existence of a distinct culture; (4) the relative freedom of women 
within their society; and (5) the absence of a division of labour and caste system. 
375
  
Later, indigenous peoples representatives criticized the UN Special Rapporteur 
Miquel Alfonso Martinez’s 1999 report,376 which claimed that the Asian and African 
situations did not qualify for the usage of the term ‘indigenous peoples’ because they 
were not victims of the European salt-water colonialism and settlements. The term 
‘indigenous peoples’, according to him, referred only to those groups which were direct 
victims of the European settlements in countries such as US, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand. According to Martinez, “in post-colonial Africa and Asia, autochthonous 
groups/minorities/ethnic groups/peoples cannot claim for themselves … the ‘indigenous’ 
status in the United Nations context.”377 He also suggested that cases relating to Asian 
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and African states should be dealt outside the confines of the UN Working Group on 
Indigenous Populations
378
 and insisted on a clear-cut distinction between indigenous 
peoples and national or ethnic minorities. This report by Alfonso Martinez was heavily 
criticized by India’s indigenous delegate Ram Dayal Munda (ICITP president), who 
claimed that “Martinez’s ‘selective view of the colonial background’ has misled him to 
preclude the existence of indigenous peoples in Africa and Asia.
379
 Mr. Roy Laifungbam, 
of the Manipur indigenous organization, criticized Martinez’s limited understanding of 
the colonial process. According to him, Martinez “has failed to grasp ‘the process of re-
colonization of indigenous peoples and nations by successors of European colonial 
governments in Asia and Africa.’”380 Further, Luingam Luithui, a representative of the 
Naga people, also criticized the Special Rapporteur for his limited understanding of 
colonization, which was strictly confined to the theory of salt-water colonialism, and thus 
“marginalize[d] a huge number of indigenous peoples who have been subjected to some 
of the worst forms of oppression in the world’s history.”381 Thus India’s tribal peoples 
have, at various forums, argued for a more flexible application of the term ‘indigenous 
peoples’, especially with regard to Asia and Africa.  
The indigeneity of specific groups within India was also explicitly recognized at 
times. For example, with regard to the Boro
382
 peoples’ recognition as indigenous 
peoples, a collective statement was made in 2006 at the UN Permanent Forum for 
Indigenous Issues (UNPFII) by the Indian Confederation of Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples (ICITP) which affirmed the indigeneity of the Boro people and declared that:  
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Madam Chair, the Boro people is a suppressed Indigenous People who live in present 
day Assam, Nepal, North Bengal and scattered in different states/provinces of North 
Eastern part of present India. The Boro People lived as a free and independent nation 
with their distinct identity since the time immemorial in these regions. During the 
British rule some of the Boro Kingdom and Principalities retained their freedom as 
protectorate kingdom. After the British’s departure, Indian forcibly occupied the Boro 
kingdoms and merged up them in to Indian domination and trampled down the Boro 
people’s right to freedom.383 
 
In the Haflong Declaration
384
 of 2007, the preamble of the document affirmed the self-
identity of the groups therein as indigenous and declared that: 
We, the indigenous peoples’ leaders and activists representing 68 indigenous peoples 
organizations from Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burma, and India, including 
indigenous leaders from all the seven sister states of the Eastern Himalaya region of 
India who are gathered here in Guwahati, Assam, India for the South Asia Regional 
Training on Conflict Resolution and Peace Building Capacity, under the aegis of 
Indian Confederation of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, North East Zone and its 
member organizations and allies.
385
 
The Naga tribal people from the state of Nagaland have been one of the most vocal 
advocates of the rights of indigenous peoples and self-determination. Its representative 
Mr. Isak Chishi Swu, Chairman of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) 
made a statement in the UN Working Group on Indigenous Population on 27
th
 July 1994, 
where he affirmed the Naga peoples’ commitment to the just cause of the indigenous 
peoples everywhere.
386
 In 2005, the Naga International Support Center (NISC), formed 
                                                 
383
 Indian Confederation of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples North East Zone, online: <http://www.icitp-
nez.org/Statement%20of%20ICITP-NEZ-UNPF_II_2006.html > 
384
 Declaration of South Asia Regional Indigenous Peoples on Conflict and Peace, Haflong , India,  31st 
March 2007. Online: ICITP-NEZ < http://www.icitp-nez.org/Haflong%20Declaration.html>   
385
 Ibid.   
386
 Statement to UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations, 12
th
 session at Geneva, on 27
th
 July 1994. 
See online: < http://nscn.livejournal.com/73193.html >     
109 
 
 
and based in Amsterdam, reaffirmed the commitment to the rights of indigenous peoples 
and demand for self-determination.
387
 In 2011, the World Parliament of Indigenous 
Peoples’ First Round Table Conference held in Tumkur (India), members of 39 
indigenous delegates from 10 countries attended the conference including representatives 
of the Naga and Manipuri tribal peoples of India.
388
 So, the Naga people have identified 
themselves as the ‘indigenous people’ within the context of international law and 
demanded indigenous rights, including self-determination.   
Further, in 2011, in an appeal letter to the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation 
of human rights defenders, Mr. Jebra Ram Muchahary (President, ICITP-NEZ)
389
 
highlighted the dire situation of the human rights of the tribal peoples in the north-east 
region and requested intervention in the following ways: 
(1) Intervention by the government of India to ensure the safety and security of life 
and properties of the human rights defenders in the country; 
(2) To stop the labeling of human rights defenders as anti-national and anti-national 
development, leading to discrimination, arbitrary arrests, unlawful detentions, 
torture and extrajudicial killings in the country; 
(3) To recommend the withdrawal of the AFSPA390 (1958) from the North Eastern 
region; 
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(4) To ensure the implementation of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (2007) in India; 
(5) To recommend the ratification of the ILO Convention 169 so as to improve the 
situation of indigenous peoples and their human rights defenders.391  
Finally, based on all abovementioned facts, one can say that the positions taken by groups 
claiming to be indigenous in India reflect both Niezen’s second and third approaches to 
definition, namely, the practical/strategic approach and the collective/global approach. 
Their approach is practical/strategic because the groups argued in favour of a more 
inclusive and widened approach to the definition that includes the specific situations of 
South Asia. Further it is a collective/global approach because they have participated in 
various international indigenous peoples’ forums and identified themselves as 
‘indigenous peoples’ within the international law context. 
 
5.3. Groups in Bangladesh 
 
As shown in the previous chapter, the government of Bangladesh does not 
recognize the existence of indigenous peoples within its territory and claims that the 
concept of indigenous peoples was applicable only to European colonies and settlements. 
According to the government of Bangladesh, indigenous peoples’ self-determination 
claims were directly antithetical to its sovereignty and majority Bengali nationalism. So 
its reluctance to recognize indigenous peoples within the state boundaries was largely 
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politically motivated and had its roots in Bengali nationalism, which was the driving 
force in the struggle for independence from Pakistan.  
According to the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), 
there are approximately 2.5 million indigenous people in Bangladesh belonging to 45 
different ethnic groups.
392
 The majority of these groups live in the Chittagong Hill Tracts 
(CHT) in the south-eastern part of the country and as noted earlier, they are commonly 
and collectively known as Jumma people. It was derived from the word ‘jhum’, the local 
Bengali term for swidden agriculture. They include groups such as the Bawm, Chakma, 
Khumi, Khiang, Lusshai, Marma, Mro/Mru, Pangkhua, Chak, Tangchangya, Tripura and 
Uchay. 
393
 They differ from the majority Bengali people in culture, physical features, 
religion, language and social organization. According to Ahmed, since the formation of 
the nation-state of Bangladesh, these peoples remained one of the most persecuted, 
discriminated and marginalized groups in the state. They were denied constitutional 
recognition, culturally discriminated by the majority, and politically and economically 
marginalized in the society.
394
 As a result, these peoples in the CHT took up arms and 
started an insurgency in 1976 against the government of Bangladesh. After 25 years of 
insurgency and civil-war, the CHT Peace Accord was signed in 1997 between the 
Government and the Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS, United People’s 
Party) which led the resistance movement.
395
  
Despite having suffered under the dominant Bengali people and non-recognition 
by the state as indigenous peoples, these groups have actively participated in the 
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international forums and advocated their identity and right as indigenous peoples within 
the larger international context. They have also strived and advocated for the 
constitutional recognition of their identity and rights, and urged the government for the 
implementation of ILO Convention 107 (to which the Bangladesh is a party)
396
 and for 
implementation of the provisions in the CHT Peace Accord.  
 Mr. R S Dewan, Spokesperson for the Jana Samhati Samiti (Jumma people), on 
several occasions participated in the UN Working Group meetings,
397
 where he 
highlighted a deep sense of concern regarding the dire situation of Jumma people in 
Bangladesh. On other occasions, he expressed that “[t]he CHT is the traditional homeland 
of ten ethnic groups … All these indigenous people are also popularly known as Jumma 
people or Jumma Nation.  They are totally different from the majority community of 
Bangladesh in race, religion and culture.”398 
According to Raja Devasish Roy’s399 report and intervention in the UN Permanent Forum 
on Indigenous Issues (PFII), tribal peoples in the CHT were clearly indigenous peoples 
within the mandate of the UNPFII: 
The issue of the mandate of the Forum on ‘indigenous issues’ and the identity of 
indigenous peoples from different countries, including Bangladesh, perhaps needs to 
be clarified. The Permanent Forum deals with issues of indigenous peoples, but 
indigenous peoples on different countries may be known by names other than 
indigenous, including ‘tribes’ or ‘ethnic minority’, or otherwise. Despite the use of 
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such varied terminology, these peoples are, and will be regarded as ‘indigenous’ by 
the Permanent Forum within the meaning of its mandate on ‘indigenous issues’.  
The ILO Conventions on Indigenous Peoples (Nos. 107 and 169) mentions both [sic] 
‘indigenous’ and ‘tribal’ groups but clarifies that the provisions of both conventions 
apply equally to both groups, indigenous or tribal, equally. Therefore, the current 
regime of international human rights law (including the ILO Conventions and the 
UNDRIP) does not distinguish between tribal and indigenous peoples, with 
indigenous peoples being the currently accepted terminology. Therefore, the CHT 
Accord and issues of indigenous peoples in different countries (whether called 
‘minorities’, ‘tribal’ or otherwise) are undeniably within the mandate of the 
Permanent Forum.
400
 
 
Further, the Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission
401
 had stated in its letter (dated 29
th
 July 
2011) to the President of the Economic and Social Council that: 
… we know very well that the United Nations instead of defining ‘indigenous 
peoples’ understands them as those who fulfill certain criteria, which among others 
are, ‘self-identification as indigenous peoples at the individual level and accepted by 
the community as their member’, ‘strong link to territories and surrounding natural 
resources’, ‘distinct social, economic or political systems’, ‘distinct language, culture 
and beliefs’, ‘form non-dominant groups of society’, ‘resolve to maintain and 
reproduce their ancestral environments and systems as distinctive peoples and 
communities’. All these criteria are clearly fulfilled by the indigenous peoples from 
the CHT as well as the rest of the country. Moreover, these peoples also fulfill the 
criteria of indigenous populations as contained in the ILO Convention on Indigenous 
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and Tribal Populations of 1957 (Convention No. 107), which Bangladesh ratified in 
June, 1972.
402
  
 
The Commission also sent a letter to the Prime Minister of Bangladesh on 12 July 2011, 
where it expressed serious concerns over the contents of the 15
th
 amendment to the 
Constitution of Bangladesh where it was clearly mentioned that ‘the people of 
Bangladesh shall be known as Bangalees as a nation’, while denying recognition of other 
cultural groups. The letter stated that: 
we strongly believe that the estimated 50-60 indigenous peoples living in the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts and in the plain lands all over the country should be rightfully 
recognized as ‘indigenous people’ in line with the United Nation’s modern 
understanding of the term based on self-identification, historical continuity with pre-
colonial and/or pre-settler societies, strong link to territories and surrounding natural 
resources, distinct social, economic or political systems, distinct language, culture and 
beliefs, and their non-dominance in society …  
The estimated 50-60 indigenous peoples all over Bangladesh should be recognized as 
‘indigenous’ (adibashi) by the Bangladesh constitution, in line with the recognition 
given by the United Nations and acknowledged by the Honourable Prime Minister 
and others.
403
  
 
On November 29, 2011, a seminar was organized by the Bangladesh Indigenous Peoples 
Forum and the ILO on the topic “Implementing Indigenous Peoples’ Rights: Challenges 
and Opportunities.”404 Mr. Jyotirindra Bodhipriya Larma, the President of the 
Bangladesh Indigenous Peoples Forum, made a closing statement: 
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In Bangladesh, there are at least 54 distinct indigenous peoples who have been living 
in the country for centuries and their number is approximately 3 million. Indigenous 
peoples of Bangladesh have an important role for the nation and society. Many 
indigenous people took part in our liberation war in 1971 and many of them had 
sacrificed their lives for the nation. But, it is a great regret that the Constitution of 
Bangladesh does not recognize the identity and rights of indigenous peoples properly. 
Denial of fundamental rights and identity of indigenous peoples in the newly 
amended Constitution has disappointed indigenous peoples.  
With the 15
th
 amendment of the Constitution, the very existence and identity of the 
indigenous peoples have been undermined by introducing the words: ‘the people of 
Bangladesh shall be known as Bangalees as a nation’. As citizen, no doubt we are 
Bangladeshi, but as nation we are not Bangalees. In fact, we are separate nations, such 
as, Tripura, Mro, Khasia, Chakma, Santal, Garo and so on … 
Bangladesh government has ratified the ILO Convention No. 107 on indigenous and 
tribal populations. The ILO Convention has recognized the traditional land rights of 
indigenous peoples. We do not see the implementation of ILO Convention in 
Bangladesh. Implementation of ILO Convention No. 107 can bring some good result 
in the life of indigenous peoples. We also demand for ratifying the ILO Convention 
169.
405
 
 
Therefore, the groups claiming to be indigenous in Bangladesh continue to struggle for 
their rights and identity as indigenous peoples and seek constitutional recognition from 
the state. In the process, they have made it amply clear that they are indigenous in the 
modern human rights and international law context. Finally, the definitional approach 
taken by the indigenous peoples in Bangladesh reflects both practical/strategic and 
collective/global approaches. It is practical/strategic approach because the groups in 
Bangladesh conforms to the modern international law practice and approach to the 
definition. It is also collective/global approach because they have taken part in various 
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international indigenous peoples’ forums and formed alliances, self-identified themselves 
as indigenous and seek recognition from both non-state groups and the Bangladesh state 
as well. 
 
5.4. Groups in China 
 
As seen in the previous chapter, the Government of China does not recognize the 
existence of indigenous peoples within its territory as it believes that the issue of 
indigenous peoples arises only in states which are direct victims of former European 
colonialism and settlements. China has generally favored a more strict legal definitional 
approach so that the groups within its territories are not given the international rights of 
indigenous peoples. But China does recognize ethnic minorities or nationalities within its 
boundaries and claims that they are given sufficient care and protection for their political 
and cultural development. There are 56 officially recognized nationalities (minzu) in 
China, out of which 55 are considered minority nationalities (or ethnic minorities).
406
 
Two of the minority nationalities have stood apart from the rest and claimed 
indigenous and ethnic autonomy rights: the Uyghur and Tibetan peoples. Their struggle 
against the state was traditionally more in line with the claims for ethnic autonomy and 
national sovereignty, but, more recently, claims have been made to their rights also as 
indigenous peoples within China.   
The Uyghur Human Rights Project (UHRP), which is a human rights research, 
reporting and advocacy organization founded by the Uyghur American Association 
(UAA) in 2004, has claimed in its 2009 report that Uyghur people are indigenous peoples 
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within the context of the UNDRIP.
407
 The report claimed that the People’s Republic of 
China voted for the UNDRIP in 2007 and as a result recognized existing indigenous 
persons within its jurisdiction.
408
 On the question of definition, the report pointed out 
that: 
There is no universal definition of the term indigenous people, and attempts to define 
or identify what it means to be ‘indigenous’ have engendered much debate. Due to the 
historical and social diversity of groups identifying themselves as indigenous 
throughout the world, there has been much controversy over definitions of the term 
“indigenous”. 
One broad definition of what it means to be indigenous that is generally agreed upon 
recognizes indigenes’ common features as “descent from original inhabitants of a 
region prior to the arrival of settlers who have since become the dominant population; 
maintenance of cultural differences, distinct from a dominant population; and political 
marginality resulting in poverty, limited access to services, and absence of protections 
against unwanted ‘development.’”3 This definition may be seen as the most 
applicable to the Uyghur case, because each feature contained in the definition is 
relevant to the Uyghur experience, as discussed below in this report.
409
 
---  
Contrary to the spirit and letter of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, People’s Republic of China leaders have adopted a peculiar view: that East 
Turkestan, along with the rest of China, has no indigenous people.
410
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With regard to China’s alleged violation of Uyghur people’s rights, the report claimed 
that “the UN Declaration consists of eight basic parts [rights] … In the case of Uyghurs 
of East Turkestan, the PRC is in violation of every part, and nearly every Article, of this 
Declaration.”411 
 
Turning to the case of Tibetan people, the main issue is an ongoing struggle for 
political and cultural autonomy and the right of self-determination based upon their long 
historical sovereignty and independent legal existence prior to 1950.
412
 With regard to the 
identity of Tibetans as indigenous peoples, in 1999, the International Campaign for Tibet, 
a Tibetan human rights advocacy group, requested the World Bank Inspection Panel to 
assess the compliance to the Bank’s policies in the China Western Poverty Reduction 
Project. 
413
 It also stated that: 
The Indigenous Tibetan and Mongol peoples in Dulan County will be materially and 
adversely harmed by the project, and this harm will be a direct result of the failure of 
the Bank to comply with its policy on Indigenous peoples. We strongly object to 
Bank staff's contention that no indigenous peoples development plan is necessary for 
this project.
414
 
 
Further on the question of definition, it stated that: 
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[World Bank Policy] OD 4.20, in its "Definitions" section, para 3, states, "The terms 
"indigenous peoples," "indigenous ethnic minorities," " tribal groups," and "scheduled 
tribes" describe social groups with a social and cultural identity distinct from the 
dominant society that makes them vulnerable to being disadvantaged in the 
development. The Mongol and Tibetan indigenous minorities affected by the project 
fit within this definition.
415
 
 
The official Central Tibetan Administration
416
 (CTA) policy paper, entitled 
“Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People” (2008), points out that: 
The Tibetan nationality lives in one contiguous area on the Tibetan plateau, which 
they have inhabited for millennia and to which they are therefore indigenous. For 
purposes of the constitutional principles of national regional autonomy Tibetans in the 
PRC in fact live as a single nationality all over the Tibetan plateau.  
---  
As a part of the multi-national state of the PRC, Tibetans can benefit greatly from the 
rapid economic and scientific development the country is experiencing. While 
wanting to actively participate and contribute to this development, we want to ensure 
that this happens without the people losing their Tibetan identity, culture and core 
values and without putting the distinct and fragile environment of the Tibetan plateau, 
to which Tibetans are indigenous, at risk.
417
 
 
Most minority nationalities that might claim to be indigenous peoples in China have been 
unable to actively participate in various international indigenous fora and deliberations 
because it is politically not possible for them to participate due to fear of suppression by 
the Chinese state. But, some of them were able to advocate and identify themselves as 
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indigenous within the context of international human rights law. Thus the definitional 
approach taken by Uyghur people seems to adhere to the legal/analytical approach to the 
definition which requires a strict legal definition for the term ‘indigenous peoples’. In 
contrast, the Tibetan peoples’ approach  reflects Niezen’s practical/strategic one, where a 
more inclusive and less abstract definition was preferred and self-identification was 
undertaken of themselves as indigenous peoples within the rubric of human rights. 
Further, the approaches taken by both Uyghurs and the Tibetans do not reflect Niezen’s 
collective/global approach because they have so far not participated in the international 
indigenous peoples’ forums and other UN fora dealing with the rights of indigenous 
peoples.  
 
5.5. Groups in the Philippines 
 
As stated in the previous chapter, the Philippines became one of the few Asian 
states to actually recognize the concept of indigenous peoples within its territory. After 
years of indigenous peoples’ struggle for their rights and identity, the government finally 
took the decision to recognize the distinct cultural identity of indigenous cultural 
communities in the new 1987 Constitution. Article 17 proclaimed that “[t]he State shall 
recognise, respect, and protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to preserve 
and develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions. It shall consider these rights in the 
formulation of national plans and policies.”418 Further, in the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights 
Act (IPRA)
419
 of 1997, indigenous cultural communities (ICCs) were defined
420
 and 
made it clear that ICCs were the indigenous peoples of the country. The IPRA went on to 
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recognize indigenous peoples’ right to ancestral lands; inherent right to self-
determination; supported autonomy arrangements in the Cordilleras and Mindamao; and 
the right to freely pursue cultural, economic and social development within the 
framework of the Philippines Constitution.
421
 
Accordingly, the government has identified 110 indigenous groups in Philippines 
with the population estimates ranging from 6.5 million to 12 million (between 10 and 
15% of the total national population).
422
 The indigenous groups in the northern mountains 
of Luzon (Cordillera) are collectively known as Igorot, and those on the southern island 
of Mindanao are called Lumad. The Igorot consists of groups such as Apayao, Tinggian, 
Kalinga, Bontok, Kankanaey, Ibaloi and Ifugao.
423
  
In a 1984 report to the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, a 
representative of the Ibaloi people claimed that: 
The Ibaloi people, together with other indigenous people inhabiting the Grand 
Cordillera mountain range in northern Luzon are known as the Igorot people.  The 
Igorot number around 600,000 people and we are among the 6 1/2 million indigenous 
or tribal peoples living in the Philippines.  
This is the first time that a member of an indigenous people from the Philippines will 
speak at a session of the UN Working Group on indigenous populations, and I wish to 
inform the working group about recent developments affecting the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of my people.  
Our experience and understanding of our oppression are showing us the way forward 
in articulating our rights which must be guaranteed and protected if we are to survive 
as distinct peoples.  
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The Igorot people and other indigenous peoples in the Philippines were not colonized 
during the Spanish colonial period from the 16th to 19th century.  We have 
successfully maintained our traditional homelands, our political institutions and our 
cultural traditions through the American, and Japanese periods from 1900 - 1945.  
And up to today, we still exhibit a high degree of self-reliance and independence. 
… 
Our people, the indigenous people do not enjoy equality under the Philippine state. 
Even if the Philippine Constitution provides that, “The State shall consider the 
customs, traditions, beliefs and interests of national cultural communities in the 
formulation and implementation of state policies,” we suffer today from 
discrimination and national oppression, which has been our situation since the advent 
of colonization.  
…  
The non-recognition and violations of our rights as peoples – our land rights and our 
right to self-determination – has led to the steady deterioration and continuous 
worsening of our problems as a people.
424
 
 
In 1987, the Federation of Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines was established, which 
was composed of 15 indigenous peoples’ organizations. These various ethno-linguistic 
groups make up the General Assembly, the Federation’s highest policy-making body. 
The National Council of Leaders is constituted by active leaders of the member 
organizations. It formulates policies/programs and organizes national campaigns 
approved by the General Assembly. The Federation represents indigenous groups such as 
the Igorots of the Cordillera Region in the North Central Island of Luzon; Agta of the 
Sierra Madre Mountain range (eastern part of Luzon island); the Aetas of the Central 
Plains of Luzon; the Mangyans of Mindoro island southern Luzon; the Bugkalots, 
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Aggays and Kalinga, Kalanguyas of Cagayan Valley in the Northernmost region of 
Luzon; the Palawanis, Bataks and Tagbanuas of Palawan; the ethnic Tumandoks of 
Panay Island and the Lumads or indigenous peoples of Mindanao.
425
 The aim of the 
organization, which represented almost all indigenous groups within the state, was: 
Facilitating the unity of different indigenous peoples organizations all over the 
Philippines; 
Equipping the indigenous peoples with necessary skills and expertise to enable them 
to articulate their struggles and aspirations; 
… 
Advancing the issues and demands, aspirations and struggles of indigenous peoples of 
the Philippines;
426
 
 
Thus, it is amply clear that groups in the Philippines identify themselves, and recognize 
each other as indigenous peoples of the places they belong to. Furthermore, due to strong 
cultural groups’ movements and activism for indigenous rights within domestic political 
sphere, the government of the Philippines in the late 1980s, recognized the status of 
indigenous cultural communities (ICCs) as the indigenous peoples of the land. The 
definitional approaches taken by ICCs seem to reflect both of Niezen’s 
practical/strategic and collective/global approaches. They have participated and 
contributed to the proceedings of the UN forums relating to indigenous peoples and 
helped create the separate international legal identity of ‘indigenous peoples’ and their 
rights. Thus, their approach to the definition is reflective of the UN’s practical and 
strategic one where indigenous identities were constructed according to their participation 
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in the lawmaking process  with self-identification as a primary method of determining 
indigenousness. 
 
5.6. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have highlighted non-western Asian groups’ views and 
understandings on the question of definition and identity of indigenous peoples.  I have 
also highlighted that the principle of prior occupancy, which became an accepted 
standard in international law, also should be applicable to the unique situations in Asia. 
This is due to the complex historical migrations and displacements in Asia which make it 
impossible and undesirable to trace the first occupants of the land. Further, I have also 
stressed how the issues of self-identification and non-dominance form important 
components in shaping the discourse of the rights of indigenous peoples in Asia. Lastly, I 
have outlined different views and approaches taken by non-western Asian groups towards 
the definition and identity of the term ‘indigenous peoples’, and shown that these views 
do not match up with approaches taken by non-western Asian states. Even though there is 
no single Asian approach to and understanding of the identity of the term indigenous 
peoples, there appear to be common approaches taken by many groups claiming to be 
indigenous peoples in international law.  
In the next chapter, I will analyze whether there are any rights of indigenous 
peoples which attained the status of customary international law.  
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Chapter 6: Customary International Law and Indigenous Peoples 
 
This chapter will analyze whether there are any rights of indigenous peoples 
which have attained the status of customary international law. The adoption of UNDRIP 
in 2007
427
 has raised the status and legitimacy of indigenous peoples in international law 
and affirmed their right to self-determination. Even though, technically, UNDRIP is a 
soft law instrument, there could be specific provisions relating to indigenous peoples that 
have attained a higher normative status in international law.  
Before going into the detail, it is crucial here to outline why it matters whether 
groups are identified as indigenous in international law as compared to other collective 
identities such as tribal or minority.  The answer to this query lies in what specific rights 
indigenous peoples enjoy (at least theoretically) in international law as affirmed in the 
UNDRIP. In the first part of the chapter, I will briefly outline those specific rights 
belonging to indigenous peoples with a specific focus on the right of self-determination.  
 
6.1. Indigenous Peoples’ Collective Rights 
 
Collective rights in international law are those which belong exclusively and 
collectively to certain kind of peoples as a whole, and are generally different from 
individual human rights. Though collective rights were controversial in international law, 
due to contested or contradictory relations with understandings of state sovereignty, they 
were increasingly recognized in various international law instruments, especially in 
human rights discourse.
428
 Indigenous peoples’ movements, since the 1960s, were 
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organized in order to attain certain basic group rights such as self-determination and 
cultural preservation.
429
 Unlike minorities, which fall under the category of individual 
rights,
430
 the indigenous peoples’ collective rights are recognized and came to fruition 
after a long period of struggle in the form of UNDRIP. There are conceptual differences 
between minorities and indigenous peoples’ rights. According to the United Nations 
Declaration on the Minorities
431
 of 1992,  the term ‘minorities’ refers to those groups 
based on national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity.
432
 The rights 
enjoyed by the minorities are, to some extent, similar to indigenous peoples' rights, such 
as rights to equality, non-discrimination, protection and preservation of culture and 
identity, and meaningful and effective participation in all aspects of political, economic, 
social and cultural life of the country. But there are huge differences in terms of their 
rights where indigenous peoples seek traditional rights to land and resources, self-
government and self-determination. Further, indigenous peoples are collective rights-
holders in international law, whereas minorities are individual rights holders. The UN 
Declaration on Minorities did not use the term ‘Peoples’, instead it called them “Persons 
belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities”433 According to Will 
Kymlicka: 
 [there are] three basic differences between minorities and indigenous peoples: (a) 
minorities seek institutional integration while indigenous peoples seek to preserve a 
                                                 
429
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degree of institutional separateness; (b) minorities seek to exercise individual rights 
while indigenous peoples seek to exercise collective rights; (c) minorities seek non-
discrimination while indigenous peoples seek self-government.
434
 
 
With regard to the difference between tribal and indigenous peoples in international law, 
I did not come across any material that describes their conceptual differences from an 
international law perspective. Though more research is needed in this area, it seems to me 
that the discourse and narrative of the indigenous peoples in international law also 
includes groups belonging to tribal people. Although the term ‘tribal’ was used in some 
of the international documents, such as the ILO Conventions, it seems that it was used 
primarily as a legal category of people within domestic law and jurisprudence. Unlike 
indigenous peoples and minorities, international law does not recognize tribal people as a 
distinct legal category bearing special rights.  
The term ‘indigenous peoples’ today matters a lot in international law because the 
UNDRIP has outlined an array of tailor-made collective rights for indigenous peoples,
435
 
namely: land and resources; cultural integrity; duty to consult and consent; equality and 
non-discrimination; right to participation in the national decision making; political 
autonomy; and self-determination. The term “tribal peoples” was not mentioned 
anywhere in the wordings of UNDRIP.  
Article 1 of UNDRIP affirms that “indigenous peoples have the right to full 
enjoyment, as a collective or as individuals, of all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms…”436 Concerning their right to land and resources, Article 26 says that 
“indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have 
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traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.”437 According to Gilbert and 
Doyle, it is important to note that “a profound cultural, social and spiritual relationship 
with their lands and territories is characteristic of indigenous peoples and fundamental to 
their survival.”438 The United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII) 
has also observed that “[l]and is the foundation of the lives and cultures of indigenous 
peoples all over the world. Without access to and respect for their rights over their lands, 
territories and natural resources, the survival of indigenous peoples’ particular distinct 
culture is threatened.”439 Others have suggested that the special and spiritual relationship 
with the land and natural resources is at the “core of indigenous society”.440 According to 
Professor R. A. Williams, “indigenous peoples have emphasised that the spiritual and 
material foundations of their cultural identities are sustained by their unique relationship 
to the traditional territories.”441 Further, this relationship is aptly illustrated by Professor 
James Sakej Henderson, who stated that:  
the Aboriginal vision of property was ecological space that creates our consciousness, 
not an ideological construct or fungible resource … Their vision is of different realms 
enfolded into a sacred space … it is fundamental to their identity, personality and 
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humanity …[the] notion of self does not end with their flesh, but continues with the 
reach of their senses into the land.
442
 
 
Article 13 of the ILO Convention 169, while affirming this special relationship, provides 
that “governments shall respect the special importance for the cultures and spiritual 
values of the peoples concerned of their relationship with the lands or territories, or both 
as applicable, which they occupy or otherwise use, and in particular the collective aspects 
of this relationship.”443 
With regard to their cultural integrity and preservation, UNDRIP Article 11 
affirms that “indigenous peoples have the right to practice and revitalize their cultural 
traditions and customs. This includes the right to maintain, protect and develop the past, 
present and future manifestations of their cultures …”444 Further they have the right not 
to be subjected to any forced assimilation or destruction of their culture.
445
 The preamble 
and Article 2 make it clear that indigenous peoples are equal to all other peoples and have 
the right to be free from any kinds of discrimination.
446
 Likewise, their right to participate 
in the decision making processes of the state which would affect their rights and lives are 
also affirmed in the Article 18. Further, the duty of states to seek indigenous peoples’ 
consent was clearly affirmed in Article 19 and 32. Article 19 states that: 
 [s]tates shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples 
concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free, 
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prior and informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or 
administrative measures that may affect them.
447
  
 
The principle of ‘Free, Prior and Informed Consent’ (FPIC) remains crucial because the 
problem of expropriation of indigenous peoples’ lands and resources, in the name of 
economic development and without their consent, is severe and growing.
448
 This 
widespread problem was termed by indigenous peoples as ‘development aggression’.449 
The spirit of the FPIC was recognized in the ILO Convention 169, where article 6 
provided that “governments shall consult the peoples concerned, through appropriate 
procedures and in particular through their representative institutions, whenever 
consideration is being given to legislative or administrative measures which may affect 
them directly.”450 The principle was also affirmed in various human rights treaty bodies 
such as Human Rights Committee (HRC), the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (CESCR) and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD). In the Poma-Poma v Peru case of 2009, HRC stated that for the effective 
participation of indigenous peoples in the decision-making, their FPIC was necessary.
451
 
Further CERD has, in its General Comment XXIII, stated that “no decisions directly 
relating to their [indigenous peoples] rights and interests are to be taken without their 
informed consent.”452 At the regional level, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
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in its 2007 Saramaka v Suriname case decision, cited Article 32 of UNDRIP and 
reaffirmed the requirement for FPIC, where it stated that: 
the Court considers that, regarding large-scale development or investment projects 
that would have a major impact within Saramaka territory, the state has a duty, not 
only to consult with the Saramaka, but also to obtain their free, prior, and informed 
consent, according to their customs and traditions.
453
 
 
At the national level, the Supreme Court of Canada, in the Delgamuukw v British 
Columbia case, affirmed government’s duty to consult if aboriginal people hold title to 
their land. The court went on to state that: 
[T]he fiduciary relationship between the Crown and aboriginal peoples may be 
satisfied by the involvement of aboriginal peoples in decisions taken with respect to 
their lands. There is always a duty of consultation. Whether the aboriginal group has 
been consulted is relevant to determining whether the infringement of aboriginal title 
is justified … The nature and scope of the duty of consultation will vary with the 
circumstances. In occasional cases, when the breach is less serious or relatively 
minor, it will be no more than a duty to discuss important decisions that will be taken 
with respect to lands held pursuant to aboriginal title. Of course, even in these rare 
cases when the minimum acceptable standard is consultation, this consultation must 
be in good faith … In most cases, it will be significantly deeper than mere 
consultation. Some cases may even require the full consent of an aboriginal nation.
454
 
 
UNDRIP goes even further and enshrines that “indigenous peoples, in exercising 
their right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters 
relating to their internal and local affairs …”455  Most importantly, the right to self-
                                                 
453
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determination forms the central part of all rights, without which all other provisions 
regarding indigenous peoples could not be realized. This is because the right to self-
determination enables peoples, including indigenous peoples, to freely determine their 
future political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development 
based upon the equality of all peoples. Therefore, all indigenous peoples’ rights enshrined 
in UNDRIP ultimately arise from this overarching principle of self-determination, which 
seeks to achieve equality, justice and emancipation in the international order. So, it is 
crucial to understand what is meant by indigenous self-determination, including its scope 
and limitations.  
 
6.2. Right of Self-Determination  
 
The principle of self-determination, which is closely linked with the territorial 
integrity of states, is one of the most controversial subjects of international law. Through 
history, scholars and nations were divided on the meaning and scope of the principle that 
ranges from: right of ethnic groups or nations to independent statehood; right of entire 
population of a state to its majority rule; and to the right of minority ethnic, linguistic and 
religious groups to internal democratic participatory right. Therefore, the right of self-
determination lacks universal consensus in theory as well as in practice in international 
legal discourse.
456
 The prime reason for this lies in the very nature of the principle's in-
built capabilities in influencing the very existence and disappearance of sovereign 
statehood in the international sphere. 
                                                 
456
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The origin of the principle of self-determination can be traced back to the 
Enlightenment era’s457 (18th century) most influential and powerful political ideas, 
namely, popular sovereignty and the consent of the governed.
458
 The concept of popular 
sovereignty (“sovereignty of the people”)459 as propounded by Rousseau sought to 
understand the capacity of people to determine their own future and destiny. It implies 
that people should be free to choose their own state and to determine the territorial 
boundaries of that state. Therefore, it is the will of the people or the consent of the 
governed that makes a state legitimate. The strongest proponent of the principle in the 
20
th
 century, who made it a global political principle, was US President Woodrow Wilson 
during the Paris Peace Conference at the end of the World War I. Though he advocated 
self-determination as a guiding principle
460
 in the post-war international system, critics 
soon raised objections against his conception of self-determination for being too loose, 
indeterminate
461
 and fatally ambiguous,
462
 and for by encouraging unrealistic nationalist 
aspirations it would provoke violent conflicts.
463
 Subsequently, neither the Peace Treaties 
following the World War I nor the Covenant of the League of Nations upheld Wilson’s 
ideas. Instead, the principle of territorial integrity was upheld in these international 
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initiatives
464
 to safeguard state sovereignty of existing states and maintain stability in 
international system.  
 With the adoption of the United Nations Charter, self-determination (then a 
political principle) formally became an international law principle. Thus, it became one 
of the main purposes of the UN which all its member states must observe in good faith. 
Article 1(2) of Charter provides that the UN is “to develop friendly relations among 
nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.” Initially, 
most European colonial powers resisted application of self-determination within their 
respective overseas colonial territories, but soon the momentum generated by the anti-
colonialist movement (in Asia and Africa), supported by Socialist states, shifted the 
whole emphasis of the principle from ‘self-government’ to a right to independence from 
the colonial rule.
465
 Thus it de-legitimized the very existence of European rule over these 
colonies. In 1960, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 1514(XV), the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’466 with 
an overwhelming majority. It was seen as the “Magna Carta”467 of the decolonization 
process and was meant to eradicate colonialism which most states by late 1950s had 
recognized to be a palpable evil.
468
 Article 2 of the UNGA Resolution 1514 (XV) 
specifically provided that “all peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of 
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that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development”469 and the “subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, 
domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary 
to the Charter of the United Nations …”470 Nevertheless, the meaning and definition of 
colonialism for the purpose of self-determination remains highly specific and limited 
based on the “theory of salt-water colonialism” where self-determination could only 
apply to territories which were separated from Europe by oceans or high seas.
471
 Thus it 
described colonies as “geographically separate, and distinct ethnically and culturally from 
the country administering it.”472 In this way, overland acquisitions and annexations of 
territories were excluded from consideration.  
The principle of self-determination became part of international human rights law 
in 1966 with the adoption of two human rights covenants - the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
473
 - where Common article 1 stated that “[a]ll peoples 
have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development.” 
Further, judicial pronouncements by the International Court of Justice in a number of 
decisions, such as the Namibia case (1971)
474
 and the Western Sahara case (1975),
475
 
firmly established self-determination as fundamental international legal right, especially 
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in the context of decolonization. In the East Timor case,
476
 the court noted that the 
principle of self-determination exists in positive international law and may even be 
viewed as having an erga omnes character.
477
  Nevertheless, self-determination remained 
obscure and indeterminate outside the decolonization context where it is associated with 
two basic faces
478
 namely: its classical, conservative or statist conception justifies the 
state-centric system of international law, which renders the entire state as one self-
determining unit with the preservation of its territorial integrity; and its secessionist, 
Rousseauesque and nationalist approach
479
 that challenges the formal structures of 
statehood by looking deeper into national groups as an authentic community deserving 
the right to separate statehood. Thus, Martti Koskenniemi has pointed out that self-
determination, in the end, “both supports and challenges statehood”480 and one is unable 
to consistently apply a right to self-determination precisely because one cannot 
distinguish, much less choose, between the two.
481
 This lack of a consensual definition, 
understanding and its application has prompted James Crawford to critique the right as 
lex obscura or uncertain law.
482
 So, outside the context of decolonization, the principle of 
territorial integrity of states prevails over the principle of self-determination in order to 
maintain international peace, security and territorial status quo.  
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6.3. Indigenous Self-determination 
 
The struggle of indigenous peoples, since the beginning of the 20
th
 century, was 
driven primarily by the demand for sovereignty and self-determination. Thus, they 
actively participated in the struggles for self-determination during the period of 
decolonization. But, as stated earlier, the right of self-determination was provided only to 
the colonies as a whole and not to groups within them. With the use of ‘uti possidetis’483 
and ‘salt-water theory’, indigenous peoples were effectively denied their demands for 
self-determination and sovereignty. The only route that remained available to them was 
through the mechanisms of international human rights law.  
The emergence of new international indigenous peoples’ movements in the 1970s 
led to advocacy for indigenous peoples’ cultural, economic, administrative, land and 
resources rights within the framework of state’s territorial boundaries. Since indigenous 
peoples face cultural, economic and political marginalization, they started demanding 
more participatory rights of self-government or autonomy within the larger state 
structure. Internationally, they started forming international networks of indigenous 
peoples who shared common experiences of marginalization and dispossession at the 
hands of the states, and pushed for a draft declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples. 
In the landmark 2007 UNDRIP, which was a result of decades of indigenous peoples’ 
struggle and international activism, their right to self-determination was finally affirmed. 
Article 3 states that: 
                                                 
483
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Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development.  
Article 4, further, stated that: 
Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to 
autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as 
well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions. 
  
But the scope and limitation of indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination was 
curbed by the provision of article 46 (1) of UNDRIP. According to this article: 
 Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, 
group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to 
the Charter of the United Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any 
action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity
484
 
or political unity of sovereign and independent States.  
 
A similar provision against the disruption of states’ territorial integrity was also 
affirmed in the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration,
485
 which is considered one of the 
landmark restatements of international law since the adoption of UN Charter. Here it was 
clearly stated that “any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national 
unity and territorial integrity of a State or country or at its political independence is 
incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter.”486 Therefore, outside the 
context of decolonization, positive international law affirms the territorial integrity of 
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states over the principle of self-determination. At what moment self-determination 
trumps over territorial integrity, in this context, is a matter of fact and politics rather than 
law.  
According to James Anaya, the wording of Article 3 of UNDRIP, which affirmed 
indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination is the same as those mentioned in UNGA 
Resolution 1514 and Common Article 1 in the two human rights covenants.
487
 The 
present UNDRIP supports the extension of a universal concept or right of self-
determination to indigenous peoples. But Anaya suggests that, even though the scope of 
this right is universal in nature, it does not entail the right to independent statehood in the 
classical colonial sense.
488
 Accordingly, indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination is 
based on human rights values. International law today does not deal only with states, but 
also with human beings in their individual capacity as well as collectively. As a result, 
self-determination may arise from this human rights framework rather than the traditional 
state framework.
489
 The term “Peoples’ in this context refers to those human beings who 
hold and exercise the right of self-determination collectively in relation to the “bonds of 
community or solidarity that typify human existence.”490 Thus, “the Declaration now 
identifies indigenous peoples as self-determining “peoples” … within a framework that is 
one of human rights as opposed to states’ rights”.491 Further, Anaya highlights that 
UNDRIP’s self-determination and other rights, though collective in nature, are in the end 
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human rights.
492
 This is because indigenous peoples’ rights are, in the end, formulated 
within the human rights discourse and processes. Indeed, according to Vine Deloria, Jr., 
the term ‘indigenous sovereignty’, in this modern human rights sense, is more a cultural 
integrity rather than strictly political one.
493
 With regard to other groups such as 
minorities and tribal people, no international law texts or documents provide self-
determination to these groups of people, as they are not considered collective right 
holders in international law.  
 
6.4. Customary International Law  
 
As discussed earlier, Article 38(1) (b) of the Statute of International Court of 
Justice
494
 pronounced “international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as 
law” as one of the sources of public international law. A customary norm in international 
law is said to arise when both components of ‘state practice’ and ‘opinio juris’495 are 
present.
496
 The requirement of the state practice is an objective or material element which 
places emphasis on the actual behavior of states
497
 and normally requires generality
498
 
and uniformity.
499
 The second element, referred to as opinio juris, is a psychological 
element, and it requires states’ belief that certain practices are legally binding upon 
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them.
500
 The only exception to the rule of customary international law is the persistent 
objectors rule.
501
  
Coming back to the rights of indigenous peoples and customary international law, 
though UNDRIP is not a legally binding instrument, some scholars argued that the key 
provisions within UNDRIP seem to reflect characteristics of customary international 
law.
502
 According to Siegfried Wiessner, two important provisions which could be 
expressive of customary international law are: (a) ‘right to maintain, develop and 
preserve distinct cultural identity, spirituality and traditional way of life’; and (b) ‘right to 
the lands and resources they have traditionally owned or occupied’.503 The right to 
preserve distinct identity of indigenous peoples appeared much before the Declaration 
and was the main reason behind the revision of ILO Convention 107, which was based 
upon the obsolete principle of assimilation and integration of indigenous groups into the 
larger society. Due to normative development and consensus in the 1970s and 80s on the 
need to change assimilationist approach, ILO Convention 169 was created and affirmed 
indigenous peoples’ right to cultural integrity and maintenance of distinct identity.504  
The UNDRIP was adopted in 2007 by a landslide affirmative vote of 144 states, 
and initially objected to by only four states, namely the US, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand. According to Prof. James Anaya and Siegfried Wiessner, the “Declaration 
appears to give it a more solemn ring, and takes it closer to most important policy 
statements of the organized world community – into the vicinity of instruments such as 
the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. While these documents are clearly not 
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binding as treaties, individual component prescriptions of them might have become 
binding if they can be categorized as reflective or generative of customary international 
law.”505 Even though the US initially objected to UNDRIP, the authors explained that the 
“US government recognizes Indian tribes as political entities with inherent powers of 
self-government as first peoples.”506 So, the US government, in the domestic context, 
recognized and promoted tribal self-government. Further, in its Observation on the 
Declaration, the US mentioned that it only objected to the broad language over the land 
rights.
507
 Thus, the United States’ objection was a matter of limiting interpretation of 
certain provisions, not a denial of the right itself.
508
 Canada, though recognizing 
aboriginal or indigenous rights and freedoms in its 1982 Constitution,
509
 also argued that 
it agreed with the overarching principles of the UNDRIP, but rejected the Declaration 
based on the actual text of UNDRIP. It has outlined area of concerns within the text of 
the UNDRIP such as lands, territories and resources; and free, prior and informed 
consent.
510
 At the time of its negative vote in the General Assembly, the Canadian 
Representative, Ambassador McNee, stated that: 
Canada has long demonstrated our commitment to actively advancing indigenous 
rights at home and internationally. We recognize that the situation of indigenous 
peoples around the world warrants concerted and concrete international action. 
Canada continues to make further progress at home, working within constitutional 
guarantees for aboriginal and treaty rights, and with negotiated self-government and 
land claims agreements with several aboriginal groups in Canada. Canada also 
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intends to continue active international engagement, both multilaterally and 
bilaterally. It is therefore with disappointment that we find ourselves having to vote 
against the adoption of this Declaration as drafted … However, the text that was 
presented at the Human Rights Council in June 2006 did not meet expectations and 
did not address some of our concerns. That is why Canada voted against it … 
Canada’s position has remained consistent and based on principle. We have stated 
publicly that Canada has significant concerns with respect to the wording of the 
current text, including the provisions on lands, territories and resources; on free, prior 
and informed consent when used as a veto; on self-government without recognition 
of the importance of negotiations; on intellectual property; on military issues; and on 
the need to achieve an appropriate balance between the rights and obligations of 
indigenous peoples, Member states and third parties … [T]he provisions in the 
Declaration on lands, territories and resources are overly broad and unclear and are 
susceptible of a wide variety of interpretations, discounting the need to recognize a 
range of rights over land and possibly putting into question matters that have already 
been settled by treaty in Canada. Similarly, some of the provisions dealing with the 
concept of free, prior and informed consent are unduly restrictive. Provisions such as 
article 19 provide that the State cannot act on any legislative or administrative matter 
that may affect indigenous peoples without obtaining their consent. While there are 
already strong consultation processes in place, and while Canadian courts have 
reinforced these as a matter of law, the establishment of a complete veto power over 
legislative and administrative action for a particular group would be fundamentally 
incompatible with Canada’s parliamentary system … By voting against the adoption 
of this text, Canada puts on record its disappointment with both the text’s substance 
and the process leading to it. For clarity, we also underline our understanding that 
this Declaration is not a legally binding instrument. It has no legal effect in Canada, 
and its provisions do not represent customary international law.
511
  
 
It is clear from the above statement that Canada objected to a number of provisions in the 
UNDRIP and did not consider it having any legal effect within its jurisdiction and 
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expressly denied any status of customary international law therein. Similar views was 
also taken by the representative of Australia while casting his negative vote: he expressed 
concerns over some key provisions in the Declaration such as self-determination, lands 
and resources, and the requirement of FPIC.
512
 On the question of customary 
international law, the Australian representative, Mr. Hill, stated that:   
With regard customary law, Australia is also concerned that the declaration places 
indigenous customary law in a superior position to national law. Customary law is 
not law in the sense that modern democracies use the term; it is based on culture and 
tradition. It should not override national laws and should not be used selectively to 
permit the exercise of practices by certain indigenous communities that would be 
unacceptable in the rest of the community…. In conclusion, with regard to the nature 
of the declaration, it is the clear intention of all states that it be an aspirational 
declaration with political and moral force but not legal force. It is not intended itself 
to be legally binding or reflective of international law. As this declaration does not 
describe current State practice or actions State consider themselves obliged to take as 
a matter of law, it cannot be cited as evidence of the evolution of customary 
international law.
513
  
 
It is clear from the above statement that Australia, like Canada, affirmed the 
Declaration’s moral force but expressly denied any legal obligations arising from 
UNDRIP, much less having any status of customary international law. Likewise, the 
representative of Bangladesh, while abstaining from the vote, stated that: 
… the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, in its present form, retains 
some ambiguities. In particular, indigenous peoples have not been defined or 
identified in clear terms. We had also hoped that this political Declaration would be 
able to enjoy consensus among Member States, but unfortunately that has not been 
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the case. Under those circumstances, Bangladesh was obliged to abstain in the vote 
on the draft resolution.
514
 
Bangladesh, while abstaining from the vote, raised concerns over the lack of definition of 
indigenous peoples in the declaration and implicitly denied legal status to UNDRIP by 
calling it a mere ‘political Declaration’. As discussed earlier, despite India and China’s 
objections to the lack of definition, they, along with Philippines, voted in favor of 
UNDRIP and upheld its strong legitimacy. But, it is important to note here that Canada 
and Australia’s strong objections to the legality of the declaration might very well put 
them into the category of persistent objectors.   
 
Nevertheless, on 3
rd
 April 2009, Australia formally adopted the declaration and 
was followed by the United States, Canada and New Zealand in 2010.
515
 Though 
Australia later endorsed the Declaration, it clarified that the Declaration remains 
aspirational and non-binding and does not affect existing Australian laws. Further, it 
claimed that provisions on indigenous land rights and FPIC cannot be used to impair 
Australia’s territorial integrity or political unity.516 On November 12, 2010, Canada, in its 
statement of support on UNDRIP, reaffirmed that the Declaration is an aspirational and 
“non-legally binding document that does not reflect customary international law nor 
change Canadian laws.”517 It also reaffirmed the concerns raised by Canada in its 2007 
statement on certain provisions such as land rights and FPIC, and stated that the 
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principles expressed in the declaration must be interpreted in a manner that is consistent 
with the Canadian Constitution and legal framework.
518
 
 
On the other hand, international and regional human rights courts have played a 
significant role in affirming indigenous peoples’ rights.  The Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, in the Awas Tingni judgement of 2001, affirmed the existence of an 
indigenous peoples’ collective right to its land519 and thus seemed to be expressive of 
customary international law.
520
 Similarly, the Belize Supreme Court also recognized the 
customary international legal character of indigenous peoples’ right to land and 
resources.
521
 
In the end, we can conclude that there appear to be some provisions related to the 
rights of indigenous peoples which are reflective of customary international law. Those 
are the ‘right to land and resources’ and the ‘right to cultural integrity, preservation and 
self-governance’. But there is no certainty at this point of time whether they are indeed 
customary norms of international law. The scholars and experts cautiously used the term 
such as ‘reflective’ and ‘expressive’ when they define the legal status of such rights. 
Most of the states have also not come up at this point of time to expressly (whether 
through practice or opinio juris) determine whether such rights are indeed customary 
laws. Though there appears to be increasing respect and acceptance of UNDRIP in 
theory, it is not clear whether these form a part of opinio juris with its complex 
psychological requirement of legal obligations. Further there appears to be lack of 
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uniform state practices on the rights of indigenous peoples, which render any scope and 
possibility of there being a customary of international law remote. Nevertheless, it is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to examine the depth of state practices concerning the 
question of customary international law.  
Regarding the question of definition of indigenous peoples, it is clear that there is 
no consensus at this moment among states and groups claiming to be indigenous peoples 
in international law. Nevertheless, international law-making in the last 30 years related to 
indigenous peoples had shown that groups (claiming to be indigenous) play a significant 
role in the process of norm creation. Through the development of bodies such as the 
Working Group and the Permanent Forum in the UN structure, indigenous peoples have 
emerged as subjects and makers of international law.
522
 Through their sustained efforts, 
they have “ceased to be mere objects in the discussion of their rights and become real 
participants in an extensive multilateral dialogue.”523 Due to these reasons, the legitimacy 
of the UNDRIP has been raised significantly and accepted universally.  
 
6.5. Legitimacy of UNDRIP in International Law  
 
Though the UNDRIP is not a legally binding document, its strong legitimacy in 
international law cannot be avoided. According to Claire Charters, the likelihood of 
states’ compliance will be greater if the perception of legitimacy of the Declaration is 
higher.
524
 According to her, legitimacy in this context means “the quality in international 
law norms that leads states to internalise a pull to voluntarily and habitually obey those 
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norms.”525 There are basically three factors526 which determine the legitimacy of any 
international instruments or norms, namely: (1) the quality of the process that leads to the 
establishment of certain norms; (2) content legitimacy - meaning substantive authority of 
a norm. It includes fairness, coherence and determinacy of norms; and (3) engagement 
legitimacy – meaning the extent to which states, international organizations, non-state 
groups, indigenous peoples and others engage with a norm after its establishment.
527
  
In the specific case of UNDRIP, it is clear that the process of drafting the 
declaration was transparent, orderly, and under the watch of a UN institution with the full 
inputs and participation of various groups of indigenous peoples from across the world. 
Due to strong indigenous peoples’ movements in 1970s, the UN Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (which works under the 
Commission on Human Rights) created the Working Group on Indigenous Populations in 
1982
528
 to “review developments pertaining to the promotion and protection of the human 
rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous populations.”529 The Working Group 
began the process of standard-setting with full participation from indigenous peoples’ 
representatives. Along with states, indigenous peoples equally took part and influenced 
drafting articles for the draft declaration.
530
 They met every year for a week from 1985-
1993 and the text of the Working Group grew in scope and size. The final addition to the 
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text from indigenous peoples was article 3 regarding the right to self-determination.
531
 
The draft declaration was adopted by the Sub-Commission and went to the Commission 
of Human Rights, where many states opposed the draft text. So, in 1995, the Commission 
on Human Rights created an open-ended inter-sessional working group to further 
consider the draft text.
532
 In this forum, indigenous peoples were initially excluded from 
the process, but they fought hard and got themselves back on the negotiating table and 
worked towards the inclusion of the term ‘peoples’ in the text. Despite strong resistance 
from states on the various aspects of the text, such as self-determination, land and 
resources, indigenous peoples adopted a policy of “No Change”.533 By 2006, after a long 
process of negotiation, a consensus emerged between state and indigenous peoples on the 
draft declaration, which recognized indigenous peoples’ collective rights such as self-
determination, traditional right to land and resources, and the term ‘Peoples’ was 
accepted.
534
 Finally, after more than two decades of negotiations, the text was adopted by 
the UN General Assembly in 2007 and became a landmark event in the history of world’s 
indigenous peoples. 
 In terms of UNDRIP’s substantive legitimacy, it certainly illustrates the 
requirement of fairness whose main underlying themes are equality and non-
discrimination. UNDRIP addressed the injustices done against the indigenous peoples in 
the past, and recognized them as a “Peoples” having the right to self-determination. In 
terms of coherence, indigenous peoples’ rights are not completely coherent as its 
conceptual understanding rests on various premises such as minority rights, human rights, 
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self-determination, historical sovereignty and sui generic claims.
535
 Nevertheless 
UNDRIP does provide a basic degree of clarity regarding what Indigenous Peoples’ 
rights are. In case of determinacy, the UNDRIP provided clear determinable rights of the 
Indigenous Peoples such as the right to self-determination, autonomy or self-government, 
consultation requirements and others. Finally the Declaration’s legitimacy had increased 
by the process of engagement by various international, states, non-state actors and 
Indigenous Peoples themselves.  Therefore even though it is not legally binding, states 
are bound to accept and comply more of the norms laid down in the Declaration.  
 
6.6. Conclusion 
 
In the end, we can conclude that at the moment there appears to be lack of 
consensus among scholars, states and courts over the customary international law status 
of some provisions, despite UNDRIP’s near universal acceptance and strong legitimacy 
in international law.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
In this concluding chapter, I will highlight the key findings of the research, along 
with the limitations in my analysis and suggestions for the future research.  There are four 
key findings, namely (a) the emergence of indigenous peoples as international 
lawmakers; (b) there is no single and uniform Asian perspective on the term ‘indigenous 
peoples’; (c) there are common approaches taken by Asian groups claiming to be 
indigenous; and (d) there is not sufficient evidence at the moment on customary 
international law regarding rights of indigenous peoples.  
First, despite traditional positivist understanding of international law where states 
were the only and primary subjects of international law, indigenous peoples have been 
able to assert their identity and participate in various international norm-creating 
processes related to their rights, such as UN Working Group. They have also taken a 
multi-layered approach to the indigenous norm creating process, including both bottom-
up and top-down approaches. They started their rights activism and movements from the 
bottom-up approach by creating indigenous peoples’ organizations and conferences, 
which helped to create and spread knowledge of the indigenous issues, aspirations and 
rights. Then they took part in the UN bodies and helped create a consensual draft 
declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples which was finally adopted by the UN 
General Assembly. In terms of a top-down approach, indigenous peoples have 
approached various treaty bodies and mechanisms and seek compliance from states. Due 
to these sustained efforts, indigenous peoples were able to identify core normative 
precepts which facilitated the recognition of a distinct legal category of ‘indigenous 
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peoples’ in international law. Thus, they finally emerged as participants and makers of 
international human rights law.
536
 
Second, as shown in the Chapter 4 and 5, there was no single Asian perspective 
on the definition and identity of indigenous peoples in international law. The views of the 
Asian states, such as China, India and Bangladesh, suggest opposition to the use of the 
term within their jurisdiction based in part on the claim that all people within these states 
were indigenous to the land.  Whereas the Philippines, following Japan and Taiwan in 
Asia, constitutionally recognized their cultural groups (who claimed such status) as 
indigenous to the land they belong.
537
 The views of the Asian groups differ from the 
states’ views, as the groups primarily rely on the internationally accepted principle of 
self-identification and seek recognition from other indigenous peoples and 
organizations.
538
 In the case of the Uyghur and Tibetan peoples, they have not been able 
to participate and seek recognition from other indigenous groups around the world.   
Third, most of the Asian groups take a common approach to the definition and 
identification of indigenous peoples. As mentioned in chapter 4, there are three broad 
approaches namely, legal/analytical, practical/strategic and collective/global approaches. 
The legal/analytical approach seeks to find out strict legal requirements or criteria for the 
definition of indigenous peoples, which automatically leaves out many groups identifying 
themselves as indigenous peoples. The practical/strategic approach to definition, which is 
endorsed by the UN system, seeks to bring indigenous peoples’ identity within the rubric 
of human rights. This approach provides opportunity for groups claiming to be 
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indigenous to self-identify themselves and seek recognition from states and indigenous 
groups and organizations. The collective/global approach, which is informally based on 
indigenous global solidarity, also endorses self-identification as a legitimate process 
within international law. Where most of the Asian states follow legal/analytical approach, 
Asian groups tend to follow practical/strategic and collective/global approaches to 
definition. Most of the Asian groups such as Jummas, Nagas, Boros, Chakmas, Tibetans, 
Uyghurs and others take common approach to the definition and identification of 
indigenous peoples.
539
 Further, they have, following on the footsteps of international 
indigenous peoples’ movements, self-identified as indigenous peoples at various 
international forums dealing with issues concerning indigenous peoples. Thus these 
groups can be said to fall within the distinct international legal category of ‘indigenous 
peoples’. Within the modern international human rights law framework where indigenous 
peoples have emerged as makers of international law, the approaches taken by Asian 
groups on the definition and identification conform to global movement of indigenous 
peoples as makers of international law. The question of definition and identity of 
‘indigenous peoples’ in Asia cannot be determined without taking into account the views 
and aspirations of groups therein. To this end, I conclude that the views and aspirations of 
Asian groups should and must matter when determining definition and identity of 
indigenous peoples in Asia.  
Fourth, there is little evidence at the moment on the question of customary 
international law concerning indigenous peoples’ rights.  Though scholars argue in favour 
of some indigenous rights attaining the status of customary norm, there is no clear and 
uniform evidence of state practice and opinio juris on these matters. As indigenous 
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peoples are increasingly playing significant participatory role in the lawmaking, it 
remains to be seen to what extent they play a role in the formation of customary 
international law. To that end, there is need for further in-depth research into this matter. 
Regarding self-identification and recognition, it is clear that the process of 
defining indigenous peoples in international law cannot proceed without the role played 
by groups claiming to be indigenous. Though traditional international law provides space 
and voice only to the states, the trend has appeared in the last 30 years particularly in 
relation to the rights of indigenous peoples that indigenous peoples are equally makers of 
international law. Thus indigenous voices related to the definition of the term ‘indigenous 
peoples’ are indispensable and shall be taken into account. In support of this proposition, 
and as discussed earlier, the principle of self-identification has emerged as standard 
practice for determining the identity of indigenous peoples. Often recognition from the 
states/governments to groups’ self-identifications was not forthcoming and in the process 
those groups (claiming to be indigenous) ends up deprived of their indigenous rights. 
Nevertheless, seeking recognition from other indigenous groups is a legitimate and 
important element in the process of self-identification, therefore such recognition are 
usually provided by other groups on the basis of some basic and common characteristics 
unique to the situation of indigenous peoples. These common characteristics or indicators 
for the process of self-identification could be found within UNDRIP and ILO Convention 
169’s indigenous rights provisions, namely: traditional and spiritual connection to lands 
and natural resources (Article 25, 26 of UNDRIP/Article 13 of Convention 169); 
historical disruption caused by either colonialism or at the time of establishing present 
state boundaries (Para 6 of UNDRIP’s Preamble/Article 1(1)(b) of Convention 169); non-
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dominance within the state; distinct social, economic and political system (Article 5, 34 
and 20 of UNDRIP); right to maintain their distinct cultural integrity (Article 11 of 
UNDRIP); right to consultation and consent (Article 10, 19 and 32 of UNDRIP/Article 6 
of Convention 169); right to self-determination (Article 3 of UNDRIP); and indigenous 
peoples’ status as collective right holders (Article 1 of UNDRIP).  Here it is important to 
note that further in-depth research is needed on the principle of self-identification, its 
requirements and processes. Even though these provisions (indicators) may play a part in 
the process of self-identification and recognition, they themselves represent rights of 
already determined indigenous peoples. Thus more study is needed to understand this 
complex relationship between self-identification and recognition.   
Coming to the limitations of the research findings, I have relied mainly on the 
views of the states and Asian groups from their statements and submissions to the UN 
mechanisms and the World Bank mechanism. I was unable to search for court cases, 
decisions and jurisprudence within these Asian states, which might have shown me 
further evidence on the question of definition and identity of indigenous peoples had I 
looked into it. Likewise, I have not relied on other international human rights 
mechanisms that are not focused on indigenous peoples.  
Further, I would like to suggest that there is a need for thorough and in-depth 
research on the question of definition and identification of indigenous peoples in Asia. 
For that purpose, the study and analysis of each Asian states and groups on their stand on 
the definition is extremely crucial in order for the norms of indigenous peoples to realize 
true universality. It is also important to do thorough research on the question of 
customary international law regarding the rights of indigenous peoples. An in-depth study 
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of the state practice and opinio juris of states who endorsed UNDRIP is also necessary. 
As discussed in above, more in-depth research is also needed on the principle of self-
identification, recognition and their requirements and processes.  
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APPENDIX 
 
 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples  
 
Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 61/295 on 13 September 2007 
 
The General Assembly, 
Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and good 
faith in the fulfillment of the obligations assumed by States in accordance with the 
Charter, 
 
Affirming that indigenous peoples are equal to all other peoples, while recognizing the 
right of all peoples to be different, to consider themselves different, and to be respected 
as such, 
 
Affirming also that all peoples contribute to the diversity and richness of civilizations and 
cultures, which constitute the common heritage of humankind, 
 
Affirming further that all doctrines, policies and practices based on or advocating 
superiority of peoples or individuals on the basis of national origin or racial, religious, 
ethnic or cultural differences are racist, scientifically false, legally invalid, morally 
condemnable and socially unjust, 
 
Reaffirming that indigenous peoples, in the exercise of their rights, should be free from 
discrimination of any kind, 
 
Concerned that indigenous peoples have suffered from historic injustices as a result of, 
inter alia, their colonization and dispossession of their lands, territories and resources, 
thus preventing them from exercising, in particular, their right to development in 
accordance with their own needs and interests, 
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Recognizing the urgent need to respect and promote the inherent rights of indigenous 
peoples which derive from their political, economic and social structures and from their 
cultures, spiritual traditions, histories and philosophies, especially their rights to their 
lands, territories and resources, 
 
Recognizing also the urgent need to respect and promote the rights of indigenous peoples 
affirmed in treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements with States, 
 
Welcoming the fact that indigenous peoples are organizing themselves for political, 
economic, social and cultural enhancement and in order to bring to an end all forms of 
discrimination and oppression wherever they occur, 
 
Convinced that control by indigenous peoples over developments affecting them and their 
lands, territories and resources will enable them to maintain and strengthen their 
institutions, cultures and traditions, and to promote their development in accordance with 
their aspirations and needs, 
 
Recognizing that respect for indigenous knowledge, cultures and traditional practices 
contributes to sustainable and equitable development and proper management of the 
environment, 
 
Emphasizing the contribution of the demilitarization of the lands and territories of 
indigenous peoples to peace, economic and social progress and development, 
understanding and friendly relations among nations and peoples of the world, 
 
Recognizing in particular the right of indigenous families and communities to retain 
shared responsibility for the upbringing, training, education and well-being of their 
children, consistent with the rights of the child, 
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Considering that the rights affirmed in treaties, agreements and other constructive 
arrangements between States and indigenous peoples are, in some situations, matters of 
international concern, interest, responsibility and character, 
 
Considering also that treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements, and the 
relationship they represent, are the basis for a strengthened partnership between 
indigenous peoples and States, 
 
Acknowledging that the Charter of the United Nations, the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
540
  and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights,2 as well as the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action,
541
  affirm 
the fundamental importance of the right to self-determination of all peoples, by virtue of 
which they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social 
and cultural development, 
 
Bearing in mind that nothing in this Declaration may be used to deny any peoples their 
right to self-determination, exercised in conformity with international law, 
 
Convinced that the recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples in this Declaration will 
enhance harmonious and cooperative relations between the State and indigenous peoples, 
based on principles of justice, democracy, respect for human rights, non-discrimination 
and good faith, 
 
Encouraging States to comply with and effectively implement all their obligations as they 
apply to indigenous peoples under international instruments, in particular those related to 
human rights, in consultation and cooperation with the peoples concerned, 
 
Emphasizing that the United Nations has an important and continuing role to play in 
promoting and protecting the rights of indigenous peoples, 
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Believing that this Declaration is a further important step forward for the recognition, 
promotion and protection of the rights and freedoms of indigenous peoples and in the 
development of relevant activities of the United Nations system in this field, 
 
Recognizing and reaffirming that indigenous individuals are entitled without 
discrimination to all human rights recognized in international law, and that indigenous 
peoples possess collective rights which are indispensable for their existence, well-being 
and integral development as peoples, 
 
Recognizing that the situation of indigenous peoples varies from region to region and 
from country to country and that the significance of national and regional particularities 
and various historical and cultural backgrounds should be taken into consideration, 
 
Solemnly proclaims the following United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples as a standard of achievement to be pursued in a spirit of partnership 
and mutual respect: 
 
Article 1 
Indigenous peoples have the right to the full enjoyment, as a collective or as individuals, 
of all human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognized in the Charter of the United 
Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
542
 and international human rights 
law. 
 
Article 2 
Indigenous peoples and individuals are free and equal to all other peoples and individuals 
and have the right to be free from any kind of discrimination, in the exercise of their 
rights, in particular that based on their indigenous origin or identity. 
 
Article 3 
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Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development. 
 
Article 4 
Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to 
autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well 
as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions. 
 
Article 5 
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, 
economic, social and cultural institutions, while retaining their right to participate fully, if 
they so choose, in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the State. 
 
Article 6 
Every indigenous individual has the right to a nationality. 
 
Article 7 
1. Indigenous individuals have the rights to life, physical and mental integrity, liberty and 
security of person. 
2. Indigenous peoples have the collective right to live in freedom, peace and security as 
distinct peoples and shall not be subjected to any act of genocide or any other act of 
violence, including forcibly removing children of the group to another group. 
 
Article 8 
1. Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right not to be subjected to forced 
assimilation or destruction of their culture. 
2. States shall provide effective mechanisms for prevention of, and redress for: 
(a) Any action which has the aim or effect of depriving them of their integrity as distinct 
peoples, or of their cultural values or ethnic identities; 
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(b) Any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands, territories 
or resources; 
(c) Any form of forced population transfer which has the aim or effect of violating or 
undermining any of their rights; 
(d) Any form of forced assimilation or integration; 
(e) Any form of propaganda designed to promote or incite racial or ethnic discrimination 
directed against them. 
 
Article 9 
Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right to belong to an indigenous community 
or nation, in accordance with the traditions and customs of the community or nation 
concerned. No discrimination of any kind may arise from the exercise of such a right. 
 
Article 10 
Indigenous peoples shall not be forcibly removed from their lands or territories. No 
relocation shall take place without the free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous 
peoples concerned and after agreement on just and fair compensation and, where 
possible, with the option of return. 
 
Article 11 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to practise and revitalize their cultural traditions and 
customs. This includes the right to maintain, protect and develop the past, present and 
future manifestations of their cultures, such as archaeological and historical sites, 
artefacts, designs, ceremonies, technologies and visual and performing arts and literature. 
2. States shall provide redress through effective mechanisms, which may include 
restitution, developed in conjunction with indigenous peoples, with respect to their 
cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property taken without their free, prior and 
informed consent or in violation of their laws, traditions and customs. 
 
Article 12 
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1. Indigenous peoples have the right to manifest, practise, develop and teach their 
spiritual and religious traditions, customs and ceremonies; the right to maintain, protect, 
and have access in privacy to their religious and cultural sites; the right to the use and 
control of their ceremonial objects; and the right to the repatriation of their human 
remains. 
2. States shall seek to enable the access and/or repatriation of ceremonial objects and 
human remains in their possession through fair, transparent and effective mechanisms 
developed in conjunction with indigenous peoples concerned. 
 
Article 13 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to revitalize, use, develop and transmit to future 
generations their histories, languages, oral traditions, philosophies, writing systems and 
literatures, and to designate and retain their own names for communities, places and 
persons. 
2. States shall take effective measures to ensure that this right is protected and also to 
ensure that indigenous peoples can understand and be understood in political, legal and 
administrative proceedings, where necessary through the provision of interpretation or by 
other appropriate means. 
 
Article 14 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to establish and control their educational systems 
and institutions providing education in their own languages, in a manner appropriate to 
their cultural methods of teaching and learning. 
2. Indigenous individuals, particularly children, have the right to all levels and forms of 
education of the State without discrimination. 
3. States shall, in conjunction with indigenous peoples, take effective measures, in order 
for indigenous individuals, particularly children, including those living outside their 
communities, to have access, when possible, to an education in their own culture and 
provided in their own language. 
 
Article 15 
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1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the dignity and diversity of their cultures, 
traditions, histories and aspirations which shall be appropriately reflected in education 
and public information. 
2. States shall take effective measures, in consultation and cooperation with the 
indigenous peoples concerned, to combat prejudice and eliminate discrimination and to 
promote tolerance, understanding and good relations among indigenous peoples and all 
other segments of society. 
 
Article 16 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to establish their own media in their own languages 
and to have access to all forms of non-indigenous media without discrimination. 
2. States shall take effective measures to ensure that State-owned media duly reflect 
indigenous cultural diversity. States, without prejudice to ensuring full freedom of 
expression, should encourage privately owned media to adequately reflect indigenous 
cultural diversity. 
 
Article 17 
1. Indigenous individuals and peoples have the right to enjoy fully all rights established 
under applicable international and domestic labour law. 
2. States shall in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples take specific 
measures to protect indigenous children from economic exploitation and from performing 
any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child’s education, or to be 
harmful to the child’s health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development, 
taking into account their special vulnerability and the importance of education for their 
empowerment. 
3. Indigenous individuals have the right not to be subjected to any discriminatory 
conditions of labour and, inter alia, employment or salary. 
 
Article 18 
Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in decision-making in matters which 
would affect their rights, through representatives chosen by themselves in accordance 
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with their own procedures, as well as to maintain and develop their own indigenous 
decision-making institutions. 
 
Article 19 
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned 
through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free, prior and 
informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative 
measures that may affect them. 
 
Article 20 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and develop their political, economic 
and social systems or institutions, to be secure in the enjoyment of their own means of 
subsistence and development, and to engage freely in all their traditional and other 
economic activities. 
2. Indigenous peoples deprived of their means of subsistence and development are 
entitled to just and fair redress. 
 
Article 21 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right, without discrimination, to the improvement of their 
economic and social conditions, including, inter alia, in the areas of education, 
employment, vocational training and retraining, housing, sanitation, health and social 
security. 
2. States shall take effective measures and, where appropriate, special measures to ensure 
continuing improvement of their economic and social conditions. Particular attention 
shall be paid to the rights and special needs of indigenous elders, women, youth, children 
and persons with disabilities. 
 
Article 22 
1. Particular attention shall be paid to the rights and special needs of indigenous elders, 
women, youth, children and persons with disabilities in the implementation of this 
Declaration. 
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2. States shall take measures, in conjunction with indigenous peoples, to ensure that 
indigenous women and children enjoy the full protection and guarantees against all forms 
of violence and discrimination. 
 
Article 23 
Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for 
exercising their right to development. In particular, indigenous peoples have the right to 
be actively involved in developing and determining health, housing and other economic 
and social programmes affecting them and, as far as possible, to administer such 
programmes through their own institutions. 
 
Article 24 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to their traditional medicines and to maintain their 
health practices, including the conservation of their vital medicinal plants, animals and 
minerals. Indigenous individuals also have the right to access, without any 
discrimination, to all social and health services. 
2. Indigenous individuals have an equal right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health. States shall take the necessary steps with a view 
to achieving progressively the full realization of this right. 
 
Article 25 
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual 
relationship with their traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and used lands, 
territories, waters and coastal seas and other resources and to uphold their responsibilities 
to future generations in this regard. 
 
Article 26 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they 
have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired. 
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2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories 
and resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional 
occupation or use, as well as those which they have otherwise acquired. 
3. States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories and 
resources. Such recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the customs, traditions 
and land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned. 
 
Article 27 
States shall establish and implement, in conjunction with indigenous peoples concerned, 
a fair, independent, impartial, open and transparent process, giving due recognition to 
indigenous peoples’ laws, traditions, customs and land tenure systems, to recognize and 
adjudicate the rights of indigenous peoples pertaining to their lands, territories and 
resources, including those which were traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used. 
Indigenous peoples shall have the right to participate in this process. 
 
Article 28 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to redress, by means that can include restitution or, 
when this is not possible, just, fair and equitable compensation, for the lands, territories 
and resources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used, and 
which have been confiscated, taken, occupied, used or damaged without their free, prior 
and informed consent. 
2. Unless otherwise freely agreed upon by the peoples concerned, compensation shall 
take the form of lands, territories and resources equal in quality, size and legal status or of 
monetary compensation or other appropriate redress. 
 
Article 29 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the conservation and protection of the 
environment and the productive capacity of their lands or territories and resources. States 
shall establish and implement assistance programmes for indigenous peoples for such 
conservation and protection, without discrimination. 
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2. States shall take effective measures to ensure that no storage or disposal of hazardous 
materials shall take place in the lands or territories of indigenous peoples without their 
free, prior and informed consent. 
3. States shall also take effective measures to ensure, as needed, that programmes for 
monitoring, maintaining and restoring the health of indigenous peoples, as developed and 
implemented by the peoples affected by such materials, are duly implemented. 
 
Article 30 
1. Military activities shall not take place in the lands or territories of indigenous peoples, 
unless justified by a relevant public interest or otherwise freely agreed with or requested 
by the indigenous peoples concerned. 
2. States shall undertake effective consultations with the indigenous peoples concerned, 
through appropriate procedures and in particular through their representative institutions, 
prior to using their lands or territories for military activities. 
 
Article 31 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their 
cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions, as well as the 
manifestations of their sciences, technologies and cultures, including human and genetic 
resources, seeds, medicines, knowledge of the properties of fauna and flora, oral 
traditions, literatures, designs, sports and traditional games and visual and performing 
arts. They also have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their intellectual 
property over such cultural heritage, traditional knowledge, and traditional cultural 
expressions. 
2. In conjunction with indigenous peoples, States shall take effective measures to 
recognize and protect the exercise of these rights. 
 
Article 32 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for 
the development or use of their lands or territories and other resources. 
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2. States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned 
through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed 
consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other 
resources, particularly in connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of 
mineral, water or other resources. 
3. States shall provide effective mechanisms for just and fair redress for any such 
activities, and appropriate measures shall be taken to mitigate adverse environmental, 
economic, social, cultural or spiritual impact. 
 
Article 33 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine their own identity or membership in 
accordance with their customs and traditions. This does not impair the right of indigenous 
individuals to obtain citizenship of the States in which they live. 
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine the structures and to select the 
membership of their institutions in accordance with their own procedures. 
 
Article 34 
Indigenous peoples have the right to promote, develop and maintain their institutional 
structures and their distinctive customs, spirituality, traditions, procedures, practices and, 
in the cases where they exist, juridical systems or customs, in accordance with 
international human rights standards. 
 
Article 35 
Indigenous peoples have the right to determine the responsibilities of individuals to their 
communities. 
 
Article 36 
1. Indigenous peoples, in particular those divided by international borders, have the right 
to maintain and develop contacts, relations and cooperation, including activities for 
spiritual, cultural, political, economic and social purposes, with their own members as 
well as other peoples across borders. 
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2. States, in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples, shall take effective 
measures to facilitate the exercise and ensure the implementation of this right. 
 
Article 37 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the recognition, observance and enforcement of 
treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements concluded with States or their 
successors and to have States honour and respect such treaties, agreements and other 
constructive arrangements. 
2. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as diminishing or eliminating the rights 
of indigenous peoples contained in treaties, agreements and other constructive 
arrangements. 
 
Article 38 
States in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples, shall take the appropriate 
measures, including legislative measures, to achieve the ends of this Declaration. 
 
Article 39 
Indigenous peoples have the right to have access to financial and technical assistance 
from States and through international cooperation, for the enjoyment of the rights 
contained in this Declaration. 
 
Article 40 
Indigenous peoples have the right to access to and prompt decision through just and fair 
procedures for the resolution of conflicts and disputes with States or other parties, as well 
as to effective remedies for all infringements of their individual and collective rights. 
Such a decision shall give due consideration to the customs, traditions, rules and legal 
systems of the indigenous peoples concerned and international human rights. 
 
Article 41 
The organs and specialized agencies of the United Nations system and other 
intergovernmental organizations shall contribute to the full realization of the provisions 
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of this Declaration through the mobilization, inter alia, of financial cooperation and 
technical assistance. Ways and means of ensuring participation of indigenous peoples on 
issues affecting them shall be established. 
 
Article 42 
The United Nations, its bodies, including the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, and 
specialized agencies, including at the country level, and States shall promote respect for 
and full application of the provisions of this Declaration and follow up the effectiveness 
of this Declaration. 
 
Article 43 
The rights recognized herein constitute the minimum standards for the survival, dignity 
and well-being of the indigenous peoples of the world. 
 
Article 44 
All the rights and freedoms recognized herein are equally guaranteed to male and female 
indigenous individuals. 
 
Article 45 
Nothing in this Declaration may be construed as diminishing or extinguishing the rights 
indigenous peoples have now or may acquire in the future. 
 
Article 46 
1. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, group 
or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter 
of the United Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would 
dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of 
sovereign and independent States. 
2. In the exercise of the rights enunciated in the present Declaration, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of all shall be respected. The exercise of the rights set forth in this 
Declaration shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law and in 
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accordance with international human rights obligations. Any such limitations shall be 
non-discriminatory and strictly necessary solely for the purpose of securing due 
recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for meeting the just and 
most compelling requirements of a democratic society. 
3. The provisions set forth in this Declaration shall be interpreted in accordance with the 
principles of justice, democracy, respect for human rights, equality, non-discrimination, 
good governance and good faith. 
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